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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Swain v.
Alabama I and its more recent 1986 decision, Batson v. Kentucky, 2 gen-
erated a plethora of scholarly commentary concerning the racially
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge. 3 Although most
1 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (rejecting the argument that the state's use of the peremp-
tory challenge to exclude African-American jurors violated the equal protection clause).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (state's use of peremptory challenge is subject to commands
of the equal protection clause when a defendant establishes a prima facie case that a
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors of defendant's
race).
3 A peremptory challenge is a "challenge to a juror to be exercised by a party to a
civil action or criminal prosecution without assignment of reason or cause," and is lim-
[Vol. 76:1
1990] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 3
scholars have condemned Swain as a green light to prosecutors' use
of the peremptory challenge to disqualify African-American jurors,4
and many have criticized the effectiveness of the Batson remedy, 5 few
ited in number by statute. BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 933 (3d ed. 1969). Such chal-
lenges are distinct from challenges for cause which require ajudicial finding that there is
a "narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of [a juror's] partiality."
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. Challenges for cause are unlimited, but are frequently denied by
trial courts because of the difficulty of establishing a juror's bias during voir dire or jury
selection. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderfid Power", 27 STAN.
L. REv. 545, 546-50 (1975). This commentator noted that cause challenges rarely pro-
vide "effective[ ] screen[ing] [of] those who share biases and prejudices common to a
racial or ethnic group" unless those jurors admit their biases. Id at 554; see also infra
note 585.
4 JoN M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMrrMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 166-67 (1977); Frederick L. Brown, Frank T. McGuire &
Mary S. Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Tials: Tradi-
tional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 197 (1978); Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury
Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247, 268-70 (1973); Roger
Kuhn,Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 283-303 (1968); John
Andrew Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His Peerless
jury, 4 Hous. L. REv. 448 (1966); BruceJ. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practice
in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1982);
Note, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection-Limiting the prosecutor's right of peremptory chal-
lenge to prevent a systematic exclusion of blacks from criminal trial juries. United States v. Robinson,
41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977); Note, The Defendant's Right to Oject to Prosecutorial Misuse of the
Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770 (1979); Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic
Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967) (authored by
Gary L. Geeslin); Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970) (authored by
Harold A. McDougall, III) [hereinafter Black Juries]; Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (authored by Bradley S.
Philips); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322, 325 (1965); Recent Deci-
sion,Juries-Systematic Exercise of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Negro Jurors May Violate the
Equal Protection Clause, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 588 (authored by David W. Schoenberg); Com-
ment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due
Process, 18 ST. Louis U.LJ. 662 (1974) (authored by Lisa Van Amburg); Comment,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA.
L. REv. 1157 (1966) (authored by. F.R.D.) [hereinafter Blueprint]. Some commentators
have defended Swain and the unfettered use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Stephan
A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337 (1982); Irving Younger, Unlawful Peremptory
Challenges, 7 LITIGATION 23 (Fall 1980).
5 Batson represented a significant improvement from Swain's "insurmountable"
defense burden of proving that a prosecutor systematically excluded African-American
jurors over a substantial time period. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. Once the defense estab-
lishes prima facie evidence of racial exclusion, Batson requires the prosecutor to provide
a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Justice Marshall's fear that
a skilled prosecutor could easily meet this burden has since been confirmed by court
decisions and has been the subject of commentators' criticism. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-
06 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra notes 492-515 and accompanying text; see also Al-
bert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153 (1989); BrianJ. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism,
Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1988); Developments, Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1581 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Ha f Step in the Right
Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal
Protection), 72 CORNE L. REv. 1025 (1987) (authored by Jonathan B. Mintz) [hereinaf-
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have addressed the crux of the wrong to be remedied: the inherent
injustice of the all-white jury.6 Further, commentators have relied
exclusively on the procedural protections supplied by the four-
teenth7 and sixth8 amendments in their analyses of these cases.
While this procedure-oriented approach is important, it fails 9 to en-
ter Half Step]; Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection, the Fair Cross-Section Requirement,
and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY LJ. 755 (1988) (authored by
Robert William Rodriguez) [hereinafter Fair Cross-Section]; Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L.
REV. 811, 811-41 (1988) (authored by David D. Hopper).
6 Most commentators have emphasized the accused's right to object to the racially
discriminatory peremptory challenge on the grounds of either fourteenth amendment
equal protection or the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. They have largely
ignored the consequences of selecting an all-white jury to judge an African-American
defendant or crime victim. Only a few scholars have focused specifically on the all-white
jury as the constitutional wrong to be remedied. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the WhiteJury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611 (1985); Kuhn, supra note 4, at 290-93;
Black Juries, supra note 4; Blueprint, supra note 4.
7 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. For articles that base their criticism of Swain on fourteenth
amendment equal protection grounds, see supra note 4. See also Alschuler, supra note 5;
Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1013
(1989) (prosecutor's peremptory challenge violates the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause).
8 The sixth amendment states, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
Articles that criticize Swain on sixth amendment grounds include Brown, McGuire &
Winters, supra note 4; Robert L. Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 385 (1985); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or
Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REV. 501
(1986); Note, Systematic Exclusion of Cognizable Groups by Use of Peremptory Challenges, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927 (1983) (authored by Stephen W. Dicker); Note, Batson v. Ken-
nedy: Sixth Amendment Remedy in Equal Protection Clothes, 22 GONz. L. REv. 377 (1986/87)
(authored by William D. DeVoe) [hereinafter Sixth Amendment Remedy]; Note, Skin Color
Doesn't Reason: Closing the Door on the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 64 U. DEr.
L. REV. 171 (1986) (authored by Brian K. Zahra); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Mean-
ing ofJury Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177 (1980) (authored by John Collier Harrison).
9 The shortcomings of the fourteenth and sixth amendment remedies are seen in
the relative ease with which a prosecutor may overcome a black defendant's objection to
striking a prospective black juror by providing a race-neutral, trial related explanation.
See infra notes 492-515 and accompanying text. With respect to a white defendant ac-
cused of committing a crime against an African-American, the same limitation applies:
the defense will often be able to provide a racially neutral reason for dismissing an
African-American juror.
I also disagree with a sixth or fourteenth amendment analysis to the extent that
some courts and commentators have interpreted those amendments to permit the pros-
ecution to object to a defendant's use of peremptory challenges in every criminal case.
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sure that African-Americans are not peremptorily excluded from ju-
ries hearing cases in which either a member of the black community
is accused by a white complainant or a black victim seeks vindication
against a white perpetrator. 10
A thirteenth amendment" analysis of the racially discrimina-
tory use of the peremptory challenge avoids this limitation by focus-
ing on the outcome of the jury selection process: the trial jury's racial
composition. Historical evidence and recent sociological data 12
show that all-white juries are unable to be impartial in cases involv-
ing the rights of African-American defendants or crime victims.
Since the beginning of slavery, the all-white jury has represented the
ultimate obstacle to justice for African-American criminal defen-
dants. Similarly, in the face of white juries, African-American crime
victims have been unable to secure legal protection in the rare in-
See infra notes 463 & 497. Under this Article's thirteenth amendment analysis, the de-
fendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges would be preserved except in the lim-
ited instance of the interracial case where a white defendant seeks to eliminate
prospective black jurors and achieve an all-white jury. See infra note 24.
10 This article focuses on African-Americans' exclusion as trial jurors. A similar
thirteenth amendment analysis would apply to other racially cognizable groups which
can demonstrate a history of discrimination associated with second-class citizenship, or
comparable conditions of involuntary servitude. See Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1019, 1026 (1969)
(arguing that "all who suffer under 'badges and incidents' of second class citizenship are
beneficiaries of the thirteenth amendment") [hereinafter Anti-Discrimination Laws]; infra
note 153 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intention in passing the thir-
teenth amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and recent judicial clarification that
the Act's protections include many groups not previously enslaved); cf. Note, The "New"
Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 H.Av. L. REv. 1294 (1969) (limiting the
thirteenth amendment to African-Americans and possibly Asian-Americans) [hereinafter
A Preliminary Analysis]. While this Article emphasizes race discrimination, the thirteenth
amendment's protection may also apply to any cognizable group that shares characteris-
tics with racial groups subjected to involuntary servitude.
11 Section one of the thirteenth amendment provides that "neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to her jurisdic-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Section two states that "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery includes the elimination of its
badges and incidents. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (con-
struing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to bar racial discrimination by private persons in the
sale of real property in light of the thirteenth amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883); infra notes 510-22 and accompanying text.
12 Professor Johnson analyzed social scientists' research in determining whether a
juror's racial bias affects a jury's determination of guilt. Based on these studies and
additional research material, Professor Johnson concluded that all-white juries fail to
give the benefit of the doubt to an accused African-American defendant, and are also
less concerned with vindicating the rights of Afican-Alnerican crime victims than those
of white victims. Johnson suggests that a minimum of three black jurors is necessary to
ensure an impartial jury verdict in interracial cases. Johnson, supra note 6; see infra notes
548-63 and accompanying text.
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stances where white people are prosecuted for interracial violence. 1 3
Moreover, the continued disqualification of black jurors remains a
badge signifying the subordinate status of people of African ances-
try. Consequently, such racially-based peremptory challenges vio-
late the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against slavery and its
incidents.
When the thirteenth amendment was ratified in 1865,14 it em-
bodied the marshalling of national power to abolish the American
slavery system, including its badges and incidents. The thirteenth
amendment's substantive jury protections stem from the under-
standing that slavery's incidents included denying legal justice and
maintaining inferior citizenship status for African-American people.
The amendment and its derivative statute, the Civil Rights Act of
1866,15 were quickly buried by the forces of reaction to Reconstruc-
tion and by narrow judicial construction. Current judicial interpre-
tation, however, has soundly discredited a limited view of the
federal government's thirteenth amendment powers. Indeed, the
powerful potential of the thirteenth amendment to eradicate current
vestiges of slavery has gained some recognition in the courts. It
should now be extended to the racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges in criminal and civil cases.
It is the author's view that the racially discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge cannot survive thirteenth amendment scru-
tiny. Such application of the amendment goes to the heart of the
equal justice and fair trial impulses that underlay the passage of the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This novel
approach provides the most far-reaching impetus for eliminating
this courtroom vestige of slavery and for assuring the inclusion of
African-American jurors.
Part One of this Article analyzes the peremptory challenge's
original objective of protecting an accused's right to be judged by
13 For purposes of providing a thirteenth amendment analysis of the racially dis-
criminatory use of the peremptory challenge, I include unredressed violence committed
by white civilians as well as law enforcement officials. Professor Charles Jones convinc-
ingly argues that the thirteenth amendment is the source of constitutional power for
prosecuting individual acts of racially motivated violence. Charles Jones, An Argumentfor
Federal Protection Against Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 689 (1986).
14 The thirteenth amendment was introduced in March 1864, but failed to receive
the two-thirds vote necessary to forward it to the states for ratification. It was reintro-
duced in January 1865 and won congressional approval on January 31, 1865, three
months prior to General Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.
See ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
64, 73 (1988); infra note 144. The thirteenth amendment was certified by the Secretary
of State on December 18, 1865. 13 Stat. 774 (1865).
15 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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an impartial jury.16 For more than 500 years, English common law
and American statutory law recognized the defendant's exclusive
right to peremptorily strike jurors. The defendant's peremptory
challenge was one of many fair trial protections systematically de-
nied African-Americans during two centuries of slavery law in this
country.
Part Two reviews the colonial and post-revolutionary American
legal systems in which the denial of legal justice to African-
Americans, and legalization of violence against them, were funda-
mental to maintaining the institution of slavery.1 7 The blanket re-
jection of African-Americans as trial jurors was usually accompanied
by their systematic disqualification as witnesses and litigants. Where
slavery existed within a colony or state, an accused black was often
summarily punished at the whim of his or her owner. In the infre-
quent instances when an accused black was allowed a trial, he or she
was tried and punished in an all-white court system in which the
defendant could neither testify nor seek civil redress against a white
person. Although most northern blacks gained access to the regular
court system by the middle of the nineteenth century, their testi-
mony, when permitted against a white person, was rendered virtu-
ally meaningless by all-white juries.
Part Three reviews the legislative intent of the thirteenth
amendment and the first civil rights statute, the Civil Rights Act of
1866. This Article argues that one of the thirteenth amendment's
primary objectives was to assure equal justice and universal freedom
for African-American people. Indeed, the 1866 Civil Rights Act ex-
panded blacks' freedom by granting them equal access to the legal
system as witnesses and litigants, and by guaranteeing that they
could enjoy the benefit of all laws for the protection of person and
property18 through the Act's federal removal section. After review-
ing the first judicial cases which upheld the broad applicability of the
thirteenth amendment's promise of freedom and the 1866 Act's
guarantee of equal justice, this Article analyzes these decisions in
light of the retreat from the liberating purpose of the thirteenth
amendment as reflected in Supreme Court decisions beginning in
1872. As a result of this retreat, Congress relied upon the four-
teenth rather than the thirteenth amendment in addressing jury se-
16 See infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 67-69, 74-78, 82-84, 89-91, 99-102, 108, 118-22, 128 and accom-
panying text.
18 Section one of the 1866 Act guaranteed for all citizens "the same as is enjoyed by
white citizens .. " The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Section three
of the Act provides for removal relief for persons "who are denied or cannot enforce...
the rights secured to them by the first section of this act." Id ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
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lection discrimination in The Civil Rights Act of 1875.19
Part Four analyzes several United States Supreme Court deci-
sions between 1880 and 1883. These cases effectively eliminated
two remedies: fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges,
and the federal removal remedy.20 By returning enforcement power
to the states, these decisions led to the reinstitutionalization of the
all-white jury, first through discriminatory jury venire selection pro-
cedures, 2' and after 1935, through reliance on the peremptory chal-
lenge to strike prospective black jurors.22 Part Four concludes by
arguing that the Supreme Court's reformed equal protection analy-
sis in Batson continues to restrict the viability of the fourteenth
amendment as a curb on racially inspired peremptory challenges. 23
Part Five suggests that the thirteenth amendment offers sub-
stantive protections against disqualification of African-American ju-
rors through the peremptory challenge. The amendment is
interpreted to require that two categories of peremptory challenges
be abolished: the prosecutor's challenge in criminal cases against a
black defendant ("defendant-centered") and the defense challenge
in any case involving a white defendant and a black crime victim or
civil rights plaintiff ("victim-determinative").24 In criminal cases not
involving an African-American, a white defendant should be able to
object to a prosecutor's exclusion of African-American jurors and
could prevail if the prosecutor were unable to provide a race-neutral
explanation ("juror-focused"). 25 Similarly, in a civil case where
neither party was African-American, a litigant should be permitted
to mount a Batson-type challenge against the opposing party's per-
emptory dismissal of an African-American juror. This Part of the
Article concludes by delineating the mutual support and interplay of
19 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; see infra notes 229-30, 281, 303-15 and
accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 316-45 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 377-91 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 424-26, 449-54, 459 and accompanying text. In the 1935 case of
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), the Supreme Court limited the previously un-
fettered discretion that state jury officials had employed since the late nineteenth cen-
tury to disqualify African-Americans from inclusion on jury venires, based on their
presumed moral and intellectual unfitness for jury duty. See infra notes 381-86, 442-44
and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 471-92 and accompanying text.
24 Although the importance of the defendant's peremptory challenge in ordinary
criminal cases should be appreciated, the historic role of anti-black violence in maintain-
ing slavery and later in perpetuating black subordination makes it necessary to prohibit
defense peremptories when they are used to strike prospective black jurors in race-sensi-
tive crimes or civil rights violations. In these limited situations a prosecutor may prevent
a white defendant from striking prospective black jurors because of the all-white jury's
historic role in denying justice to black crime victims. See infra notes 575-76, 581-87 and
accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 579-94 and accompanying text.
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the sixth and fourteenth amendments with the thirteenth amend-
ment to eliminate the racially discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge.
I
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Federal and state courts currently allow both the government
prosecutor as well as the defense attorney to peremptorily remove a
specified number of prospective trial jurors in a criminal case "with-
out assigning any reason."' 26 But for more than five hundred years,
use of the peremptory challenge was the exclusive right of the de-
fense lawyer as a means of protecting the fair trial rights of an
accused. 27
Nearly seven centuries ago, in 1305, English legislators recog-
nized the fundamental nature of the defendant's right to perempto-
rily strike potential jurors "who may be suspected of entertaining a
prejudice" against the person on trial.28 The new statute eliminated
the prosecutor's peremptory challenge, and permitted prosecution
removal of a juror only when the King's lawyers could "assign of
their Challenge a Cause certain." 29 In doing so, the English Parlia-
ment abolished a practice that had permitted Crown prosecutors to
remove unlimited numbers of jurors solely by asserting that it was
being done in the King's name.3 0 Parliament declared that these
challenges were "mischievous to the subject, tending to infinite...
danger."''a At the same time, Parliament declined to alter the
common-law rule that allowed defendants thirty-five peremptory
challenges in felony or treason cases to remove any juror believed to
be partial to the government or prejudiced against the defense.
The intent of the 1305 statute was obvious: English legislators
allowed the defendant, but not the King, to exercise peremptory
challenges in order to protect the defendant's fair trial rights. Only
by allowing an accused to remove potential jurors based upon "sud-
den impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to con-
26 See supra note 3.
27 See generallyJ. PROFATr, A TPEArTsE OF TRIAL BY JURY § 155, at 210-11 (1877).
28 Id.
29 Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), digested in 1 PICKERING'S STAT-
urrEs 309 (1762).
30 Profatt refers to the pre-1305 common-law practice in which the prosecution ex-
ercised unlimited peremptory challenges by simply alleging "quid non bons sunt pro
rege." J. PROFArr, supra note 27, at 211. Since trial by jury did not replace earlier meth-
ods of resolving disputes such as trial by battle or trial by ordeal until after 1215, the
Crown's peremptory challenges existed for less than a century before being repealed by
the English Parliament in 1305. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 3-4, 147.
31 SIR EDWARD COKE ON LrrrLErON 156 (14th ed. 1791), cited in Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965).
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ceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another" 32 could the
defendant's right to be judged by an impartial jury be protected.
Blackstone explained that English common law perpetuated the de-
fendant's peremptory challenge because of a professed sense of
"tenderness and humanity [to prisoners] .... A prisoner should
have a good opinion of his jury .... The law wills not that he should
be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice,
even without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike."33
During the next 500 years, English and then American common
law continued to limit use of the peremptory challenge to the defen-
dant. In England, ajudicially developed procedure permitted pros-
ecutors to temporarily "stand-aside" jurors it thought were not
impartial without assigning cause.34 Some American colonies per-
mitted the "stand-aside" practice, but others resisted giving the
government any access to a procedure intended to protect an indi-
vidual against prosecutorial abuse.3 5
The defendant's right to the peremptory challenge had become
such a fundamental precept of American common law that in 1789,
when Congress was drafting a constitutional amendment to guaran-
tee an accused's right to an "impartial jury trial," the proposed lan-
guage referred to "the right of challenge and other accustomed
requisites."'3 6 Although the final draft of what would become the
sixth amendment did not include mention of the accused's right of
peremptory challenge, Congress codified the common-law rule in
1790 by providing for thirty-five defense peremptory challenges
32 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; A FACSIMILE
OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 346-47 (1979).
33 Id. at 346.
34 The "stand-aside" procedure has been criticized for undermining the purpose of
the 1305 statute because it often produced a result similar to that of the peremptory
challenge. Profatt blamed "judicial construction" for creating a procedure that was con-
trary to the legislators' "evident design of... deny[ing] any right of peremptory chal-
lenge to the King." J. PROFATr, supra note 27, at 212-13. Van Dyke blames " [c]ourt
practice [for] allow[ing] the crown to continue a procedure that Parliament had explic-
itly eliminated." J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 148.
The stand-aside procedure is distinguishable from the peremptory challenge in one
important respect: ajuror directed to "stand-aside" may eventually be selected to serve
on the jury; a juror peremptorily stricken is permanently excused and disqualified.
Where jury selection was not completed because the defense used its peremptory chal-
lenges, or because the prosecutor exercised too many "stand asides," the "stand-aside"
jurors would be recalled and could be removed only if the prosecutor showed "cause."
Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965) (referring to the defendant's peremptory
challenge and the prosecutor's right to "stand aside" as "peremptories on both sides ...
[under] the settled law of England").
35 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 148-49. During the colonial period, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania permitted the "stand-aside." Florida, North Carolina, and
Louisiana later approved of the practice.
36 Gazette of the United States, Aug. 29, 1789, at 158.
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in trials for treason, and twenty defense challenges in trials for other
capital crimes. 37 Significantly, the federal statute maintained the
centuries-old practice of denying such challenges to the
government.
It was not until 1865, the same year that the thirteenth amend-
ment was approved by both Houses, that Congress changed this
long-held practice and provided for a limited number of prosecutor
peremptory challenges in federal criminal trials.38 Many state legis-
latures had passed similar laws in the period just preceding the Civil
War, and the remaining states did so immediately following the
War's conclusion. 9 Advocates of the prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenge argued that it was necessary to overcome jury sympathy for
37 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Grimes Against the United States, ch. 9,
§ 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
38 Act. of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2(v), 13 Stat. 500 (five prosecution and 20 defense
peremptory challenges in capital and treason cases; two prosecution and ten defense
challenges in noncapital felonies).
The fact that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge was created in the same year
that Congress passed the thirteenth amendment suggests that some proponents of the
federal peremptory challenge may have sought a procedural device to assure that
African-Americans would never serve asjurors. See infra note 142 (speech of Rep. Eng-
lish in 1860). The congressional debates, however, do not support the notion that the
prosecutor's peremptory challenge was originally intended to exclude on the basis of
race. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 435, 2198-99 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 127 (1865). Contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion that most
states passed prosecutory peremptory laws between 1865 and 1870, these laws were
actually passed prior to the thirteenth amendment's ratification. Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 216 (1965); see infra note 39. Presumably, the federal peremptory statute was a
response to the 1856 United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Shackle-
ford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1855). There,the Court rejected government's "stand-
aside" as equivalent to the defendant's right to peremptorily challenge jurors. Cf
United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 480 (1827), where Justice Story sug-
gested that the prosecutor's right to stand aside in a federal case was part of the com-
mon law inherited from England.
39 In 1820, Alabama was the first state to pass a prosecutor's peremptory challenge
law (§ 10, passed Dec. 21, 1820), followed by Georgia's Act of 1833, Penal Code Div.
322, § XV. Three states passed similar laws in the 1840s: Missouri (ch. 138, Art. VI, § 4
(1845)), Tennessee (CODE OF TENN. 184546, ch. 75), and Mississippi (ch. 65, Art. 8,
referring to "the trial of any white person"). Ten states followed in the 1850s, five prior
to the Schackleford decision and five just afterward: see, e.g., Kentucky (ch. 6, Art. IV
subdiv. II § 204 (1854)), North Carolina (REV. CODE 1854, ch 35, § 33), and Rhode
Island, the first northern state, in 1854 (Pub. L., 1854, ch. 172, § 33). In 1856, Texas
(Act of Aug. 26, 1856, art. 3038, ch. 111) enacted its law, and Connecticut (ch. 37,
passedJune 4, 1858), and New York (ch. 332, 81st Sess.) followed in 1858. Just prior to
the Civil War, four northern states-Maryland (ch. 308, § 18, passed March 9, 1860),
New Hampshire (ch. 2350, § 1, approved July 3, 1860), Pennsylvania (1860 Pa. Laws
440), and Michigan (No. 72, § 5, approved Feb. 25, 1861)-provided a prosecutor's
right to strike prospective jurors.
After the thirteenth amendment was ratified in 1865, Maine (ch. 108, § 1, approved
February 27, 1867), Massachusetts (ch. 151, approved April 10, 1869), Vermont (Public
Act No. 128 (1872)), and West Virginia (ch. 47, § 23 (1872)) passed comparable stat-
utes. Finally, NewJersey (1898 NJ. Laws, ch. 237, § 81), and Virginia (Code 1919, ch.
195, § 4900) were the last states to enact similar laws. (I thank research assistant David
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the defendant. For example, Pennsylvania prosecutors complained
about jury panels in which "one or more persons [were] pledged to
the defendant...; the right to peremptorily challenge four jurors is
the security of the public against such contingencies." 40
The history of the defendant's peremptory challenge follows a
consistent tradition in which English common law and American
state and federal law emphasized the fair trial rights of the ac-
cused.4 1 The relatively recent prosecutor's challenge suggests a
concern that the government should not be prejudiced by potential
jurors who might be ill-disposed to convict "one of their own."
Neither fair trial considerations nor sympathy for the accused,
however, were relevant to a person of African ancestry facing a crim-
inal charge. In the rare instance when a black person was granted a
trial prior to the Civil War, the defendant was certain to be con-
victed when the accuser was a white person.42 In the absence of any
known black jurors in this country prior to 1860,43 the all-white jury
expressed little sympathy for African-American defendants or crime
victims; to the contrary, the denial of impartial courtroom justice
was one of slavery's badges and incidents.
Although the peremptory challenge did not become a primary
tool for excluding the black juror until 1935,44 it must be viewed as
the most recent incarnation of the anti-democratic impulse to keep
juries all-white. Although the thirteenth amendment theoretically
granted freedom to African-Americans, and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 targeted access to legal justice as one of the rights one must
enjoy to be free,45 the continuing exclusion of black jurors has
meant that all-white juries continue to function as a barrier to black
people's access to legal justice, whether as complainants or criminal
defendants.
Weissman for his invaluable assistance in identifying the origin of each state's peremp-
tory challenge).
40 J. PRoFA'rr, supra note 27, at 210-11.
41 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. Although the peremptory chal-
lenge is not a constitutional right, the United States Supreme Court recognized that it is
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." Frazier v. United
States, 335 U.S. 497, 506 n. 11 (1948) (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1894)); see also Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931) (finding error in lower
court's refusal to permit examination of prospective jurors as to their racial prejudices);
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (concluding that the peremptory chal-
lenge is "essential to the fairness of trial by jury").
42 See infra notes 94-95, 141 and accompanying text.
43 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 406-26 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 143-78, 203-38 and accompanying text.
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II.
COLONIAL AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY LAWS: FIXING A
"[S]TIGMA OF THE DEEPEST DEGRADATION ... UPON THE WHOLE
[AFRICAN-AMERICAN] RACE ' 4
6
To understand how the racially inspired use of the peremptory
challenge violates the thirteenth amendment, one must first look at
the legal status of people of African descent in the United States
during the 200 years when slavery existed as a legalized institution
in this country. That status established the reference point against
which the effects of abolishing the institution of slavery, and other
post-Civil War attempts to grant freedom and legal equality for Afri-
can-Americans as witnesses, litigants, and jurors, must be mea-
sured.47 Similarly illuminating are the mechanisms of the ensuing
backlash-in the form of disenfranchisement, discriminatory jury se-
lection practices, and racial violence 48 -that led to the reimposition
of the all-white jury during the late nineteenth century, and which
continues to the present.49
The study of colonial (1660-1776) and post-revolutionary
(1776-1860) law exposes the criminal justice system as a mainstay of
institutionalized slavery. During the period that slavery existed in a
colony or state, African-Americans were usually judged and summa-
rily punished in special courts by all-white judges or juries for al-
leged crimes committed against whites. 50 Violent acts by whites
against blacks were rarely defined as criminal and then only as prop-
erty crimes committed against the slave's white owner.51 Not only
did the legal structure of slavery fail to protect blacks against the
violent acts of whites, but it denied African-Americans the right to
seek legal redress, or to testify as a witness against whites.52
The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford53 sum-
46 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 409 (1857).
47 The Congressional intent in passing the thirteenth amendment and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875 are discussed infra at notes 143-78, 203-38, 301-15 and
accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 377-437 and accompanying text.
49 These sections attempt to synthesize three centuries of political and legal history
in which African-American criminal defendants and crime victims were denied impartial
justice and jury verdicts, a history which I believe is not generally well known. See DER-
RICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 217 (1987); Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Op-
positionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2411 (1989).
50 See infra notes 70, 94-96, 114, 136 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 77-78, 92-93, 99-102 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 79-80, 84, 89-91, 113, 127, 134-35 and accompanying text.
53 60 U.S. 393 (1857). For a thorough reporting of the case's factual background
and the process of judicial decision-making leading to the Court's decision, see DON
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marized more than 100 years of colonial legal treatment of people
of African descent, and concluded that they had always been re-
garded as "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and.., had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them."'54 In reviewing this country's early history,
the Supreme Court relied on the "prevailing opinion of the time"55
in each of the thirteen colonies to justify the enslavement of African
people.56
Nowhere was this racial stigma expressed more strongly than
within the criminal legal process. Colonial criminal justice guaran-
teed virtual immunity against criminal prosecution of the white
master (and of the white population generally) for assaults against
black people. At the same time, the law barred the black victim from
seeking legal redress or judicial intervention.57
Although each colony's history was unique and the develop-
ment of laws affecting its black population reflected local circum-
stances, the thirteen colonies all maintained special laws which
applied only to African-American people and were administered
against them by all-white judicial bodies.58 Many colonies had sepa-
rate courts and procedures that were used only when a white person
accused a black person of criminal conduct. 59 Due process protec-
tions, such as the right to trial before an impartial jury, were almost
EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLIrCS (1978).
54 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
55 Id. at 408.
56 [F]or more than a century before [they had] been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
Id. at 407. The Court referred to anti-miscegenation colonial laws in Maryland and Mas-
sachusetts as emblematic of this legal degradation. Id at 407-09.
57 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 187-90 (3d ed. 1969); Lo-
RENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1974); A. LEON HIGGINBOT-
HAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR (1978); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATrTUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO 1550-1814, at 101-34 (1968).
58 See W. JORDAN, supra note 57, at 104 ("No English colony remained without laws
dealing specifically with the governance of Negroes."). Higginbotham reviewed the
slave codes of Virginia, A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 19-20, 32-36, 38-40, 50-53;
Massachusetts, id. at. 80-82; New York, id at 115-23, 141-50; South Carolina, id at 167-
68, 170-90, 193-201, 216-18; Georgia, id. at 248-51, 252-61; and Pennsylvania, id. at
280-88, 299-305; see also J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 76-78 (Maryland); id at 78-81
(North Carolina); id. at 98-99 (Delaware); id at 94-96 (NewJersey); id at 101-11 (New
England colonies of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire). Greene provides
the most in-depth look at the New England colonies' criminal law enforcement. L.
GREENE, supra note 57, at 124-66.
59 See infra notes 68, 114, 134 and accompanying text.
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nonexistent for the black slave defendant.60
The status of African-Americans improved little after the Revo-
lutionary War. The Supreme Court concluded in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford6' that there had not been any "change of opinion as to the
relative rights and position of the white and black races in this coun-
try." 6 2 The Court referred to state legislation 63 and the ratification
of the Constitution64 as evidence that "the same opinions and prin-
ciples" 65 of "the inferior and subject condition of that race . . .
[were] equally fixed and equally acted upon ... the whole race." 66
In the period from 1776 to 1860, an all-white court or trial jury
still determined a black defendant's guilt or innocence in both the
northern and southern courtroom. Prior to the Civil War and the
subsequent enactment of the thirteenth amendment, African-
60 [Our ancestors] were probably impelled by a sense of common danger,
and the duty of self-preservation, to vest this extraordinary jurisdiction in
three justices and four freeholders, who might be hastily collected at the
courthouse, and proceed to the condemnation and execution of a slave,
without indictment, jury, or notice to the owner ....
State v. Ben, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434-35 (1821) (emphasis added) (describing the proce-
dures followed by North Carolina's special courts under its 1741 Act).
61 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
62 IdE at 413. The Court's sweeping statements in Dred Scott fail to suggest the con-
tradictions of American colonists who were waging a war for independence under the
battle cry of the "natural" and "inalienable" rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, yet at the same time enslaving a significant portion of their population. See
Edmund Morgan, Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox, 59 J. AM. Hisr. 5 (1972)
(Arguing that "the rise of liberty and equality in this country was accompanied by the
rise of slavery." Morgan concluded that the revolution preserved "the rights of English-
men ... by destroying the rights of Africans"); cf William W. Froehling, The Founding
Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HisT. Rav. 81 (1972) (suggesting that the Founding Fathers
sought to cripple the institution of slavery by banning slavery in northern states and
agreeing to close the slave trade in 1808).
63 The Court cited several New England state laws as examples of rights that were
denied to northern African-Americans, regardless of status: the 1786 and 1836 Massa-
chusetts anti-miscegenation laws and numerous Connecticut statutes, including an 1833
law which criminalized the teaching of nonresident black children. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
413-15 (citing Crandall v. Connecticut, 10 Conn. 340 (1833)). See J. FRANKLN, supra
note 57, at 163 (describing the Crandall case wherein a white mob broke the school's
windows, insulted Mrs. Crandall, and forced the school's closure following her arrest).
The Supreme Court also referred to an 1855 New Hampshire law that barred African-
Americans from joining the state militia, and an 1844 Rhode Island anti-miscegenation
statute. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 415, 416.
64 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 416. The Court referred to U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (prohibit-
ing Congress from lifting the importation of slaves until at least 1808), and art. 4, cl. 3
(slaves escaping to another state must be returned to the slave's owner). For an aboli-
tionist critique of the Constitution, see STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND
THE U.S. CONSTrrIMON 153-83 (1967); Juliet E.K. Walker, Whither Liberty, Equality or Le-
gality? Slavery, Race, Property and the 1787 American Constitution, 6 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTS.
299 (1989); see alsojustice Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennia" Commemorat-
ing the Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1337 (1987).
65 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 413.
66 Id at 416.
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Americans' exclusion from jury duty remained a national, uniform
badge and incident of slavery.
A. Southern Colonial Justice for the African-American
Defendant
Virginia's slave codes, enacted in the late seventeenth century,
became a legislative model for the other southern colonies. 67 These
laws gave the slaveowner virtually unlimited discretion to adjudicate
guilt and to punish his slaves. No trial or judicial finding that the
slave was, in fact, guilty was required.68
Because summary justice was the rule, a criminal trial for a slave
was the rare exception, granted most commonly when a white per-
son other than the slave's owner was the accuser.69 Even in these
cases, the right to trial by jury rarely existed for the accused person
of African ancestry, slave or free. Instead, special courts were cre-
ated for the slave defendant, and were typically presided over by
three white persons-a single justice of the peace and two freehold-
67 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 39.
68 In 1669, Virginia legalized an owner's killing of his slave who resisted corrective
punishment by his master on the theory that "it cannot be presumed that propensed
malice (which alone makes [murder] Felony) should induce any man to destroy his own
estate." Id. at 36. In 1680, the Virginia legislature criminalized the act of self-defense
by a black person, slave or free, by requiring that "any Negro [who] lift up his hand
against any Christian he shall receive thirty lashes ... ." Id at 39.
South Carolina followed the general principle that a master had the right to kill a
slave who offered any resistance, regardless of the circumstances. Id. at 188-89; W.JoR-
DAN, supra note 57, at 106 ("Masters were given immunity from legal prosecution should
their slaves die under 'moderate' correction"). Its 1690 law authorized a white person
to administer a "moderate" whipping to a slave who was apprehended trying to escape,
but if the slave violently resisted, the authorized punishment ranged from whipping for a
first offense, having his "nose slit, and face burnt in some place" for a second offense,
and execution for a third conviction. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 171. In 1712,
South Carolina law authorized a white person to "beat, maim, or assault" a slave who
was travelling without a pass or to kill if the slave refused to show the pass and could not
be taken alive. Id.
Further, South Carolina's 1722 and 1740 laws and Georgia's 1755 law justified a
white person's killing of any slave who struck and injured another white person. Id at
195, 256. Although South Carolina's 1740 law criminalized a master's "willful" killing
of his slave, the misdemeanor crime was punishable merely by the imposition of a fine.
The same law justified killing a slave if it was done "on a sudden heat or passion, or by
undue correction." 2 BREVARD'S DIG. 241 (1814); see alsoJACOB D. WHEELER, A PRAGrr-
CAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY 202 (orig. published in 1837, reprinted 1968).
69 Since the slaveowner had virtually unlimited discretion to punish a slave without
judicial authorization, and a slave was powerless to complain if the punishment was ex-
cessive, the special courts were created primarily for a slave charged with a crime against
a nonowner. More commonly, punishment was administered by "[a]ny white person-a
drunken patrol, an absconding felon, or a vagabond mendicant-[who] is supposed to
possess discretion enough to interpret the laws, and to wield the cowskin or cart-whip
for their infraction." GEORGE MCDOWELL STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAws RELATING TO
SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 94 (1856).
[Vol. 76:1
1990] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
ers70 -who were frequently also slaveowners. Virginia law served as
a model for the institutionalization of all-white judicial bodies
throughout the colonies.
Throughout the South, colonial legislatures authorized severe
and brutal sentences, 7 1 to be determined and enforced by the indi-
vidual white slaveowner or his agent.7 2 The value of a slave made
execution a less preferred sentence, although it was legislatively
mandated for an ever-expanding number of crimes. 73 While these
laws attempted to define precise legal sanctions for a slave's "trans-
gressions," slaveowners could inflict whatever punishment they de-
sired. No record of legal reprobation exists for an owner who
overstepped authorized sanctions in any southern colony.
70 Id. at 91; W. JORDAN, supra note 57, at 106. Every southern colony-Maryland,
Delaware, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia--created special courts to try
felony cases involving a criminal charge against a slave. See Md. Act of 1717, ch. 13, § 6;
Delaware 1721 Act, cited inJ. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 98-99; A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 57, at 179-81 (describing South Carolina's courts); id. at 257-59 (referring to Geor-
gia's system); North Carolina's 1741 Act, cited in State v. Ben, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 434
(1821). An accused slave was denied a right to trial by jury, and any "of the safeguards
cherished by Englishmen .... A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 180 (citing H. M.
Henry, The Police Control of the Slave in South Carolina 58 (diss., Vanderbilt University (Em-
ory, 1914)). Instead, the slave courts were known for passing "swift justice" in cases
considered serious. Higginbotham cited a South Carolina case in which a black man was
arrested for stealing a horse, tried, found guilty the next day, and executed the day after.
Id at 180.
71 While whipping was the most common punishment for a first-time offender for
many crimes, more brutal punishment followed for repeat offenses. In South Carolina,
for example, a slave's repeated acts of leaving the plantation without permission author-
ized his owner, or one acting under his direction, to brand the slave "with the letter R,
on the right cheek," to mutilate by cutting off one of the slave's ears, to dismember by
cutting "the cord of the slave's legs" above the heel or by castration in the case of a male
slave, and ultimately, to kill the slave. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 177; see supra
note 68.
72 Winthrop Jordan suggests that slave laws were primarily intended to impose dis-
cipline on white slaveowners in order to control the slave population. "It was the white
man who was required to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the
curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols." W. JoRDAN, supra note 57, at
108-09. According to Jordan, members of the legislative assemblies were mostly slave-
owners who attempted to enforce slave-discipline by forcing owners, individually and
collectively, to enforce the laws in their own self-interest. Id
73 Georgia's 1755 penal law provided for capital sentences for crimes that white
legislators thought slaves were more likely to commit. Most of these sentences related
to stealing or destroying property that would be punishable, if at all, with a minimal
sentence if committed by a white person. Additional capital offenses were added to
Georgia's 1765 and 1770 codes, included teaching another slave about the use of poi-
sonous plants or herbs, striking a white person for a second time, or attempting to rape
a white woman. In reviewing Georgia and South Carolina laws, Judge Higginbotham
concluded that the slave's value meant that a capital sentence was "seldom imposed,"
despite being warranted for many offenses. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 256-57,
262.
CORNELL LI W REVIEW
B. Southern Colonial Justice for the African-American
Complainant
Because severe sentences and even execution of slaves were le-
gally prescribed punishments for unproven transgressions, the de-
nial of black defendants' rights and denial of black complainants'
rights were virtually synonymous. What would be deemed a crimi-
nal assault or homicide if committed by one white person against
another became a legalized punishment when the victim was black.
In addition, the rape of a black woman, free or slave, was not re-
garded as a crime.74 Because the law recognized no legal rights for
blacks, it allowed no legal redress.
Throughout the southern colonies, the murder of a slave by a
white person was usually not considered a crime. For example, the
colonies granted absolute immunity to a white person if he killed a
slave who resisted apprehension, or who defended himself regard-
less of the circumstances. 75 The white person effectuating the cap-
ture always had the discretion to summarily execute the slave or to
impose a less-than-ultimate sentence. 76 The limited instances
where a southern colony classified the killing of a slave as a crime
involved the killing of someone else's slave77 and the laws provided
that the slaveowner be compensated for the loss of property. 78 In
every southern colony, slaves were denied access to courts 79 and
74 See L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 203-05 (noting that even though crimes against a
black woman were numerous, she had no legal recourse for sex crimes committed
against her); W. JORDAN, supra note 57, at 141 (stating that a white man's dominion over
blacks extended to sexual dominance).
75 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 171.
76 Some states provided greater incentive to the person apprehending a runaway
slave and returning the "property" alive to its owner. For example, Georgia legalized
the killing of a runaway slave, and paid a reward five times as great if a white person
returned a slave alive rather than returning with a male slave's "scalp with Two ears."
It at 254.
77 Some southern colonies attempted to limit extreme cruelty against slaves when
committed by a nonowner. Georgia, for example, created a civil cause of action for a
slaveowner, not a slave, to sue and recover damages where a nonowning white "cut the
Tongue put out the Eye Castrate[d] or ... inflict[ed] any other Cruel punishment" on a
slave. Id. at 255. South Carolina's penal code criminalized similar conduct, but limited
the punishment to the payment of a fine to the slave-owner. It at 195.
78 Id. In South Carolina, a white servant who killed a slave could be sentenced to
three months in jail and four years of additional servitude. Corroboration by two white
witnesses was required to convict, making this sentencing outcome extremely unlikely.
Id. at 176, 253-54.
79 By definition, a slave was regarded as property and therefore had no rights of his
own and thus no standing to sue. Slaves could not be witnesses against white persons in
civil or criminal cases. J. WHEELER, supra note 68, at 194. Some colonies, such as Vir-
ginia and South Carolina, created specific laws which prevented a slave from suing for ill
treatment. IE at 38, 195-97. Other colonies limited a slave's right to sue for freedom by
requiring a white person to act as legal guardian. It at 194 (referring to South Caro-
lina's 1740 Act).
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were prevented from testifying against white people.8 0 Conse-
quently, slaveowners and white people generally had automatic im-
munity against crimes committed. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham
summarized the nonperson status of people of African descent:
"Once the slave status has been declared, most human rights are
eradicated as a matter of law. The slave is denied the right to utilize
the legal process in his behalf, to stop injustice for himself, his body
or his family."'' s
The southern colonial legal system's refusal to provide legal
protection to those enslaved also applied to the relatively few free
blacks living in the South.8 2 Even though they enjoyed some rights
equal to whites, such as the right to travel, to bear arms, or to own
property, free African-Americans "had a good deal less liberty than
the law allowed."8 3 Because of their race, they, too, were branded
legally inferior to whites, and their sworn testimony was automati-
cally rejected in any criminal case where the alleged perpetrator was
white.8 4 Consequently, they were as vulnerable to physical attacks
80 See G. STROUD, supra note 69. This author asserted that a slave, or a free black,
could not be a witness against a white person in a civil or criminal case, offering the
following explanation: "this exclusion is not confined to the evidence of slaves; but
natives of Africa, and their descendants, whatever may be the shade of their complexion,
and whether bond or free, are under the like degrading disability." Id. at 44. A slave
could testify only against another slave, and sometimes against a free black. J. WHEELER,
supra note 68, at 194. Virginia's statute was typical: "Any negro or mulatto, bond or
free, shall be a good witness in pleas of the commonwealth for or against negroes or
mulattoes, 'bond or free, or in civil pleas where free negroes or mulattoes shall alone be
parties, and in no other cases whatsoever.'" G. Stroud, supra note 69, at 44 (quoting 1 REv.
CODE OF VIRGINIA 422 (emphasis in original)). Stroud also discusses laws of Maryland,
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. See id at 44-48.
81 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 170.
82 IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WrroTr MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 3, 45-48 (1974). In the pre-1790 period, free African-Americans constituted
about four percent of the south's colonial black population. Of the approximately 3,650
free African-Americans living in the South, virtually all resided in Maryland (represent-
ing about half of the colony's black population), and Virginia (representing only one
percent of the total black population in 1782). The few remaining free blacks lived in
Georgia and Louisiana.
83 Id. at 9. Berlin pointed out that southern colonies did not begin to prohibit free
blacks from voting until the early eighteenth century when Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina passed laws. Georgia enacted a similar law in 1761, the same year that
North Carolina lifted its ban. Maryland was the only southern colony to prohibit free
blacks from joining the militia, and Virginia also was alone in specifically precluding free
blacks from holding office. Berlin concluded that by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, free African-Americans' legal status had become comparable to a slave's, thus mak-
ing them "slaves without masters." Id- at 318.
84 Although free blacks had some rights equal to whites, southern law presumed
every black to be a slave within the courtroom. In that context, they were consistently
and deliberately disqualified as witnesses, jurors, and litigants against white parties. Id.
at 65; see supra note 80. Not one criminal case has been found in which a free black
testified against a white party; in a South Carolina chancery court, a free mulatto was
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from whites as were slaves and continued to lack legal recourse
within the colonial legal system.
C. Post-Revolutionary Developments in the South
During the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars,
southern states generally maintained African-Americans' status as
nonpersons, whether they were slave or free. In the early post-
Revolutionary period, some southern states attempted to distin-
guish between the status of the free8 5 black and the person held in
bondage. Post-war legislative acts of manumission freed some
blacks,8 6 and, for a limited period, some states interpreted freedom
to include the rights to vote, to own property, to bear arms, to serve
in the militia, and to travel freely.8 7
Despite these changes, a free southern black's status in the
courtroom remained the equivalent of a slave's. Aside from manu-
mission lawsuits,88 courts denied slaves access to sue, or to file com-
allowed to sue a white person and to swear to the truth of his pleading. A. HIGGINBOT-
HAM, supra note 57, at 205-06.
85 In 1790, the United States population was approximately four million people.
African-Americans represented about 20% of the population, although only eight per-
cent, or about 59,000, were not enslaved. Slightly more than half of the free black popu-
lation lived in the South. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 217; I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at
48-50, 112-13.
Between 1790 and 1810, free African-Americans became the "fastest-growing ele-
ment in the Southern population." I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at 49. As they grew in
number, however, free blacks' economic and civil liberties were all but obliterated. Id at
90. After 1810, their numbers declined and reflected a deterioration in free blacks' legal
status throughout the Nation. SeeJ. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 217.
86 In 1782, Virginia repealed its fifty-nine-year-old prohibition on private acts of
manumission, thereby allowing a slaveowner to manumit slaves under the age of forty-
five by will or deed. In 1787, Delaware passed a similar act. The following year, Mary-
land extended manumission by will. When Kentucky joined the Union in 1792, it
adapted the Virginia law, as did the Missouri territory in 1804. I. BERLIN, supra note 82,
at 29-30; A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 49.
87 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 91. Shortly after the Revolution, Delaware,
Maryland, and Kentucky enfranchised free blacks in their first constitutions. These
states repealed their laws during the early nineteenth century, however, and other
southern states disenfranchised blacks when they entered the Union. JOHN H. FRANKLIN,
THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860, at 102, 116 (1943).
Although free blacks could own property, they could not rent or buy land, or enter
certain occupations. It at 114-16; I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at 61-64. Their inability to
testify against a white person also meant that they were unable to collect their debts and
to avoid being victims of numerous frauds. I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at 65.
88 See G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 52-57 (stating that where slavery existed, the
general rule denied a slave the right to sue or to seek legal redress, with the exception
that most states allowed court access when a slave sued for his freedom). Stroud also
discusses the laws of South Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and
Mississippi. Ido at 52-57; see also J. WHEELER, supra note 68, at 197, 388415 (citing
cases).
To succeed, a slave had to overcome the general presumption that "[b]eing a negro
... he is presumed to be a slave." G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 53. Stroud points out
1990] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 21
plaints against wrongdoers. 89 Some states drastically limited free
blacks' right to sue by prohibiting every person of African ancestry
from testifying against a white person because of their supposed in-
tent to conceal or deny the truth.90 Consequently, blacks had no
personal remedy to redress violent acts by whites.91
States rarely prosecuted whites for kidnapping and enslaving
free African-Americans because blacks were usually the only wit-
nesses to the crime, and kidnappers would often arrange to have
white persons testify on their behalf.92 In the rare instance where
the state did prosecute, the all-white jury would acquit. 93
When accused of a crime, blacks were judged by an all-white
court or jury, whether they were tried in the "special" courts or in
that this legal presumption facilitated the crime of manstealing because a kidnapped
slave had the difficult task of convincing a southern court, consisting "in all probability
... [of] slaveholders" that he was being illegally held. Id. In addition, some states like
South Carolina and Georgia added an even more chilling deterrence to bringing such a
suit: if the slave did not convince ajudge andjury of his right to freedom, a court" 'was
empowered to inflict such corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb, on the
ward of the plaintiff, as they in their discretion shall think fit.'" Id. at 52 (quoting 2
BREvARD's DIG. 229-30).
89 J. WHEELER, supra note 68, at 197; see also G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 52 (be-
cause "a slave can neither acquire or retain property, as his own, contrary to the will of
his master... he cannot be a party to a civil suit; for there is no species of civil suit which
does not, in some way, affect property").
90 J. WHEELER, supra note 68, at 194; G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 44 (citing Virginia
(1 R.V.C. 422), Missouri (2 MissouRi LAws, 600), Mississippi (Mississippi REV. C ODE,
372), Kentucky (2 Lrrr. & Swi. 1150), Alabama (TouLMIN's DIG. 672), Maryland (MARY-
LAND LAws, Act of 1717, ch. 13, § 2 & 3, and Act of 1771, ch. 14 § 4), North Carolina
and Tennessee, Act of 1777 ch. 2 § 42). Berlin believes that for a brief period between
1783 and 1787, Maryland and Delaware may have allowed free blacks to testify against
whites, but by 1787 both states had barred free blacks from testifying. I. BERLIN, supra
note 82, at 91 n.21.
91 G. STROUD, supra note 69, argues that a slaveowner's immunity from criminal
prosecution was based "chiefly, if not solely" on the rule that banned a slave from testi-
fying against a white person. Id at 20. Stroud also describes the difficulty of convicting
a slaveowner for whipping a slave to death because state law sanctioned "the master's
power to inflict corporal punishment to any extent, short of life and limb." Id. at 28.
Consequently, when a slave was killed after receiving a whipping that was considered
"moderate correction," some states considered this a justifiable homicide. See id. at 20-
28 (citing CLAY's ALA. DIG. 413; Georgia Act of Dec. 2, 1799, 2 COBB'S DIG,, 982; Mis-
souri, Rev. Stat. 344-45; South Carolina, 2 BREVARD'S DIG. 241 (killing a slave "on a
sudden heat of passion"); Statute, Laws of Tennessee, 676, 677).
92 I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at 99-101.
93 Id. at 101 (citing minutes of Delaware Abolition Society, Dec. 21, 1803). One
Delaware lawyer summarized the difficulty of obtaining convictions of white defendants
in such cases:
[The propensities ofjuries to lean on the merciful side of the question,
when the crime was committed against a black person, was so strong as to
raise a high degree of suspicion that the accused would be acquitted, if
they were prosecuted for kidnapping.
Id (emphasis added).
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the regular court system.94 As likely as white juries were to acquit
white defendants accused of crimes against a black person, they
were virtually certain to convict a black defendant in an interracial
case.95 And when convicted, free blacks received punishments more
severe than those whites received for committing the same crime.96
When southern states first prescribed sanctions against the
crime of homicide, slaves gained a modicum of legal protection.97
Since blacks were not permitted to testify against whites, however,
94 During the post-revolutionary, pre-Civil War period, most southern states ex-
tended the right to trial by jury in a capital case to slaves for two reasons: "[It] was
intended to surround the life of the slave with additional safeguards, and more effectu-
ally to protect the property of the owner .. " State v.Jim, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 142, 144
(1826).
Consequently, both free and enslaved African-Americans who were charged with
capital crimes received trial by jury guarantees in the state constitutions of Alabama
(ALA. CONST. title on slaves, § 2); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 25); and Missouri (Mo.
CONsT. art. 3, § 27). State law guaranteed these rights in Georgia, G. STROUD, supra note
69, at 89 (citing PRINCE's DIG. 459); Maryland, id. at 89-90 (citing Md. Laws, Act of 1751,
ch. 14); Mississippi, id. at 89 (citing Miss. REv. CODE 382); North Carolina, id at 90-91
(citing REV. STAT., ch. 111, §§ 42-4); Tennessee, id at 89 (citing Act of 1835, ch. 19);
and Kentucky, id at 89 (citing 2 Lrrr. & Swi. 1164). Only South Carolina, Louisiana,
and Virginia continued to hold these trials in their 'Justice and Freeholder" courts. See
id at 91-92 (citingJAMEs DIG. 392-93; Statutes of Louisiana of 1852, ch. 541; and CODE
OF VIRGINIA, ch. 212, §§ 2, 4 & 5, at 787).
In noncapital cases, a slave's right to ajury trial was guaranteed in only two states:
Missouri, for all misdemeanor and felony crimes, and Alabama, for offenses higher than
petit larceny. Most other states maintained or created "Justices and Freeholder Courts"
for a slave's noncapital crimes. Id at 95.
95 A Baltimore attorney "observed that local juries were 'inclined to convict a man
merely because he was black, as an Englishjudge.., condemned every Irishman, merely
because he was of that nation.'" I. BERLIN, supra note 82, at 335 (citing Baltimore Sun,
Oct. 22, 1839). Berlin concluded that "free [blacks] rarely received justice at the hands
of all-white judicial systems." Id
96 G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 74-88. Stroud's analysis of southern states' sentenc-
ing codes indicates that slaves faced capital sentences for crimes that called for minimal
jail terms for white defendants or moderate terms for free blacks. Id. at 84-88. Virginia
law, for example, classified four crimes as capital offenses if committed by any person.
Sixty-eight additional crimes were punishable by death if committed by a slave. Id. at
77-80. Similarly, Mississippi's penal law classified twelve crimes as capital offenses for
all persons convicted, but included thirty-eight additional crimes that were punishable
by death only if committed by a slave. Id at 80-83.
In noncapital cases, Stroud described the "punishment of universal prevalence and
of perpetual occurrence" was to order that the slave be whipped with twenty to forty
lashes, "well laid on." Id. at 94. Because of the slave's labor value, imprisonment was
an unlikely sentence, and dismemberment was a less tolerated punishment. Some state
laws, however, explicitly provided for "any torture.., which can be practiced without
producing death or dismemberment." Id
97 Just prior to the American Revolution, North Carolina law recognized the crime
of murder of a slave, either by a slaveowner or any white person, as a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment up to one year. An Act to Prevent the Willful and Malicious
Killing of Slaves, Mar. 2, 1774, ch. XXXI N.C. Laws 274 (1791). In 1791, the North Caro-
lina legislature upgraded the offense to a felony, and increased the punishment to the
same as if he had killed a freeman, ch. IV N.C. News 3 (Supp. 1791-94), but this statute
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states rarely enforced these sanctions.98 Rape of black women still
was still not recognized as criminal, 99 and a slaveowner's "right" to
seriously injure a slave in 1829 was vindicated when a court reversed
the conviction of a slaveowner who had shot a hired slave in the
back as she attempted to flee from punishment. 100 Not only were
slaveowners immune from assaults that fell short of killing their
slaves, 10 but in 1850, North Carolina's judicial process reinstated
the legal right of any white person to impose summary discipline on
any "insolent" black person without it constituting a crime: "unless
was declared unconstitutional ten years later in State v. Bonn, 1 N.C. (I Hay W.) 191
(1801).
In 1821, a Mississippi court was the first to recognize the common-law crime of a
slaveowner killing a slave. State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 83, 84 (1820). Two years
later, North Carolina's appellate court held that "a slave is a reasonable [creature] or
more properly a human being... [then] killing a slave with malice prepense, is murder
by the Common Law." State v. Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454,455-56 (1823). Prior to the
Civil War, every southern state considered it a capital offense to cause the "wilful, mali-
cious and premeditated killing of a slave .... G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 20-21; see
State v. Flanigan, 5 Ala. 477 (1843); State v. Maner, S.C.L. (2 Hill) 453 (1834); Field v.
State, 9 Tenn. 156 (1829) (first recognizing the common-law crime of manslaughter
against a slave); Chandler v. State, 2 Tex. 305 (1847).
98 G. STROUD, supra note 69, at 20.
99 More than halfway into the twentieth century, no southern white male had been
convicted of raping a black woman. GERDA LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1972); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 234,
410-12 (1975); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN (1981); Judith Schacter, The Long Arm of
the Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1247, 1262 (1986); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and The
Law, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 103 (1983).
100 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). In Mann, the North Carolina court
stated:
We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in
the Courts ofJustice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible
that there is no appeal from his master.., it will be the imperative duty of
the Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave,
except where the exercise of it is forbidden by statute.
Id. at 267-68. The Mann ruling effectively foreclosed a slave from seeking judicial inter-
vention when assaulted by a slaveowner or his hirer. See Hoover v. North Carolina, 20
N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 365 (1839). In Hoover, the same North Carolina court rein-
forced the principle that a slaveowner could not face criminal prosecution for having
beaten, tortured, and starved his slave, but could be criminally charged only if the slave
died from the assault. "A master may lawfully punish his slave, and the degree must, in
general, be left to his own judgment and humanity, and cannot be judicially ques-
tioned .... mhe master's authority is not altogether unlimited. He must not kill.
There is, at the least, this restriction." Id. at 368. In State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.)
391 (1849), North Carolina's ChiefJustice indicated the widespread nature of these as-
saults that were never prosecuted.
101 South Carolina and Louisiana recognized the crime of cruel and unusual punish-
ment of slaves, but followed North Carolina's precedent in deciding that the mere beat-
ing of a slave was not criminal. State v. Maner, S.C.L. (2 Hill) Rep. 453, 456 (1834)
(reinforcing the complete immunity provided a South Carolina slave owner for "a mere
beating [of his slave] unaccompanied by circumstances of cruelty or an attempt to kill
and murder"); J. WHEELER, supra note 68 (disagreeing with Stroud's characterization
"that the master may, at his pleasure, inflict any species of punishment upon the person
of his slave") (quoting G. STROUD, supra note 59, at 23).
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a white man, to whom insolence is given, has a right to put a stop to
it, in an extra judicial way, there is no remedy for it. This would be
insufferable. Hence we infer... that this extra judicial remedy is
excusable."1 02
Despite the similarities between the denial of legal rights for
blacks under the colonial legal system and the denial of legal rights
to blacks under post-revolutionary southern law, there was one dif-
ference: state court decisions during the post-revolutionary period
reveal the embryonic stages ofjudicial reliance upon the rule of law.
Yet, judicial intervention never challenged the underlying master-
slave relationship or the institution of slavery itself. The few "en-
lightened" court decisions that appear to reflect a humanitarian im-
pulse to provide greater legal protection for slaves in reality only
strengthened slaveowners' property interests.103 Southern state
court cases between 1820 and 1860 illustrate the incipient, yet un-
even, growth of the region's efforts to define the boundaries of per-
missible conduct against blacks and yet maintain the master's
absolute dominion. 10 4
102 State v.Jowers, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 555, 557 (1850). Ten years earlier, the North
Carolina court in State v. Jarrott, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 76 (1840) had stated in dicta that a
slave's insolence in calling a white person a thief would have justified an "ordinary"
assault, but not the excessive knife attack used in the case. Id at 83-84.
105 See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823), where a North Carolina court
declared that a stranger's assault against a slave was a crime in "keeping pace with the
march of benignant policy, and provident humanity, which for many years, has charac-
terized every Legislative act, relative to the protection of slaves." Id at 583. The court's
decision also kept pace with its concern that the slaveowner's property value would be
diminished if a white person's assaultive conduct went punished: "If such offences may
be committed with impunity, the public peace will not only be rendered extremely inse-
cure, but the value of slave property must be much impaired, for the offenders can sel-
dom make any reparation in damages." Id. at 585.
104 See Patrick S. Brady, Slavery, Race and Criminal Law in Antebellum North Carolina: A
Reconsideration of the Thomas Ruffin Court, 10 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 248 (1978-79). In State v.
Will, 18 N.C. (I Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834), a North Carolina appellate court recognized a
slave's right of self-defense against a master's life-threatening assault when charged with
murder, but rejected it as a valid defense against a manslaughter charge. "Resistance
.. . on the part of the slave to the battery of his master cannot be legally excused,
although such battery may be unreasonable [only] the degree of [the slave's] criminality
[will be reduced] .... ." Id. at 171. The same North Carolina court denied a black
person's right of self-defense if "insolent" to a white person in State v. Jowers, 33 N.C.
(2 Ired.) 555 (1850), but then upheld a noninsolent black's "natural right of self-de-
fense" against the "gross oppression" of a police officer making an unlawful arrest in
State v. Davis, 52 N.C. (Jones) 52 (1859); cf State v. Jones, 2 Miss. (Walker) 83, 84
(1821) (murder of a slave first defined as a common law crime); Mitchel v. Wells, 37
Miss. 235, 275-76 (1859) (a lone dissenting judge on Mississippi's highest court la-
mented 38 years later that the majority's reversal of a white defendant's conviction for
the killing of a slave had removed the last legal restraints against such killing).
One commentator, A.E. Nash, argued that the South's appellate process "insisted
on reasonably fair trial standards" by reversing nearly 60% of 232 capital convictions of
black defendants between 1850-1860, and by affirming approximately 30 convictions of
whites for crimes committed against blacks. A.E. Keir Nash, A More Equitable Past? South-
[Vol. 76:1
1990] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
D. Northern Colonial Justice for the African-American
Defendant
Northern colonies were the first to legalize slavery, both de
facto '05 and de jure;106 yet their first slave codes did not appear until
1702, decades after Virginia's model code was enacted. 10 7 Northern
slave codes followed the southern principle that allowed a slave-
owner "to punish ... slaves for . .. Crimes and offenses at [the
master's] Discretion" without fear of criminal prosecution.' 08
Although they shared a common legislative philosophy of summary
punishment of blacks and immunity for whites, the northern slave
codes were distinguishable from those of the southern colonies in
that they afforded more legal protection to the criminally accused
slave.
In the New England colonies, which had the smallest black
populations, 10 9 an accused black, free or slave, was generally guar-
anteed the same due process protections as a white defendant, in-
cluding the right to trial by jury in the regular court system and the
right to testify in court against whites. 10 Massachusetts' judicial
ern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C.L. REv. 197, 233-35
(1968); A.E. Keir Nash, The Texs Supreme Court and Trial Rights of Blacks, 58J. AM. HIST.
622 (1971); A.E. Keir Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme
Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REv. 64 (1970); see also Daniel J. Flanagan, Criminal
Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J. So. HIST. 537 (1974); cf. MICHAEL
STEPHEN HINDUS, PERSONS AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE AND AUTHORrrY IN MASSA-
CHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA 1767-1878 (1980); Patrick S. Brady, supra note 104;
Michael Stephan Hindus, BlackJustice Under White Law, 631J. AM. HIST. 599 (1976). Yet,
the opening provided by appellate review was minuscule when compared to the cases
that never reached the criminal courts or were never prosecuted against whites. STAN-
LEY ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITrUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
56-58 (1963). John Hope Franklin noted that free blacks may have received the greatest
protection from the higher courts when compared with "the laws that were seldom en-
forced" for slaves' protection, but added that the coutt process was not very helpful to
slaves. "The laws that were for the purpose of protecting the slaves were few and were
seldom enforced. It was almost impossible to secure a conviction of a master who mis-
treated his slave." J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 206-07.
105 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 100 (stating that the Dutch West India Com-
pany imported 11 black males into the Dutch settlement of New Netherlands in 1626)
(citing EDGAR McMANUS, A HISTORY OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN NEW YORK 11 (1970)).
106 L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 63. In 1646, Connecticut became the first colony to
authorize slavery by legislative act. See RobertJ. Cottrol, Law, Politics and Race in Urban
America: Towards a New Synthesis, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 483 (1986).
107 Pennsylvania enacted its first statute dealing with slaves in 1700, New York in
1702, and Massachusetts in 1728. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 281.
108 Id. at 119.
109 In 1750, approximately 12,000 black people lived in the four New England colo-
nies, while 19,000 lived in New York, NewJersey, and Pennsylvania. Almost seven times
as many African-Americans, 206,000 lived in the colonial south. J. FRANKLIN, supra note
57, at 61.
110 New England slaves were allowed to testify against a white person, even in cases
where a black person was not a party, L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 179;J. FRANKLIN, stpra
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process went one step further in protecting a black defendant's right
to trial by impartial jury, permitting the defendant to challenge pro-
spectivejurors during jury selection.'11 As was true in every colony,
none of the prospective jurors was black.112
Other northern colonies, such as New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, did not accord such rights to a slave defendant.
These colonies used judicial procedures more similar to those used
in the South. They denied slaves the right to testify against a white
person,' 13 and created special courts to decide criminal cases involv-
ing slave defendants. 1 4 In each colony, slaves were denied the
right to a jury trial, although a 1708 New York statute permitted
slaveowners to obtain jury trials for their criminally accused
slaves." 5 Unlike white criminal defendants, however, New York
slaves did not have the right to challenge jurors whom they consid-
ered biased.1 6 And if the jury found a slave guilty of certain crimes,
the defendant's status resulted in a significantly harsher and more
note 57 at 104. Massachusetts'judicial decisions established slaves' rights to be charged
with a crime through the regular procedure of indictment by a grandjury. See The Franck
Negro, 3 Mass. Ct. Bay of Assts. 194 (1669); see also The Negro Sebastian, 5 Mass. Recs 117
(1676) (establishing slaves' rights to be tried by ajury in the regular court system and to
appeal their cases to the highest courts). See L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 184-85. Rhode
Island, however, administered special courts for the trial of slaves accused of purloining,
"the only instance in which New England law established special trial procedures for
Negroes." ARTHUR ZILVERSMrr, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
IN THE NORTH 13 (1967).
111 See L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 185, referring to a Massachusetts trial in 1691 in
which the defendant slave, during jury selection, "making no challenge against any of
them they were sworn for his tr[i]al."
112 Id at 299, 332.
113 Prior to 1664, under Dutch rule, a New York slave could testify against other
blacks, or in cases when one or both of the parties was white. Id at 104. But under
English rule, New York's 1702 slave code prohibited a slave from testifying in any matter
except against another slave who had been charged with conspiring to escape, killing his
master, or destroying his master's property. Id. at 119-20. In 1730, a New York statute
explicitly disqualified a slave from testifying against any free black, even when that per-
son had been accused of conspiring to kill the slave's master. Id. at 133. Similar anti-
testimony laws were passed in New Jersey, see A. ZILVERSMrr, supra note 110, at 23-24,
and Pennsylvania, which also applied this prohibition to include free blacks during the
years 1700-1780. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 281-82, 299; seeJ. FRANKLIN, supra
note 57, at 221; EDWARD R. TURNER, THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA, SLAVERY-SERVIrUDE-
FREEDOM 1639-1861, at 110, 113 (1911).
114 The composition of these courts was similar to that of the special courts in the
South: an all-white body consisting ofjustices of the peace and freeholders. A. HIGGEN-
BOTHAM, supra note 57, at 124. New York created special courts in 1708 consisting of
three justices of the peace and five freeholders. Id. (citing Colonial Laws of New York,
ch. 181, 631 (Oct. 30, 1708)). In 1700, Pennsylvania established a special court for the
trial of "negroes [which included] two justices of the peace and six of the most substan-
tial freeholders of the neighborhood." Id. at 281, 306. New Jersey established special
courts for slaves in 1714 and discontinued their use in 1768. See A. ZILVERSMrr, supra
note 110, at 13-16.
115 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 124-25.
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brutal punishment than that faced by white defendants.' 17 If con-
victed of an assault against a white person, a New York slave could
receive any judicial sentence except death or amputation; if a jury
convicted a slave of any number of capital offenses, the slave faced a
mandatory death penalty. 18
Despite the disparity in sentencing black and white defendants,
the northern colonies appear to have relied more frequently onjudi-
cial process than did the southern colonies and to have imposed less
brutal sentences in noncapital cases.' 19 Most northern legislatures
did not authorize branding, mutilation, or dismemberment as lawful
sentences for a slave's repeated offenses in noncapital cases. 120
However, in capital crimes such as murder, rape of a white per-
son, 12 1 or threats to state security,122 New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania sentencing laws were as cruel as any imposed in the
southern colonies.
117 Id.
118 Id at 119-24.
119 "The [New England] codes were not nearly as harsh as those of the southern
colonies or even the middle colonies. There were few capital crimes and little branding
and maiming. The usual form of punishment was the lash which, admittedly, was gener-
ously used both by masters and by colonial officials." J. FRANKIN, supra note 57, at 106;
L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 130-43; W. JORDAN, supra note 57, at 104; A. MEIER & E.
RUDVICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETrO (1970).
Although colonial New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania laws authorized
sentences such as branding, maiming, dismemberment and execution by fire, they ap-
parently were not employed as systematically in noncapital crimes as they were in the
South. A. ZILvERSMrr, supra note 110, at 22. For some crimes, such as striking and
injuring a white person, northern slaves faced a less severe judicial sentence than im-
posed by southern law. New York's 1702 law provided a maximum sentence of 14 days
in jail and/or corporal punishment, "not extending to [the slave's] life or limb," A. HIG-
GINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 120; cf. South Carolina's 1722 law which mandated a death
sentence in such cases if the white person was injured or bruised. Id. at 186, 195.
120 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 119, 132, 146.
121 "In 1706, the courts had been empowered to punish capital offenses committed
by a slave 'in such manner and with such circumstances as the aggravation and enormity
of the crime shall merit.'" Id. at 124. In one case, four slaves were put to death with
"all the torment possible for a terror to others" for the murder of a family of seven. W.
JORDAN, supra note 57, at 116. A 1700 Pennsylvania law provided that any black con-
victed of attempting to rape a white woman or maid be castrated, but it was repealed in
1706 when the punishment was changed to whipping, branding, and deportation. See A.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 282. NewJersey's 1704 Act also authorized castration
for the crime of rape, and branding when a slave was convicted of grand larceny. W.
JORDAN, supra note 57, at 154.
122 In 1712, a New York slave conspiracy trial resulted in mass convictions on
charges of arson and the murder of nine white people. The trial judge sentenced 13
slaves to die by hanging, a fourteenth was chained and starved to death, three others
were burned (one over a slow fire for eight to ten hours), and another was broken on the
wheel. W. JORDAN, supra note 57, at 115-16. Nearly 30 years later, charges of another
slave conspiracy resulted in a New York court convicting and sentencing 13 blacks to die
by burning at the stake and 18 by hanging (along with four whites), and 70 other blacks
were expelled from the colony. Id at 116-20; A. ZILv ERSMrr, supra note 110, at 20-23.
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E. Northern Colonial Justice for the African-American
Complainant
In the New England colonies, both free and enslaved blacks'
access to the court process and the right to testify against a white
person were protected. There, African-Americans theoretically had
the same procedural rights as did whites to seek redress for any
criminal or civil wrongs.1 23 Beginning in 1765, a smattering of cases
in Massachusetts illustrated that these written protections occasion-
ally materialized for some black complainants. In that year, a free
black woman successfully sued and recovered damages against a
white man who kidnapped her and kept her as a slave.124 In 1769, a
black slave sued his owner "in trespass for assault and battery, and
imprisoning... [him] in servitude."1 25 Five years later, a slave ob-
tained a jury verdict awarding him his freedom.1 26
In colonial New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, however,
because an African-American could not testify against a white per-
son or seek judicial redress, a white person had virtual immunity to
commit crimes ranging from assault to murder against black peo-
ple.127 Though whites could theoretically testify on behalf of blacks
against their white perpetrators, one can understand why this rarely
happened.
In the unusual situation where a colony recognized the crime of
raping a black woman, the legislature provided special dejure protec-
tion for the white offender. A 1700 Pennsylvania law eliminated any
punishment for white men found guilty of raping a black slave.1 28
The legal systems of these colonies thus closely resembled the
Southern model. Indeed, violence that was legally used to subju-
128 L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 181-85.
124 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 84; A. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 110, at 19
(stating that New England slaves could be a witness against a white man and could sue in
regular courts).
125 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 84-85.
126 Id at 85. Significantly, the slave's post-Revolutionary right to civil recourse
eventually led to the abolition of slavery in 1783. See Quock Walker v. Jennison, Proc.
Mass. Hist. Soc. 1873-1875, 296 (Sept., 1781) (a slave successfully sued for damages
against several white persons, including his owner, who had beaten him severely); Com-
monwealth v. Jennison, Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1873-1875, 294 (April, 1783) (the State
successfully prosecuted Quock Walker's owner following a court's charge that "Our
Constitution... sets out.., that every subject is entittled to liberty.., and in short is
totally repugnant to the idea of being born slaves," and the trial jury convicted the slave-
owner of assault and battery).
127 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 146, 282.
128 Since legal protection depended upon the rare sight of white witnesses coming
forward, it had even less meaning for deterring the most common form of violence
against slaves on the plantation. FREDERICK DOUGLASs, A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE (1845). See generally G. STROUD, supra note
69; infra note 134.
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gate blacks was a crucial mechanism for the perpetuation of the in-
stitution of slavery in these northern colonies.
F. Post-Revolutionary Developments in the North
The movement toward freedom during the Revolutionary War
eventually led northern states to abolish slavery. Between 1780,
when Pennsylvania's legislature called for the "Gradual Abolition of
Slavery,"' 129 and 1804, when New Jersey passed its emancipation
statute, 30 every original northern colony proclaimed its intent to
abolish slavery.' 3 '
In New England, this process guaranteed the continuation of
the dejure rights that slaves and free blacks had enjoyed during most
of the colonial period.' 3 2 In the remaining northern states-New
York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey-the master-slave relationships
continued long after enactment of abolition legislation.' 3 3 Until
state law officially abolished slavery, slave codes continued to deny
129 A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 299-303, 310. Pennsylvania did not abolish
slavery outright: African-Americans born after the law was enacted were free only after
serving their mothers' masters for 28 years. See A. ZILVERSMrr, supra note 110, at 116-
17. The Pennsylvania law became a model for other northern states; New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut passed similar laws in subsequent years.
130 A. ZLvRsMrr, supra note 110, at 192-93.
131 Vermont's Constitution explicitly outlawed slavery when it entered the Union in
1777. Id at 116. Rhode Island freed its slaves in 1784. Id at 119. A Connecticut stat-
ute passed in 1784 required that a child of a slave remain in bondage until 25 years old
(reduced to age 21 in 1797). Id at 123. In 1799, New York's law maintained slavery
until a male reached his 28th birthday and a female turned 25; slavery was officially
abolished in 1827. Id. at 182. NewJersey passed a gradual act in 1804 under which all
slave children born after that date would be free when they reached their 25th birthday
if male, or their 21 st birthday if female. Id at 192-93. New Hampshire passed legisla-
tion in 1857 which specifically banned slavery and provided for citizenship. Id. at 117.
132 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. The small black population in
New England was assured "the same judicial procedure and protection in criminal [and
civil] cases as did white persons." L. GREENE, supra note 57, at 184. These included the
right to testify in court, to seek redress in the legal system, and to receive procedural
protections as a criminal defendant. See supra notes 124, 126 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 131. The 1860 census revealed that slaves were still living in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, and were presumably not liberated unless still alive when the
thirteenth amendment was passed in 1865. A. ZILVERSMrr, supra note 110, at 207-08.
New York's legislative acts during this period demonstrate the ambivalent approach
toward providing court access rights for African-Americans. On February 17, 1809, the
New York legislature granted a slave's right to seek legal redress for personal injuries
(1809 N.Y. Laws), following successful criminal prosecutions against two white people in
the brutal beating of their slaves. Four years later, however, New York reaffirmed a
slave's disqualification to testify against a white person. In the same 1813 Act, the legis-
lature extended a slave's right to trial by jury, except when accused by a white person of
assault. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 145 (citing P. Van Ness and John Wood-
worth, eds., Laws of the State of New York Revised and Passed at the 36th Session of the
Legislature (1813), vol. 2, 207). Finally, in 1827 when slavery was officially abolished,
African-Americans were able to testify against a white person and to exercise their right
to trial by jury. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 57, at 147.
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slaves' rights.13 4
Once the states abolished slavery, they also began to remove
legal obstacles that denied African-Americans access to court. Stat-
utes that had denied slaves the right to testify against white persons
were repealed in many states, 135 and black criminal defendants were
afforded the same dejure procedural protections as accused whites,
including the right to trial by jury in the regular court system.136
The expansion of procedural legal protections that followed
slavery's abolition, however, was often accompanied by racial vio-
lence which chilled blacks' exercise of their newly attained rights.
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio experienced significant episodes
of white mob violence that resulted in substantial injury to blacks
and damage to their property.' 3 7 This violence was often accompa-
134 New York's "special courts" were abolished in 1827. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 57, at 147. Pennsylvania's special courts and laws for slaves also lasted for the life
of a slave. Id. at 272. NewJersey eliminated its slave courts in 1768, but enforced slave
codes until 1844, when slavery was officially abolished. A. ZILVERSMrr, supra note 110, at
221. While slavery existed, each state prohibited people of African ancestry from testify-
ing against a white accuser, and from filing a criminal complaint unless a white person
provided "credible" testimony. Consequently, every white person received near-
automatic immunity in assault, murder and rape cases when a black person was the only
witness to the crime.
135 In 1830, a free black could testify against a white person throughout New Eng-
land, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. By 1860, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Wisconsin had guaranteed this right. Oregon passed a similar law in 1862,
and California followed in 1863. In 1865, Indiana and Illinois became the last northern
states to repeal laws that had excluded black people from testifying against a white per-
son. Paul Finkleman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebel-
lum South, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 414, 424, 426 (1986).
136 E. TURNER, supra note 113, at 116 (stating that free blacks were tried in same
courts, punished with same penalty, and given same civil rights as a white person follow-
ing the 1780 Act).
137 White mob violence occurred in several northern states and cities prior to 1865.
See LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800-1850, at 96-11 (1981).
J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 234-35; LEON F. LrwACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO
IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860, at 100, 106-11 (1961). In New York, anti-black riots
took place in New York City in 1834, and in the upstate cities of Utica and Palmyra in
1839. In 1863, during the Civil War, the largest civil insurrection in American history
other than the South's occurred in New York City, when many blacks were murdered
and others were forced to take refuge in Central Park or NewJersey. See E. FONER, supra
note 14, at 32-33 (citing ADRIAN COOK, THE ARMIES OF THE STREETS: THE NEW YORK
CITY DRAFt RIOTS OF 1863 (1974)).
In Philadelphia, white mobs attacked African-Americans several times between
1834 and 1849. L. CURRY, supra, at 106. In 1834, white mob violence resulted in the
killing of one black person, the beating of many others, and the burning of thirty homes
and several churches. The following year, another similar attack caused numerous inju-
ries, destroyed buildings, and led to hundreds of black people fleeing the city. In 1838,
white mobs burned several buildings in the black community. In 1842, white mobs went
on a two night rampage of assault and arson, causing "serious injuries ... on every black
person encountered." Id.
In Cincinnati, white mobs attacked blacks and destroyed buildings within the black
community in 1829, 1836, and 1841. The 1841 riot was described as the most violent:
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nied by inaction or inadequate response by state law enforcement
officials toward those responsible. In virtually every situation, either
the state did not prosecute or the all-white jury did not convict the
perpetrator. In those rare cases where there was a successful prose-
cution, the courts imposed an extra-lenient punishment that failed
to vindicate the rights of the black crime victim. 138 Frederick
Douglass described African-Americans' plight in Philadelphia: "No
man is safe-his property and all that he holds dear, are in the hands
of the mob, which may come upon him at any moment, at midnight
or mid-day, and deprive him of his all."' 13 9
Moreover, despite the dejure eligibility of many qualified black
people, northern juries remained all-white prior to 1860.140
1500 white people attacked blacks for two nights, killing several and injuring many
more. Local law enforcement decided to take black males into custody, assuring them
that they and their families would be protected. The white mobs then attacked the black
women and their children. Id. at 108.
138 In general, Curry describes this leniency as not uncommon. L. CURRY, supra note
137, at 107. In Philadelphia, law enforcement officials failed to arrest white lawbreakers
in four of the five anti-black riots between 1834-1849. In the only incident in which
arrests were made, ten rioters were found guilty, but they neither received a prison sen-
tence, nor were they required to pay a fine. Id A Philadelphia citizens' committee re-
port concluded that African-Americans could avoid similar violence if they would behave
"inoffensively and with civility at all times and... not.., be obtrusive." L. LrrwAcK,
supra note 137, at 101.
In 1863 in New York, whites were not prosecuted after having engaged in the New
York City insurrection. See E. FONER, supra note 14, at 32. In Cincinnati, whites were
sentenced to pay fines in the 1829 riot. L. CURRY, supra note 137, at 107. In Providence,
during the Hardscrabble Riot of 1824, police made no effort to halt the destruction of
property. Later one watchman testified that he "considered he was doing his duty by
going there and keeping as still as possible." Id at 102.
139 L. LrTWACK, supra note 137, at 102.
140 Idl at 94. This commentator indicated that the first black jurors served at a trial
in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1860 (citing THE LIBERATOR, Apr. 1, 1859; THE LIBERA-
TOR, June 15, 1860; C.J. Fames, Walt Whitman Looks at Boston, 1 N.E. QUARTERLY at 356
(1928); ISAAC CANDLER, A SUMMARY VIEw OF AMERICA 291 (1824)); see L. GREENE, supra
note 57, at 299 (free blacks could not serve as jurors in New England); A. MEIER & E.
RUDVICH, supra note 119, at 76; see also ALExIS DE TOQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(P. Bradley ed. 1945) (describing the distinction between dejure and defacto rights for
free blacks in the antebellum north: "If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but
they will find none but whites among their judges; and although they may legally serve as
jurors, prudice repels them from that office." Id. at 359 (emphasis added)).
Juror eligibility was generally tied to voting, and African-Americans who met the
criteria could have theoretically served as jurors prior to 1860 in Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan (limited voting rights), New Hampshire, New York (property requirement to
vote), Ohio (mulatto persons could vote), and Vermont. See Finkleman, supra note 135,
at 425. However, it is questionable how many eligible blacks actually did vote. In New
York, the $250 property requirement was considered" 'not a trifle for a man doomed to
toil in the lowest stations; few Negroes are in consequence competent to vote. They are
in fact very little better than slaves, although called free.'" L. LrrWACK, supra note 137,
at 83-84 (quoting CARL D. ARFWEDSON, THE UNrrED STATES AND CANADA IN 1832, 1833
AND 1834, 239 (1834)). In other states, public anti-black opinion made it less likely that
an eligible black voter actually exercised his franchise rights. Id. at 84-93.
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Although blacks could now testify in court, all-white juries could
freely disregard that testimony which they had legally rejected for
more than 150 years. A black defendant's sworn testimony was still
regarded as inherently unreliable and untrustworthy.
When the first African-Americans broke the color barrier and
sat as trial jurors at a Worcester, Massachusetts criminal trial in
1860,14 1 the event did not escape the notice of a United States Con-
gressman from Indiana who warned of the dangerous consequences
that would follow:
Republicanism... in Massachusetts would allow a white man to
be accused of crime by a negro; to be arrested on the affidavit of a
negro, by a negro officer; to be prosecuted by a negro lawyer; tes-
tified against by a negro witness; tried before a negro judge; con-
victed before a negro jury; and executed by a negro executioner;
and either one of these negroes might become the husband of his
widow or his daughter! 142
III
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
As military defeat of the southern confederacy appeared immi-
nent, the Thirty-Eighth Congress sought to overrule Dred Scott v.
Sandford143 and to legalize slavery through enactment of the thir-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.'4 Although
141 L. LrWACK, supra note 137, at 96 (citing New York Constitutional Debates of
1846). English traveler Edward Abdy referred to the "difficulty of finding unprejudiced
witnesses and juries" when a black defendant was on trial. EDWARD ABDY, JOURNAL OF A
RESIDENCE AND TOUR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM APRIL 1833 TO OCTOBER
1834, vol. I, 46-47, 95; vol. III, 151 (1935).
142 L. LrrWACK, supra note 137, at 96-97; see CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 285
(1860) (statement of Rep. English, Indiana (Dem.) after learning that two black jurors
had been included on the Worcester, Massachusetts monthly jury list).
Congressman English's speech, "The Political Crisis," denounced some of the New
England states, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa for passing laws al-
lowing blacks to testify and sit onjuries. The Congressman compared these Republican
states with Democratic states, such as Indiana, Illinois, Oregon, and California, that
barred African-Americans from testifying against whites and from sitting as jurors. In
his concluding remarks, Congressman English described Republican "equality laws" as
disgusting, since they were contrary to the Democratic party's view that the United
States government was a white man's government. Id.
143 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
144 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII. The thirteenth amendment was introduced in the
House of Representatives on December 14, 1863 by James M. Ashley of Ohio. CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1863). That same day, Iowa Congressman James F.
Wilson, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced a joint resolution seeking
that the amendment be submitted to state legislatures for ratification. Id. at 21. On
January 13, 1864, Missouri Senator Henderson made a similar motion in the Senate. I&.
at 145. Following debate in the spring, 1864, the Senate passed the amendment 38 to 6.
Id. at 1490. The House vote, 93 in favor and 65 opposed, fell thirteen votes short of the
two-thirds needed to forward it to the states for ratification. Id. at 2995. (The official
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the amendment's proponents were forced to concentrate on refut-
ing arguments that Congress lacked power to amend the Constitu-
tion, 145 they identified the amendment's general objective as one of
promoting justice and equality before the law. The legislative histo-
ries of the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
show that the purpose of the amendment was to reach the root of
slavery and prepare for the destruction of the system.146
A. Legislative Intent
The legislative debate which shaped the thirteenth amendment
underscored Congress's concern that the amendment was intended
to do more than merely strike "the shacle... from the limbs of the
hapless bondsman."' 47 Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, the
vote was later changed to 96-66, 21 not voting, id. at 3014). Following the November
1864 elections, the newly constituted House reconsidered the Amendment in its second
session and, after extensive debate, more than two-thirds voted in favor. Id. at 531.
145 The principal argument used by opponents against the passage of the thirteenth
amendment during the first session of the 38th Congress was based on principles of
federalism and advocacy of states' rights: "Let us leave it... to each state to do what it
believes to be just and expedient in reference to its own people and its own institu-
tions." Id at 2940 (statement of Rep.John Pruyn, N.Y.); see also id at 2926 (statement of
Rep. William Holman, Ind.); id at 2615 (statement of Rep. Anson Herrick, N.Y.); id at
2945 (statement of Rep. Martin Kalbfleisch, N.Y.); id. at 2992-95 (statement of Rep.
George Pendleton, Ohio); id at 1356-66, 1440-41 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury, Del.);
id at 104 app. (statement of Sen. Davis).
Many, however, openly defended slavery. Indiana Congressman Edgerton, for ex-
ample, remarked: "Better, sir, for our country, better for man that negro slavery exist a
thousand years than that American white men lose their constitutional liberty in the
extinction of the constitutional sovereignty of the Federal States of the Union." Id. at
2987. New York Congressman Wood argued that this is "no time to make or alter con-
stitutions .... Nations do not alter their forms of government amid revolutions." Id at
2940.
Several proponents understood Congressman Wood to mean that slavery was the
best condition for African-Americans. See id at 2942. They attacked him for suggesting
"a proposition so monstrous and so barbarous ... ." Id at 2980 (statement of Rep.
Russell Thayer, Pa.). Illinois Congressman Farnsworth replied, "What vested right has
any man or State in property of man?" Id at 2978; see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d
Sess. 220 (1865) (statement of Rep. John Broomall, Pa.). But Kentucky Congressman
John Mallory joined Wood's remarks when he said that the "condition of slavery... is
the best.., in which the African has ever been placed on the continent of America... as
it regards his physical, moral and intellectual want." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2983 (1864).
Opponents also argued that the absence of 11 southern states invalidated the
amendment because there would be less than three-fourths of the states voting to ratify.
IE at 2988 (statement of Indiana Rep. Joseph Edgerton); id. at 2978 (statement of Rep.
Mallory).
146 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1203 (1864) (Sen. Henry Wilson, Mass.); see
also id at 2980 (statement of Rep. Russell Thayer, Penn.) ("Now is the time to uproot
and destroy forever this prolific cause of all our sufferings."); id at 1370 (statement of
Sen. Clark, N.H.).
147 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1863-64).
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first to speak after the amendment was introduced in the Senate on
March 29, 1864, promised that:
If this Amendment shall be incorporated by the will of the nation
into the Constitution of the United States, it will obliterate the last
lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading
and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was
and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.148
New Hampshire Senator Daniel Clark, President pro tempore of the
Senate, echoed Senator Wilson and explained that the proposed
amendment would not only accomplish the "simple" emancipation
of slaves, but would also "plant new institutions of freedom."1 49
The amendment's supporters understood that there was an in-
stitutional foundation that supported slavery, a system of laws that
propelled the black race to an inferior and subordinate position.
During the congressional debates, a central theme of many legisla-
tors was that the denial ofjustice to people of African ancestry was a
primary incident of "this poisonous plant."' 50 For example, Iowa
Congressman James F. Wilson, co-author of the amendment and
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, compellingly argued that
slavery contradicted and threatened the concept ofjustice that was a
"main object" of the American people when "they ordained the
Constitution of the United States .... Slavery is injustice. The
establishment of justice would destroy slavery. Both cannot live in
peace .... We must establish justice on the tomb of slavery or have
it not at all."'151
Some legislators made general references to badges of slavery
that had denied blacks the privileges and immunities of citizenship
which belonged to every free citizen, "high or low, rich or poor,"'1 52
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1329.
150 Id. at 1481. Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner described how "courts
which should have been asylums of liberty have been changed into barracoons ....
Under the influence of slavery, justice, like Astraea of old, had fled." I&. Pennsylvania
Congressman William Kelly viewed the amendment's primary objective as securing 'jus-
tice to all men," id at 2985, while in Illinois Congressman Isaac Arnold's words, "lib-
erty, equality before the law, is to be [its] greatest cornerstone." Id at 2989.
Congressman Arnold's statement continued: "Much yet remains to be done.... While
our gallant soldiers are subduing the rebels in the field, let us second their efforts by
sweeping from the statute book every stay and prop and shield of human slavery, the
scourge of our country, and let us crown all by incorporating into our organic law the
glorious prohibition of slavery." Id. Pennsylvania Congressman E.C. Ingersoll sup-
ported "the adoption of this amendment because it will secure to all the oppressed slave
his natural and God-given rights ... a right to live.., in a state of freedom.., the day is
not far distant when we may rejoice in the glorious consummation of the eternal princi-
ples of liberty, truth, and justice." Id. at 2990-91.
151 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1201 (1863-64).
152 Id. at 1319 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
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black or white.153 Iowa Senator James Harlan was one of the few
early proponents of the amendment who attempted to define the
specific rights to be included within its guarantee of freedom. Sena-
tor Harlan identified some of "the necessary incidents of slavery
which it was the specific object of the amendment to abolish," in-
cluding, among others, the denial to blacks "of a status in court."'154
He argued that the institution of slavery had "robbed [African-
Americans] of all their rights and then robbed [them] of their capac-
153 Professor tenBroek, the seminal commentator on the amendment, concluded
that the amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude included "a
direct ban against many of the evils radiating out from the system of slavery," and pro-
tected against "the denial to the blacks, bond and free, of their natural rights... [and]
the denial to the whites of their natural and constitutional rights." Jacob tenBroek, Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CAL. L. R~v. 171, 180 (1951). He
describes free blacks as "only less degraded, spurned and restricted than his enslaved
fellow. He bore all the burdens, badges and indicia of slavery save only the technical
one." Id at 179. Reviewing the legislative record, wrote Professor tenBroek, "ex-
plode[s] the traditionally accepted belief [that] the scope and meaning of the thirteenth
amendment" was limited solely to the abolition of slavery and emancipation of those
enslaved. Id Rather, it guaranteed blacks their natural and constitutional rights by
eliminating the badges and incidents of slavery, and extended these protections to
whites.
Congressman James F. Wilson introduced the amendment by referring to the
"twenty million of free men [white and black] in the free states [who] were practically
reduced to the condition of semi-citizens of the United States," and whose "enjoyment
of rights, privileges and immunities ... could be enjoyed only when debased to the uses
of slavery." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1863-64).
Senator Wilson described the poor white man as the "wronged victim of the slave
system .... impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that makes toil a badge of
disgrace, and... [who] will.., begin to run the race of improvement, progress and
elevation" once slavery is abolished. Id. at -1324. Congressman E.C. Ingersoll asserted
that the amendment's guarantees would apply to "the seven millions of poor white peo-
ple who live in the slave States but who have ever been deprived of the blessings of
manhood by reason of this thrice-accused institution of slavery [which has kept them in]
ignorance, in poverty, and in degradation." Id. at 2990.
For additional discussion of the thirteenth amendment framers' intent to protect
white Unionists, see Amicus Curiae Brief of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin, Louis R. Har-
land, Stanley N. Katz, Leon F. Litwack, C. Vann Woodward and Mary Frances Berry at
19, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) [hereinafter Historians'
Brief]; St. Francis College v. AI-Khazaraji, 481 U.S. 604, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1011
(1987); and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding respec-
tively that Arab-Americans and Jewish-Americans are among the groups protected
within the 1866 Civil Rights Act); G. Sidney Buchanon, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal
Histoiy of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1974).
154 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1863-64). Senator Harlan named sev-
eral incidents of slavery including "the conjugal relation.... the abolition practically of
the parental relation .... the relation of person to property. . ., the right to testify...
and the right to human sympathy ... , the suppression of the freedom of speech and of
the press .. ., [and] the perpetuity of the ignorance of its victims."
See also Judiciary Committee Report related to proposed statute, S. 99, Equality
before the Law, concerning allowing testimony of African-Americans against white per-
sons in federal court. SENATE REPORTS (Feb. 29, 1864). Senator Sumner also referred
to "that odious rule of evidence, so injurious to justice and discreditable to the country
...." Id at 1482.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
ity to complain of wrong." The Senator recognized that the white,
slaveowning class's exclusive control over the administration ofjus-
tice and selection of judicial bodies had "robbed [African-
Americans] of their power to appear before impartial tribunals for
the redress of any grievance, no matter how severe."' 155
Opponents of the thirteenth amendment argued against its pas-
sage because they recognized that the amendment's guarantee of
freedom meant more than merely freeing the slaves from bondage.
New York Congressman Fernando Wood charged that the amend-
ment would result in "the utter and complete extirpation of slavery
from the soil of the Republic,"' 56 a consequence which his New
York colleague, Anton Herrick, feared would allow Congress to con-
trol the states' domestic affairs.' 57 Indiana Congressman William
Holman argued that the amendment's guarantee of freedom was
equivalent to granting African-Americans full rights of citizenship:
Is freedom the simple exemption from personal servitude? No
sir. In the language of America it means the right to participate in
government, the freedom for which our fathers resisted the Brit-
ish empire.., the elevation of the African to the august rights of
citizenship.158
Following the narrow defeat of the thirteenth amendment in
1864,'5 9 Congressman Ashley, the Republican floor leader, pledged
to reintroduce the amendment after the November election.' 60 As
the second session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress convened, it was
clear that the November voters had delivered a "more definite ex-
pression of the public will" to the House.' 61 One representative ex-
plained the popular mandate that had emerged from the election:
"what has transpired between the last session of Congress and the
present . . . [is] that the policy pursued by the Administration has
been indorsed by the vote of the people . . . [by a] four hundred
thousand majority .. "..",162 Public interest in the passage of the
155 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1439 (1863-64).
156 Id at 2942.
157 Id at 2635.
158 Id. at 2962.
159 See supra note 144.
160 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 3357 (1864-65).
161 Id at 144 (statement of Rep. Godlove Orth, Ind.: "Probably it was right that the
question of reconsideration should have been postponed. ... [In a Government like
ours, resting upon the will of the people .... it was well to have another and more
definite expression of the public will.").
162 Id. at 155 (statement of Rep. William Higby, Cal.). Though many Democrats lost
in the 1864 congressional elections, they retained their seats until March 4, 1865. Presi-
dent Lincoln threatened to call a new session of Congress in order to pass the thirteenth
amendment, but first sought to sway lame duck Democrats to vote in favor under the
theme of national unity. His arguments succeeded in convincing 14 Democrats who had
lost their elective posts to vote in favor of the amendment, providing the necessary two-
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thirteenth amendment was reflected by the actively contested de-
bate that consumed eight consecutive days of House session inJanu-
ary, 1865.163 Both supporters and opponents sharpened their
disagreements as they considered the consequences of granting
freedom.
Proponents of the amendment still emphasized that slavery was
"a system.., at variance with... every idea ofjustice."'164 In expla-
nation of the phrase "equal rights before the law,"1 65 they re-
emphasized earlier calls for "removing every vestige of African slav-
ery from the American Republic."' 166 This caused opponents to
charge that the Republican-led Congress intended to include
African-Americans as members of the "political community formed
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United
States,"' 67 who would be entitled to and eligible for many rights,
including the rights to vote and to serve as jurors. 168
thirds majority. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CML WAR ERA
838-39 (1988); see infra note 176 for a description of the excitement surrounding the
amendment's passage.
163 The debates began on Friday, January 6, when Congressman Ashley reintro-
duced the amendment on the floor of the House, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
138 (1865), and after eight days of debate a vote on the amendment was postponed to
January 28. Many legislators participated in the debate, often punctuated by intense
exchanges that reflected their diverse views.
164 1i&; see also id at 142 (statement of Rep. Godlove Orth, Ind.: "What is this institu-
tion of American slavery? A system of fraud, of injustice, of crime, and of tyranny.").
165 Id at 154, 155 (statement of Rep. Henry Davis of New York: "I am not.., one
of those who believe that the emancipation of the black race is of itself to elevate them to
an equality with the white race.... [B]ut I would make every race free and equal before
the law .... ).
166 Id. at 155 (statement of Rep. Henry Davis of New York).
167 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1857). Pennsylvania Congressman
Thayer summarized the principal arguments of those who opposed the amendment's
passage: First, Congress lacked constitutional power to amend. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 150-54 (1865); see id. at 197 (statement of Rep. Andrew Rogers, NJ.); id
at 154 (statement of Rep. Charles Eldridge, Wis.); id at 177, 179-80 (statement of Rep.
Elijah Ward, N.Y.); i at 221-25 (statement of Rep. George Pendleton, Ohio); id. at 523
(statement of Rep. James Brown, Wis.). Second, it was improper to pass an amendment
when the South was unrepresented in Congress. Id. at 149-50; see id. at 146-48 (state-
ment of Rep. George Bliss, Ohio); id. at 219-20 (statement of Rep.James Cravens, Ind.);
id. at 523, 524 (statement of Rep. Alexander Coffroth, Pa.). Third, abolishing slavery
would amount to an injustice to private property rights. Id at 181-83 (statement of Rep.
Brutus Clay, Ky.).
168 Congressman Voorhees accused "[tihe party now in power [of] seek[ing] to en-
franchise the liberated negro, to make him a voter, a juror, and eligible to office." CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1865) (emphasis added). Virginia CongressmanJohn
Stiles seconded these remarks: "The right of negroes to become voters,jurors, and in all
respects equal with the white man is the favorite theory of the times and of the party in
power." Idt at 291 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2986 (statement of Rep. Edgerton,
who believed that federal and state citizenship rights, including the right to vote, were
all logically involved in the proposed amendment). Others denounced the call for free-
dom and equality. Id. at 179 (statement of Rep. Mallory, Ky.); see also id. at 177 (state-
ment of Rep. Ward, who feared that the amendment would mean that "all persons shall
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Supporters of the amendment rallied to the general theme that
"[j]ustice, long delayed, should be awarded"' 169 to African-American
people. Some specifically addressed the legal process. Elaborating
on his first session support for granting Negroes all the rights of
white men,' 70 Pennsylvania Congressman William Kelley turned his
attention to the one-sided results of the all-white jury. Congress-
man Kelley read into the congressional record an 1864 New Orleans
newspaper editorial that severely criticized an all-white jury's acquit-
tal of a white defendant who admitted killing a young black man.171
The editorial condemned the all-white verdict because it failed to
meet the "twofold purpose" of a jury: "Justice has to strike the cul-
prit and avenge the blood of the innocent, as well as to defend the
accused party against undue prejudices."' 172
The editor exhorted his readers to demand change: "Why have
we no representatives in thejury? Are our lives, honor, and liberties
to be left in the hands of men who are laboring under the most stub-
born and narrow prejudice? Is there any protection or justice for us
at their hands?"'173 The editorial closed with a plea to Congres-
sional abolitionists who would be reconsidering the passage of the
thirteenth amendment to completely reform the laws relating to the
formation of the jury. 174
Congressman Kelley added that slavery made it virtually impos-
sible for an accused black, or for white people in the South loyal to
be equal under the law, without regard to color .... ). Ohio Congressman White ar-
gued that the constitutional ban on slavery would empower Congress to pass "appropri-
ate legislation" that would destroy the fundamental nature of government:
What will be the effect of turning loose this mass of people? Do you
propose to enfranchise them, and make them "before the law" . . . the
equals of the white man; give them the right of suffrage; the right to hold
office; the right to sit upon juries? Do you intend.., to make this a mongrel
Government, instead of a white man's Government?
Id. at 216 (statement of Rep. C.A. White, Ohio) (emphasis added).
169 Id at 200 (statement of Rep. John Farnsworth, Ill.). Representative John Mc-
Bride of Oregon stated:
Sir, let the rights and status of the Negro settle themselves as they will
and must upon their own just basis. If, as a race, they shall prove them-
selves worthy [of] the elective franchise, I tell gentlemen they will enjoy
the right; they will demand and they will win it, and they ought to have it.
Id. at 201-02; see id at 220 (statement of Rep. John Broomall, Pa.); id. at 234 (statement
of Rep. Smith, Ky.); id. at 244 (statement of Rep. Russell Thayer, Pa.).
170 Id. at 2987.
171 Congressman Kelley was referring to an editorial published in the New Orleans
Tribune, Dec. 15, 1864, a newspaper he characterized as "the organ of the proscribed
race in Louisiana." In the Louisiana case, "[t]here was no dispute as to any of the facts":
the white defendant purposefully pushed a young black man into the water, and watched
him drown while preventing a rescue by any of the victim's friends. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1865).
172 Id. (quoting from the New Orleans Tribune, Dec. 15, 1864).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 2009 (1864-65).
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the Union, to receive a fair trial. "Where will they find an unpreju-
diced judge and an impartial jury to vindicate their innocence when
falsely accused ... ?"175 Congressman Kelley thus acknowledged
that the exclusion of black jurors was one of slavery's badges be-
cause it denied courtroom justice to the African-American
community.
When the House passed the amendment,1 76 the fundamental
nature of the amendment's constitutional prohibitions and guaran-
tees was not lost on supporters or opponents. 77 Though not de-
lineating specific rights, privileges, and immunities of citizenship,
the thirteenth amendment's congressional debates laid the concep-
tual foundation for defining freedom and liberty,' 78 a task taken up
later in the formulation and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
B. The Southern Response: White Violence and the Black
Codes
Immediately following the Civil War, a southern wave of vio-
lence clearly signalled that the Confederacy would seek to prevent
the thirteenth amendment from removing slavery's badge of injus-
tice to African-American people. In Arkansas, "24 Negro men[,]
wom[e]n and children were [found] hanging to trees all [a]round
the Cabbins";179 in Louisiana "white men whipped colored menjust
the same as they did before the war";180 in Texas, blacks were "fre-
quently beaten unmercifully";' 8 ' in South Carolina and Alabama,
black men were murdered for "insubordination"; 8 2 in Georgia,
175 Id. at 289 (1865).
176 After the House vote was recorded, 119 in favor, 56 opposed, 8 not voting, the
House response was described as follows:
The announcement was received by the House and by the spectators with
an outburst of enthusiasm. The members on the Republican side of the
House instantly sprung to their feet, and, regardless of parliamentary
rules, applauded with cheers and clapping of hands. The example was
followed by the male spectators in the galleries, which were crowded to
excess, who waved their hats and cheered loud and long, while the ladies,
hundreds of whom were present, rose in their seats and waved their
handkerchiefs, participating in and adding to the general excitement and
intense interest of the scene. This lasted for several minutes.
Id at 531.
177 Congressman Kelley described the amendment as "unfolding a new page in na-
tional life," id at 290, while opposing Kentucky Congressman Robert Mallory called the
measure radical and revolutionary. Id.
178 After the amendment was passed by Congress, Frederick Douglass stated, "Ver-
ily, the work does not end with the abolition of slavery, but only begins." E. FONER,
supra note 14, at 76.
179 Id., at 119 (citing letter from William L. Mallet to Thaddeus Stevens, May 28,
1866, Stevens Papers).
180 Id (citing S. REP. No. 693, pt. 2, at 175-76, 191).
181 Id (citing ExEc. Doc. No. 27, at 83).
182 Id. at 120.
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North Carolina, and Virginia, violent assaults and killings marked
the end of the War.'8 3
A historian of the period noted that violence often went unpun-
ished because local law enforcement officials refused to prosecute
offenders. 8 4 Some officials were reluctant to prosecute because
they feared such a decision would be "unpopular and dangerous,"
and could lead to loss of public office.' 85 Most declined to prose-
cute because they still believed that blacks had no right to legal pro-
tection from whites' violence. Slavery's legacy made it all but
impossible for southern law enforcement officials to punish white
offenders after the War. "[B]ecause Southern whites viewed vio-
lence as an acceptable means of labor and race control, white sher-
iffs, magistrates, judges, and jurors often proved unwilling to mete
out justice to whites who committed acts of violence against freed
men.,'186
The long standing rule that disallowed the testimony of blacks
against whites was a focal point of whites' legal immunity. However,
the letters of Freedman Bureau officials, who were assigned to vari-
ous confederate states during the post-War period, 18 7 reveal that
the inadmissibility of testimony was only the first obstacle to court-
room justice for people of African ancestry. For even where a
state's rules allowed blacks to testify, the more serious barriers to
overcome were the "white judges and jurors [who] would disregard
[the] testimony offered by blacks."' 88 In many states, federal offi-
183 Id. at 12.
184 CONG.JoINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1866) followed hearings on post-War conditions in the South regarding the fail-
ure of local and state officials to enforce the criminal laws where the victim was black or
viewed as a white unionist. REPORTS OF ASSISTANT COMM. OF THE FREEDOM'S BUREAU,
1865, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 27, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1866); Freedmen's Affairs, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 66, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1866); Murder of Black Soldiers, U.S. REP.
No. 23, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. (1866). E. FONER, supra note 14, at 203-05, refers to "po-
lice forces as well as state militias frequently terroriz[ing] the black population .... "
Foner concludes that "blacks ... had little confidence in the courts of Presidential Re-
construction." See also Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MiH. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (1952); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutional-
ism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 874-75 (1985).
185 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 204.
186 DONALD G. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 25 (1979); see also E. FONER, supra note 14,
at 205.
187 The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands Act was first passed
in March 1865, and authorized the President to appoint a Commissioner to direct the
Bureau's operations and as many as 10 assistant commissioners. Though the statute was
vague in describing the agency's authority, its general purpose was to protect blacks in
the post-War South. See also D. NIEMAN, supra note 186. The Bureau's specific responsi-
bilities included distributing clothing, food, and fuel to freedmen and to white southern
refugees. E. FONER, supra note 14, at 69.
188 D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 18 (emphasis added) (citing Letter from Assistant
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cials and prosecutors realized that eliminating discriminatory testi-
mony did not mean that an accused black could receive a fair trial
"owing principally to the prejudice of [white] jurors."189
Although many southern state law enforcement officials de-
clined to act against white violence, the ones that did arrest and
prosecute those responsible rediscovered the one-sided results of
the all-white jury process. For example, in Texas, whites were in-
dicted and charged with 500 murders of blacks between 1865 and
1866.190 In the 500 subsequent trials, all-white Texas juries acquit-
ted every one of the defendants.' 9 '
In the words of one historian, the post-War violence "reflected
whites' determination to define in their own way the meaning of
freedom and their determined resistance to blacks' efforts to estab-
lish their autonomy .... ,"192 As further evidence of what "their own
way" meant, every confederate state passed a series of laws, 198 the
Commissioner Samuel Thomas to Commissioner 0.0. Howard (Sept. 21 1865)).
Thomas's fellow official, Assistant Bureau Commissioner Orlando Brown of Virginia,
also questioned the impartiality of a southern court in evaluating a black person's sworn
testimony: "is it probable that justices would give such testimony its proper weight es-
pecially where their white neighbors are a party to a suit?" Id. (citing letter from Or-
lando Brown to 0.0. Howard (Sept. 8, 1865)). Neiman discusses the difficulties facing
Bureau agents in Louisiana:
In this situation, the problem was not that state officials refused to admit
blacks to the witness stand or denied them equal rights; the heart of the
matter was that state law enforcement and judicial officials deprived
freedmen of substantive justice through inaction, unfair rulings, and
prejudiced verdicts.
Id. at 25.
189 Id at 137 (quoting William Fitch, United States Attorney at Savannah).
190 Id at 120.
191 Id. at 204-05 (citing JAMES W. SMALLWOOD, TIME OF HOPE, TIME OF DESPAIR:
BLACK TEXANS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 33 (1981)). That South Carolina's trials deliv-
ered similar results is revealed from comments made by the head of that state's Freed-
men's Bureau: "It seldom results in anything but the acquittal of the criminal." Id at
204 (citing letter from South Carolina Bureau head Robert K. Scott to James L. Orr
(Dec. 13, 1866)). In Alabama, the report was the same: "It is almost impossible to
convict a white man for an offense committed against a freedman. Nojury is impanelled
that will weight out to such an offender ajust amount of punishment." Id. at 130 (citing
letter from an Alabama agent to Gen. Wager Swayne (Apr. 27, 1866)).
While reluctant to convict a white defendant charged with violence against blacks,
an all-white panel was ready to convict an accused black person, often on flimsy evidence
and "after a mere mockery of a trial." Id. at 26 (citing letter from Col. George D. Robin-
son to Col. C. Cadle (Jan. 17, 1866)). In Boydton, Virginia, a Federal agent reported
how black defendants were convicted "on the poorest kind of circumstantial evidence."
Id at 131 (citing letter from George Graham to Gen. 0. Brown (Aug. 31, 1868)).
192 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 120; see Historian's Brief, supra note 153, at 5.
193 In November 1865, Mississippi passed the first "Black Codes." South Carolina
and Louisiana followed soon thereafter with similar legislation. D. NIEMAN, supra note
186, at 83, 86. InJanuary 1866, Florida enacted laws that were as harsh as any state's in
1866. Id. at 89-91. Mindful of northern reaction to these laws, Alabama, Georgia, and
Virginia passed facially non-discriminatory codes in March 1866. Id at 92-98.
The last three states to pass Black Codes were Texas and Tennessee (in the fall of
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purpose of which was "to make Negroes slaves in everything but
name."19 4 Though some states' "Black Codes" were worse than
others, they saddled blacks with "onerous disabilities and burdens,
and curtail[ed] their rights ... to such an extent that their freedom
was of little value .... -195 In general, the Codes restored white
control over the mobility and working conditions of free blacks
through the use of labor contracts and compulsory work laws that
were enforced by southern state judicial systems. 196
The Black Codes permitted a black person to testify against
whites, but only in cases where one of the parties was black.' 9 7
Freedman Bureau officials reported in 1865 that in states allowing
such testimony the effect of a black person's testimony was negligi-
ble in the face of the all-white jury and court. 198 Secure in the
knowledge that repeal of testimony laws was uneventful when white
judges and jurors evaluated the validity of black testimony, every
southern state modified the absolute bar on testimony by blacks by
passing new laws between December 1865 and February 1867.199
1866) and Arkansas, which relied on pre-War laws until enacting its Black Code in Feb-
ruary 1867. THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 109, 113,
114 (1965).
194 D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 72-98. The Black Codes represented a legalized
form of slavery and were characterized by apprenticeship laws, labor contract laws, va-
grancy laws, restricted travel, and a legal system that denied civil and legal rights to
blacks while imposing extremely harsh criminal penalties against them. CONG. GLOBE,
29th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1866). See generally D. NIEMA', supra note 186, at 72-98; T.
WILSON, supra note 193, at 96-115 (detailing the particular Black Codes of each southern
state).
195 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
196 Southern states'judicial systems enforced the compulsory work laws through va-
grancy and sentencing statutes which forced a black person to either accept a labor
"contract" or be sentenced to be hired out as an unpaid owner. The nonpayment of a
court fine also resulted in additional periods of work. W.E.B. DuBois described the use
of vagrancy laws in the post-War South: "Negroes must leave the old plantations ... but
if caught wandering in search of work, and thus unemployed and without a home, this
was vagrancy, and the victim could be whipped and sold into slavery." W.E.B. DUBOIS,
BLACK RECONSTRaUCTON 152-53, 154-67 (1953); see also E. FONER, supra note 14, at 199-
204; D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 72-98; T. WILSON, supra note 193, at 96-115.
197 The Mississippi legislature was the first to repeal its testimony law and allow
African-Americans a limited right to testify. Following the State's initial refusal to pass
such a law, President Andrew Johnson warned Mississippi's Governor that federal
troops would remain in the state, and that Mississippi's senators and representatives
would not be seated in Congress, until Mississippi passed legislation that "g[ave] protec-
tion to all freedmen.., in person and property without regard to color." D. NIEMAN,
supra note 186, at 74. Every southern state followed Mississippi's example, and repealed
laws that had previously barred blacks from testifying against whites. The new laws per-
mitted testimony in cases where a black was a party to the action, although some differ-
ences existed in each state's laws. Id at 94, 99, 100, 109, 113. For example, Florida and
Virginia did not admit a black person's sworn deposition into evidence. Id. at 99-100; see
also W. DUBoIS, supra note 196, at 152-53.
198 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text; E. FONER, supra note 14, at 204.
199 D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 25.
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North Carolina made certain that the message was not lost on ju-
rors: prior to a black person's sworn testimony, judges were re-
quired to warn the witness to tell the truth. 200 Federal Bureau
agents also reported that some state prosecutors urged white jurors
to discount the testimony of blacks because their "childlike nature
and propensity to lie made them unreliable witnesses." 20 1
The states' procedural reforms were meaningless to the out-
come of cases when measured against the reality that a black per-
son's testimony would be rejected by the all-white court or jury.
The Black Codes perpetuated the exclusion of black people from
juries, and several states reinforced this practice by passing specific
laws that limited jury eligibility to whites only.20 2 Interestingly,
most of these state laws were passed after the Civil Rights Act was
approved by Congress, perhaps in anticipation that the Act's equal
rights protections threatened to dismantle the institution of the all-
white jury.
C. Civil Rights Act of 1866
The South's violent response to the passage of the thirteenth
amendment delivered a clear message that black people's "free-
dom" would include neither protection of their civil rights nor
equality with whites.203 As United States legislators met in the
Thirty-Ninth session of Congress, Republican Party members were
determined to ensure the enforcement of the amendment by elabo-
rating its meaning in statute. As described below, in seeking to es-
tablish "freedom as a permanent institution," the legislators
recognized that lack of justice for black people in the courts of the
country had been an integral part of the institution of slavery be-
cause it denied black people redress for wrongs committed against
them.
200 T. WILSON, supra note 193, at 105.
201 D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 131.
202 Texas, Tennessee and Arkansas, the last three states to pass Black Codes, see
supra note 193, enacted specific laws that disqualified blacks from serving as jurors. See
T. WILSON, supra note 193, at 110, 113, 114. Florida was the first, and only, southern
state whose Codes specifically provided that only white males could serve as jurors. D.
NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 89-90.
203 The South's response to the passage of the thirteenth amendment was not unex-
pected. Michigan Congressman Howard spoke for many when he said:
It was easy to foresee, and of course we foresaw, that in case this scheme
of emancipation was carried out in the rebel States it would encounter
the most vehement resistance on the part of the old slaveholders. It was
easy to look far enough into the future to perceive that it would be a very
unwelcome measure to them, and that they would resort to every means
in their power to prevent what they called the loss of their property under
this amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 503 (1866).
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Illinois Senator Lyman Trumball, a moderate-conservative Re-
publican 20 4 and Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, intro-
duced legislation that was to give meaning to the thirteenth
amendment's "declar[ation] that all persons in the United States
should be free. ' 20 5 In Senator Trumbull's words; "the only object
* . . is to secure equal rights to all the citizens of the country ....
[T]he bill applies to white men as well as to black men. ' 206
To give "practical effect, life, vigor, and enforcement" 20 7 to the
amendment, Senator Trumbull proposed that the Civil Rights Bill
of 1866 guarantee citizenship rights for people of African ancestry
and thereby overturn the Supreme Court's ruling in Dred Scott v.
Sandford. The Bill's first sentence declared that all persons born in
the United States were United States citizens, and as Senator Trum-
204 Contrary to popular belief, the overwhelming majority of United States Senators
who favored civil rights legislation between 1863-1869 were not radical republicans but
were "consistent conservatives" or "centrists-moderates." MICHAEL LES BENEDICr, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCrION, 1863-
1869 (1974). Benedict describes Senator Trumbull as one of the 15 "consistent con-
servatives" (five were regarded as centrists/moderates, and 11 were considered radicals)
for the following reasons: "He continually opposed radical legislation, led[ ] the effort
to restore Louisiana in 1865, led[ ] the movement to weaken the disqualification section
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, oppos[ed] black suffrage .... vot[ed] to acquit
[President] Johnson on the impeachment in 1868, and oppos[ed] efforts to sustain
southern Republican governments after 1868." Id at 39. Eric Foner described Senator
Trumbull as "embody[ing] the moderate... policy" of Republicans. See E. FONER, supra
note 14, at 243.
205 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866); see also id at 504 (statement of
Sen. Howard); id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer):
It was the purpose of the [thirteenth] amendment to relieve those who
were slaves from all the oppressive incidents of slavery ... to secure to
that class of persons the fundamental rights of citizenship... which con-
stitute the essence of freedom ... life, liberty, and property, and which
make all men equal before the law ....
RepresentativeJames F. Wilson (Iowa) introduced the Civil Rights Bill in the House
with even more sweeping constitutional declarations than those offered by Senator
Trumbull:
If citizens of the United States, as such, are entitled to possess and enjoy
the great fundamental civil rights which it is the true office of Govern-
ment to protect, and to equality in the exemptions of the law, we must of
necessity be clothed with the power to insure to each and every citizen
these things which belong to him as a constituent member of the great
national family.
Idt at 1118.
206 Itt at 599; see also id at 1118 (statement of Rep.James Wilson); idt at 1263 (state-
ment of Rep. Broomall: "Its terms embrace the late rebels, and it gives them the rights,
privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States .... ).
Many proponents and opponents of the Bill spoke about the statute's protection to
every citizen in the Republic's domain, and emphasized that it was not intended to be
limited to the South. Proponents included Rep. Wilson, id at 1117; Rep. Broomall, idt
at 1263; and Sen. Henderson, id. at 3035. Those opposed to the bill were: Sen. John-
son, id. at 504-05; Sen. Davis, id at 595; Sen. Cowan, id. at 603; Rep. Rogers, idt at 1120-
21; and Rep. Bingham, idt at 1291, 2542.
207 Id at 1151 (Rep. Thayer).
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bull stated, were entitled to "the great fundamental rights belong-
ing to free citizens." 208 The Bill then enumerated several of these
specific rights, including the "same right to sue, be parties .... give
evidence ... and to full and equal benefit of all laws ... for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." 20 9
To assure that these rights would receive federal protection, section
three of the 1866 Act provided for federal removal "of all causes ...
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the [state]
courts ... any of the rights secured to them by the first section of
this act." 210
In the congressional debates that preceded passage of the 1866
Act, legislators identified repeal of the slave laws that had prevented
black people from testifying or offering evidence against whites in
court as among the "inevitable incident[s] to liberty, without which
liberty would be but a name." 211 Each such law was said to have
deprived the black population of protection of their natural
rights.2 12 The Bill's supporters argued that one could not proclaim
208 Id. at 475 (Sen. Trumbull). The first sentence of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
states that "all persons born in the United States ... excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27.
209 Id
210 Id at § 3. Professor Robert Goldstein's excellent and comprehensive analysis of
section 3 removal relief distinguishes between the 1866 Act's intent to create federal
jurisdiction for state court defendants "who are denied or cannot enforce" section I
rights in the state courts, and its intent to create federal jurisdiction "on behalf of a class
of persons (such as victims or witnesses) other than state court defendants" who are like-
wise unable to enforce rights guaranteed by the Act. Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Varia-
tions on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REv. 469, 482-83 (1989) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's failure to follow this distinction in Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13
Wal.) 581 (1872)) (emphasis in original); see infra notes 264-80 and accompanying text.
211 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 42 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Sen-
ator Trumbull addressed both the antebellum laws and the Black Codes statutes during
the debate: "[A]ny statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of
civil rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his lib-
erty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited."). Id.
at 474.
212 Wilson concluded that the "great fundamental rights" were the natural rights of
man:
Before our Constitution was formed, the great fundamental rights
... belonged to every person who became a member of our great na-
tional family.
Upon this broad principle I rest my justification of this bill. I assert
that we possess the power to do those things which Governments are
organized to do; that we may protect a citizen of the United States against
a violation of his rights by the law of a single State; that by our laws and
our courts we may intervene to maintain the proud character of American
citizenship; that this power permeates our whole system, is a part of it,
without which the States can run riot over every fundamental right be-
longing to citizens of the United States....
Id. at 1119.
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freedom and then refuse to guarantee access to the courtroom. 213
An opponent of the Bill, Pennsylvania Senator Cowan, was one of
the few who recognized that guaranteeing the right to testify begged
the ultimate issue to be decided: would a jury believe a black per-
son's testimony? "[W]hatever objections there may be to their testi-
mony will go to their credibility rather than to their competency." 21 4
Democratic opponents of the Bill sought to restrict the impact
of the thirteenth amendment's prohibition on slavery. They argued
that the thirteenth amendment only severed the master-slave rela-
tionship, 215 and had not bestowed upon the freed slave all the rights
of a free citizen.2 16 In fact, this position was expressed by some of
the same legislators who had previously opposed passage of the
thirteenth amendment because of its potential sweep. 217 Oppo-
nents argued that the amendment should be narrowly construed
and that: "It was not intended to overturn this Government and to
revolutionize all the laws of the various States everywhere." 218
Others warned that the removal remedy would "wholly absorb all
213 Id; cf id. at 1157 (statement of Rep. Thornton, in opposition to the bill, who
argued that it was not "necessary that the negro should be a witness in all cases between
parties to secure his freedom"); id. at 480 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury that there exists
"'no right on the part of the [black] person to testify").
214 Id. at 1783; see supra note 188.
215 Id at 499 (statement of Sen. Cowan: "That amendment... was simply made to
liberate the negro slave from his master. That is all there is of it .... Nobody pretends
that it was to be wider in its operation than to cover the relation which existed between
the master and his negro African slave."); id. at 476 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); id at
1156 (statement of Sen. Thornton); cf Sen. Trumbull's response to Sen. Saulsbury; idt at
43. Sen. Howard answered Sen. Cowan's view of the thirteenth amendment:
[S]uch was not the intention of the friends of this amendment at the time
of its initiation here and at the time of its adoption.., much less by the
liberty-loving people
Its intention was to make him the opposite of a slave, to make him a
freeman .... [E]ntitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is
free ....
Id. at 503-04; see also remarks of Rep. Garfield ("What is freedom? Is it the bare privilege
of not being chained? ... If this is all, then freedom is a better mockery, a cruel delu-
sion") quoted in E. FONER, supra note 14, at 66 (quoting THE WORKS OF JAMES A. GAR-
FIELD 1882-1883).
216 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 476 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
217 Id. at 499 (statement of Sen. Cowan); id. at 113, 477 (statement of Sen. Sauls-
bury); id. at 317 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); id. at 185 (statement of Sen. Davis).
218 Id. at 499 (statement of Sen. Cowan); see also id. at 479-80 (statement of Sen.
Saulsbury); id at 317 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1063-64 (statement of Rep.
Hale); itt at 1120, 1122 (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 1154 (statement of Rep. El-
dridge); itt at 1268, 1270-71 (statement of Rep. Kerr); itt at 1292 (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
Republican proponent Sen. Morrill responded: "I freely admit this species of legis-
lation is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the midst of revolution ... a civil
and political revolution which has changed the fundamental principles of our Govern-
ment in some respects." Idt at 570.
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reserved state sovereignty and rights," 219 and give Congress unlim-
ited power to secure civil rights in the North as well as the South.220
Some characterized the Bill "as one of the most dangerous that was
ever introduced.., because it promised to bestow [equality] upon
the whole free negro population." 221 As one Congressman in favor
of th Bill stated: "Make the colored man a citizen of the United
States and he has every right which you or I have as citizens of the
United States under the laws and Constitution of the United
States." 222
The moderate-conservative wing of the Republican Party over-
whelmingly supported passage of the civil rights legislation. Radical
Republicans also endorsed the Act, although they favored more fun-
damental change.223 Consequently, the nonradicals were surprised
when the leader of their party, President Andrew Johnson, agreed
with the opposition and vetoed the Civil Rights Bill.2 24 Johnson
said the bill represented "an absorption and assumption of power
by the General Government which.., must.., destroy our federa-
tive system [and] foment discord between the two races .... Can it
be reasonably supposed that they possess the requisite qualifications
to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
219 IL at 506, 1777-79 (statement of Sen. Johnson); id. at 60 (statement of Sen.
Guthrie); id at 1120 (statement of Rep. Rogers); id at 1156-57 (statement of Rep.
Thornton); idL at 1266 (statement of Rep. Raymond); id at 1295-96 (statement of Rep.
Latham).
220 Though Congress's focus was on the southern codes, it was quite clear from the
debate that congressmen on both sides of the Bill were aware that its protections applied
to the entire nation. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
221 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
Rep. Eldridge also characterized the bill as "one of the most insidious and dangerous of
the various measures which have been directed against the interest of the people of this
country." Id at 1154.
222 It at 1266 (statement of Rep. Raymond, New York); see also id at 486 (statement
of Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 601 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
223 Moderate and conservative Republicans opposed black suffrage but favored civil
rights equality. See E. FONER, supra note 14, at 235-36, 176-239. Conservative Penn-
sylvania Senator Cowan expressed the consensus that had been built in favor of the
1866 Act: "I believe all the moderate, conservative men of this Chamber are fully
agreed that every man should have his national rights secured ... that he should have
the right to sue and be sued, and to testify in courts of justice." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1865).
Radical republicans supported the 1866 Act, although their objectives went beyond
equality in civil rights. M. BENEDICT, supra note 204. at 149. Some, led by Thaddeus
Stevens, advocated land confiscation from the wealthiest 10% of confederate planters,
with forty acres being distributed to each freedman, and the remaining 90% being sold
to the highest bidder. E. FONER, supra note 14, at 235. Stevens's amendment received
only 37 votes. M. BENEDICT, supra note 204, at 149-50.
224 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 247. The vote in both Houses of Congress indicated
the strong support for the civil rights statute. Considerably more than the two-thirds
required voted in favor in the Senate (33-12, 5 not voting) and in the House (111-38, 34
not voting). CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 607, 1367 (1866).
48 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
United States?" 225 Senator Trumbull was the first to respond to
Johnson's action by saying, "If the bill now before us, and which
goes no further than to secure civil rights to the freedman, cannot
be passed, then the constitutional amendment proclaiming freedom
to all the inhabitants of the land is a cheat and a delusion." 226
In April 1866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress overrode Johnson's
veto and in doing so upheld congressional power to pass any law
securing freedom to persons in the United States. 227 According to
225 CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., Ist Sess, 1681, 1679 (Johnson's Veto Message). Pres-
ident Johnson's speech also indicated that he feared Congress's power to "declare who,
without regard to color or race, shall have the right to sit as ajuror or as ajudge, to hold
any office, and, finally, to vote." Id. at 1679. Johnson's animosity toward blacks is de-
scribed in HANs Louis TREFOUSSE, ANDREWJOHNSON: A BIoGRAPHY (Norton ed. 1990).
226 CONG. GLOBE, 39th cong., Ist Sess. 1761 (1866).
227 Some proponents of equality before the law remained unconvinced about the
constitutionality of the 1866 Bill. During the debate, Ohio Congressman Bingham, the
second highest ranking Republican, proposed a constitutional amendment to secure the
Bill's objective of guaranteeing a citizen's "equal protection of life, liberty and property"
and "privileges and immunities." Id. at 1034, 1088 (statement of Rep. Bingham). Other
Republican supporters of the Bill respected Representative Bingham's concern about
the constitutionality of the 1866 Act:
The gentleman from Ohio .. .says the act is unconstitutional. Now I
have the highest respect for his opinions as a lawyer, and for his integrity
as a man .... On so vital a point I wish to make assurance doubly sure.
•.. If we are already safe with the civil rights bill, it will do no harm
to become the more effectually so, and to prevent a mere majority from
repealing the law and thus thwarting the will of the loyal people.
Id. at 2498 (statement of Rep. Broomall); see also id. at 2502 (statement of Rep. Ray-
mond, who voted to uphold the President's veto after first voting in favor of passage); id
at 2511 (statement of Rep. Elliot); id. at 2896 (statement of Rep. Doolittle); id (state-
ment of Rep. Howard). In addition, several Congressmen who opposed the Bill also
questioned its constitutionality. See, e.g., id. at 497 (statement of Sen. Van Winkle); id. at
41 (statement of Sen. Cowan); id at 504 (statement of Sen.Johnson); id at 1120 (state-
ment of Rep. Rogers). But see infra note 249 and accompanying text, citing federal and
state court decisions that upheld the constitutionality of the 1866 Act pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment. Though Congress tabled this proposal, doubts about the future
repeal of the Bill led Republicans to include Bingham's language when they introduced
what would become the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, only
three weeks after overriding the President's veto. Id. at 2459. On April 30, 1866, Rep-
resentative Stevens introduced the House-Senate Joint Committee's Reconstruction
plan, which is the current language included in the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment. When introducing the amendment, Stevens addressed those who argued that
"the civil rights bill secures the same things." Id at 2459. Stevens explained that a law
is repealable by a majority, "[a]nd... the first time that the South with their copperhead
allies obtain the command of Congress it will be repealed. The veto of the President
and their votes on the Bill are conclusive evidence of that." Id
The equal protection section of the Act was not seen as exceptional because it was
viewed as equivalent to the 1866 Bill's protections. See id. at 2459 (statement of Rep.
Stevens); id. at 2498 (statement of Rep. Broomall); id. at 2511 (statement of Rep. Eliot);
id. at 2896 (statement of Rep. Doolittle); id. at 2896 (statement of Rep. Howard). The
controversial sections of the fourteenth amendment were contained in sections two and
three. Section two concerned the issue of black suffrage and determination of a south-
ern state's number of representatives in Congress, id at 2544, 2869; section three
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one scholar, the Act won the overwhelming support of Congress be-
cause it "was an expression of most Americans' sense of fundamen-
tal justice," and contained "modest objective[s]" that were intended
"to protect Southern blacks (and whites) from corrupt law enforce-
ment practices that allowed crimes against them to go unpunished,
and subjected them to arrest, trial, and conviction of crimes by hos-
tile and prejudiced sheriffs, judges, and juries. '228
Although the 1866 Act did not specifically address the issue of
the all-white jury,229 its guarantee that a person receive "the full and
equal benefit of all laws ... for the security of person and property"
significantly changed the southern trial jury's composition. Follow-
ing an 1866 federal circuit court decision 230 that upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Civil Rights Act and the Military Reconstruction
Act passed in 1867,231 black jurors began to appear in several south-
sought to deny voting rights to those who aided the confederacy until 1870, id at 2544
(Representative Stevens's declaration: "Give us the third section or give us nothing").
228 Kaczorowski, supra note 184, at 883. Professor Kaczorowski argues that the
equal protection guarantees of the 1866 Act permit courts and Congress to add rights
that they believe are essential to the enjoyment of the natural rights of life, liberty and
property.
229 Voting and jury duty for African-Americans were controversial and potentially
divisive issues for Republicans in 1866. To assure passage, Republican floor leaders
Senator Trumbull and Representative Wilson, argued that the 1866 Civil Rights bill
"has nothing to do with" voting rights or jury service. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. 476 (1866).
Opponents viewed the clear language of the 1866 Act as including voting and jury
duty rights within the statute's guarantee of "equal benefit of all laws.., as those en-
joyed by white persons." See id. at 477-78, 606 (1866) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); id.
at 1122 (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 1157 (statement of Rep. Thornton); id. at 1291
(statement of Rep. Bingham). Some Republican proponents agreed, see id. at 768 (state-
ment of Sen. Wade); id. at 1058 (statement of Rep. Kelly); id. at 1642 (statement of Rep.
Garfield). Others sided with their floor leader's position of the Bill. Id. at 1255 (state-
ment of Sen. Wilson); id at 1151 (statement of Rep. Thayer); id. at 1263 (statement of
Rep. Broomall); id. at 1832 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
Benno Schmidt has suggested that "[it is child's play to argue that a right to serve
on juries ... is within the family of rights" covered by the 1866 Act because it is a right
"essential ... [and] necessary to full and equal benefit of all laws ... for the security of
person and property' " Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination:
The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1401, 1426-27 (1983)
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27). Even if the 1866 Act was
narrowly construed, Schmidt contends that "it by no means follows ... that a right to
serve on juries without racial discrimination was beyond the protection of the Act." Id.
at 1427. To the contrary, Schmidt argues, "an equal right to serve on juries is in har-
mony with the general aim of the 1866 Act-impartial justice with respect to basic civil
rights of life, liberty and property." Id. He concludes by stating that "it is very difficult
to accept that legislative history, narrowly conceived, should trump general text in con-
stitutional interpretation." Id; see tenBroek, supra note 153, at 181, 187; Aviam Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 683-86
(1979).
230 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
231 The Military Reconstruction Act was passed on March 2, 1867 over President
Johnson's veto. Ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2. The Act divided the South into
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ern states, including Georgia, 23 2 Texas, 233 North Carolina, 23 4 South
Carolina,23 5 and Louisiana. 23 6 By 1870, the integrated jury was a
common sight in those states. 237 This dramatic change in the court-
room was consistent with the sentiments of many, like Congressman
Thayer, who voted for the thirteenth amendment and the 1866 civil
rights statute:
The [1866] bill.., is to prevent that great measure from re-
maining a dead letter upon the constitutional page of this coun-
try.... The practical question now to be decided is whether... [a
five military districts, and authorized the President to appoint a major general to com-
mand each district and protect life and property. The five generals, with the exception
of the first military district in Virginia, ordered county sheriffs to select black jurors
either from its list of registered voters alone (Gen. Pope, third district covering Georgia,
Florida, and Alabama), or in combination with taxpayer lists (Gen. Sickels, second dis-
trict covering North and South Carolina; Gen. Ord, fourth district covering Mississippi
and Arkansas; Gen. Hancock, fifth district covering Texas and Louisiana). D. NIEMAN,
supra note 186, at 203-03, see E. FONER, supra note 14, at 307-08, 330. State constitu-
tional conventions between 1867-1869 eliminated property requirements for jury ser-
vice. Id. at 320. Despite these changes, "[i]n many instances, [state] judges avoided
military interference by covertly excluding blacks from jury duty or by allowing a very
few to serve as jurors." D. NIEMAN, supra note 186, at 203.
232 In one Georgia county, voters elected a black Justice of the Peace, who immedi-
ately broke the previous color barrier in jury selection by administering a policy which
assured that there would be an equal representation of blacks and whites on a Georgia
jury. E. FONER, supra note 14, at 358.
233 On May 8, 1867, the New York Times published a front page article entitled
Important Order by General Griffin-Jurors in Texas. The article described the Commanding
General in Texas issuing two directives. The directive first applied to any white male
eligible for jury duty, and required that before he could sit as a juror, he must swear,
under oath, that he "never voluntarily borne arms against the U.S.... [and promises to]
support and defend the Constitution." The second directive focused on assuring that
African-Americans would serve on Texas juries. The directive referred to section two of
the Civil Rights Act, and reminded the Texas official in charge of empanelingjurors that
it was a misdemeanor for any public official to deprive a citizen of any equal protection
right secured by the Act. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1867, at 1, col. 4.
234 A New York Times article published on August 9, 1867, entitled The Jury Order
Enforced, described the first integrated jury selected in Wilmington, North Carolina. The
'Jury of inquest" seated equal numbers of white and black people. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1867, at 4, col. 6. Three weeks later, the same newspaper reported on a North Carolina
state court opinion that upheld the right of black people to serve as jurors. The court's
decision declared that the thirteenth amendment had abolished the automatic exclusion
of black people from serving as jurors, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 affirmatively
granted black citizens the same rights enjoyed by whites including the right to serve as a
juror. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1867, at 5, col. 2.
235 In Charleston, South Carolina, federal district court judge Bryan ruled that the
selection of an integrated jury was constitutional with the passage of the thirteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. N.Y. Times, Decision by Judge Bryan Relative
to Colored Jurymen, Oct. 17, 1867, at 1, col. 4; see E. FONER, supra note 14, at 458.
236 A New York Times article reported on a New Orleans state judge swearing in the
first black grand juror in Louisiana. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1867, at 1, col. 6.
237 See E. FONER, supra note 14, at 366, 372. See supra notes 231-36 and accompany-
ing text, describing the first black citizens to serve as trial jurors in each of these states.
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large class of people] shall have the benefit of this great charter of
liberty given to them by the American people.
[W]hen I voted for the amendment to abolish slavery... I did
not suppose that I was offering them a mere paper guarantee.23 8
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment 1866-
1871
It would not be long before judicial interpretation reinforced
Thayer's analysis that the thirteenth amendment and the 1866 Act
were more than "mere paper guarantees." One month after the Act
was passed, the United States Attorney in Kentucky indicted three
white men for burglarizing the home of a black family in United States
v. Rhodes.239 The United States Attorney argued in federal court
that black victims of crimes committed by whites were unable to
enforce their right of personal security in Kentucky state courts be-
cause state law disqualified every black person from testifying
against a white criminal defendant.240
Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as the designated
Circuit Court Justice, rejected the defendant's claim that the civil
rights statute was an unconstitutional usurpation of state authority.
Justice Swayne concluded from the Act's legislative history that
Congress's "main object" in moving to protect a black person's
right to testify was to avoid perpetuating a "denial of justice"
against black crime victims and criminal defendants. 24 1 Justice
Swayne viewed the testimony rule together with the role of all-white
"[c]ourts and juries that were frequently hostile to the colored man,
and administered justice, both civil and criminal, in a corresponding
spirit." The result, said the Justice, was that "[c]rimes of the deep-
238 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866).
239 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151); see ROBERTJ. KACZOROWSKI, THE
PoLrTcs OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 9-10 (1985).
240 In Bowlin v. Kentucky, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867), Kentucky's highest court re-
versed a white defendant's conviction based on the testimony of a black witness. The
court also upheld a state statute which allowed a black's testimony only in cases against
blacks or Indians, or in civil cases to which only blacks or Indians were parties. Id at 6.
241 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 787 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
Recognizing the vulnerability of the entire African-American community when a crime
against an individual member went unpunished, Justice Swayne construed the language
that gave federal courts jurisdiction to include crime victims as among those "affect[ed]"
by the "cause." Id. at 786-87. Taking into account the historical circumstances in which
no legal remedy had been available to African-American crime victims, Justice Swayne
asserted that the court's responsibility was to resolve "[e]very doubt ... in favor of the
validity of the [1866] law." Id at 793. "It is incredible that all this machinery, including
the agency of the freemen's bureau, would have been provided, if the intention were to
limit the criminal jurisdiction conferred. . ., and exclude all white persons from its oper-
ation." Id. at 787.
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est dye were committed by white men with impunity." 242
Because the thirteenth amendment guaranteed freedom, said
Justice Swayne, the 1866 Act grant of citizenship was theoretically
"unnecessary": as free people, every black person was entitled to
the status and rights of citizenship. 243 However, given whites' con-
tinued opposition to blacks' rights, the Justice acknowledged that in
the absence of the Civil Rights Act, the "simple" abolition of slavery
would have "been a phantom of delusion.... [S]lavery would have
been in effect restored ....
Justice Swayne's decision in Rhodes upheld Congress's authority
to "give full effect to the abolition of slavery thereby decreed [under
the thirteenth amendment]. ' 245 Because all branches of the United
States government are charged with upholding the Constitution,
Swayne also highlighted the enforcement responsibilities of the ex-
ecutive and judicial branches.2 46
The following year, Chief Justice Chase, who sat as a Circuit
CourtJudge in Maryland, breathed additional life into the thirteenth
amendment. In In re Turner,247 the Chief Justice ruled that an ap-
prenticeship contract violated the equal protection clause of the
Civil Rights Act because it required the petitioner to work until she
was eighteen years old under conditions similar to those under slav-
ery. Such conditions were incidents of slavery and thus directly vio-
lated the guarantees of the thirteenth amendment.248
By upholding the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
these circuit court decisions249 provided a constitutional foundation
242 Id
243 Id. at 789. Justice Swayne concluded that the rights of citizenship were a direct
result of the thirteenth amendment's grant of freedom: "Mhe emancipation of a native
born slave by removing the disability of slavery made him a citizen. If these views be
correct, the provision in the act of congress conferring citizenship was unnecessary, and
is inoperative." Id
244 Id. at 794.
245 Id. at 793. In deciding that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was a constitutional exer-
cise of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment, Justice Swayne cited Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all the means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." See Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 791. In making
his decision, Swayne also referred to article 1, section 8, cl. 18-the necessary and
proper clause of the constitution. Id. at 792.
246 "[The thirteenth amendment] would have been competent to put in requisition
the executive and judicial, as well as the legislative power, with all the energy needed for
[t]he purpose [of abolishing slavery]." Id at 793.
247 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
248 Id. at 339.
249 In addition to the U.S. Circuit Court decisions in Rhodes and In re Turner, Profes-
sor Kaczorowski cites two unreported federal district court opinions which upheld con-
gressional power and intent to pass the 1866 Civil Rights Bill. R. KAczoRowsKi, supra
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for federal prosecutions of individuals who perpetuated the badges
and incidents of slavery. Yet, despite the occurrence of organized
white violence against blacks in the late 1860s, only the United
States Attorney in Kentucky aggressively prosecuted white offend-
ers. 250 The years 1869 through 1871 witnessed an unparalleled es-
calation of white terror and lawlessness. 251 Congressional hearings
conducted in 1870 revealed Ku Klux Klan criminality "so pervasive
that local law enforcement authorities in several Southern states
were unable to provide even the semblance of criminal law enforce-
ment."252 Following the hearings, Congress passed new federal
note 239, at 22. See also note 235, decribing a South Carolina decision upholding Con-
gress's authority and applying it to jury selection.
Most state appellate courts also upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the years
immediately following its enactment. E.g., Kelley v. State of Arkansas, 25 Ark. 392
(1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act, and upholding a black witness's testi-
mony against a white defendant); Gaines v. State, 39 Tex. 606, 611-12 (1873); see People
v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869) (acknowledging authority of federal government to
enforce civil rights). The Washington decision was overruled in People v. Brady, 40 Cal.
198 (1870) (states' rights theory) but reinstated in Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43
(1872). See also Ex parte Warren, 31 Tex. 143 (1868); supra note 234 (describing an 1867
North Carolina court decision upholding Act as it applied to jury selection); Smith v.
Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794 (C.C.D. Ky.
1866) (No. 16,151) (citing In re A.H. Somers, an 1866 Maryland high court decision); cf.
Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867) (striking down the Act as a violation
of a state's sovereignty to secure its citizens' rights); State v. Rash, 6 Del. (I Houst.) 271,
279-80 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1867) (refusing to challenge the constitutionality of Act, and
declaring that the right to testify was a rule of state judicial procedure rather than of
citizenship).
250 Benjamin Bristow, the U.S. Attorney in Kentucky, prosecuted 29 cases under the
1866 Civil Rights Act, including United States v. Rhodes, discussed supra notes 239-46
and accompanying text. See Goldstein, supra note 210, at 469-74. In 1870, Bristow be-
came the first Solicitor General and helped enforce the aggressive prosecutorial policy
established by the first Attorney General, Amos T. Ackerman. See R. KACZOROWSKI Supra
note 239, at 52, 80-83, 86, 87, 89-92.
251 In 1867, African-Americans began to form political groups, such as the Union
League, "the political voice of the freedman," for the purpose of gaining voting rights,
inclusion on local juries, and protection against white offenders, among other issues. E.
FONER, supra note 14, at 283-85. During the state constitutional conventions held in
1867, African-Americans gained state suffrage rights as the Republican Party won con-
trol of the southern state governments. kd at 314. Beginning in 1868, white supremacy
groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camelia, and the White
Brotherhood, engaged in a pattern of systematic violence throughout the South. The
violence targeted individual blacks who attempted to vote or who were active in the
Republican Party. Id at 425-27. White mobs attacked any African-American whom they
believed was "impudent" or who resisted behaving in accordance with the former
master-slave relationship. Ide at 430. Black elected officials were particularly vulnerable;
ten percent of those who served on the state constitutional conventions in 1867-68 were
victims of violence, including seven who were murdered. Id. at 426.
252 R. KAcZOROWSKI, supra note 239, at 81. The Ku Klux Klan is described as "a
military force serving the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all
those who desired the restoration of white supremacy." E. FONER, supra note 14, at 425.
The KKK leadership included "the very best citizens" living in the south, including
"planters, merchants, lawyers, and even ministers." Id at 432-33; see D. NIEMAN, supra
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criminal legislation2 53 and created a Department ofJustice to prose-
cute cases in which citizens' civil and political rights had been
violated.
While all-white state juries had previously freed whites respon-
sible for violating blacks' civil and political rights, federal prosecu-
tors now directed their arguments to newly constituted multiracial
juries. In 1867, the year following Justice Swayne's decision in
Rhodes, a remarkable change occurred in the administration of jus-
tice in the South: a black person's testimony was not only heard, but
it was evaluated by a jury consisting of black, as well as white, ju-
rors.25 4 In many southern states of the Republican controlled
South, including Georgia, Texas, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Louisiana, African-American men began to be called and to
serve as jurors.255 By 1870, as "biracial democratic government...
was functioning effectively in many parts of the south," 25 6 the culpa-
bility or civil liability of whites prosecuted for racially motivated vio-
lence was frequently being judged by juries of both blacks and
whites. "By having black men on thejuree bench," said one former
slave, "we then could defend our rights before the laws." 25 7
Between 1870 and 1873, the Justice Department's record in
successful prosecutions of white supremacists was extraordinary,
note 186, at 200; R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 239, at 53. For details of Klan violence
see E. FONER, supra note 14, at 425-44; ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku
KLux KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971).
White violence during this period went virtually unpunished. "If a white man kills a
colored man in any of the counties of this State... you cannot convict him." E. FONER,
supra note 14, at 435 (citing a Florida sheriff testifying during KKK Hearings). Professor
Kaczorowski describes local law enforcement officials' failure to respond as caused
either by fear or because they were "members of the Klan and participated in their
crimes." R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 239, at 55.
253 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, was primarily concerned with
prosecuting those who interfered with an individual's right to vote. In 1871, Congress
enacted a second Enforcement Act, sometimes referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), which was a comprehensive remedy against violations of civil
rights and included the "re-enact[ment of] the [1866] civil rights bill ... for the purpose
of carrying the fourteenth amendment into effect." The Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F.
Cas. 649, 655 n.6 (C.C. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
254 See E. FONER, supra note 14, at 355, 358, 362, 372; N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1867, at
1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1867, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1867, at 5, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1867, at 4, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 8, 1867, at 1, col. 4; supra note
237.
255 See supra notes 232-36.
256 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 372. Foner noted that the absence of the black juror
in communities or states under Democratic control was generally accompanied by a de-
nial ofjustice to blacks. For example, in Virginia, which managed to avoid implement-
ing the reforms of Reconstruction, one Freedmen Bureau official commented: "It is
almost impossible to convict a white man for an offense committed against a freedman."
Id. at 420. Civil litigants fared no better.
257 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 421 (citing letter from former Tennessee slave J.W.
Bailey to Tennessee Governor Dewitt Senter (May 15, 1869)).
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particularly when compared to the government's previous granting
of virtual immunity to such offenders. Federal prosecutions culmi-
nating in jury verdicts increased nearly twelvefold, from forty-three
cases during the Department's initial year in 1870 to over 500 cases
in 1872.258 Jury results were even more astonishing as "Republican
jurors and magistrates now treated black testimony with respect
.... ,"259 In 1872, integrated juries returned guilty verdicts in ninety
percent or more of these cases, almost double the federal conviction
rate in non-civil rights criminal cases.2 60 The combination of an ag-
gressive federal law enforcement policy and juries' willingness to
credit testimony against white defendants led one federal officer in
1872 to conclude that the Department was on the verge of destroy-
ing the Klan.261
Federal enforcement of civil rights law had proven that "[t]he
law on the side of freedom is of great advantage... where there is
power to make that law respected. ' 262 However, 1872 represented
the high water mark of the federal government's policy of aggressive
prosecution. Later that year, political support weakened and federal
funding decreased, forcing the Justice Department to cut back to a
strategy of selective prosecution against white terrorists. 263 The
258 Professor Kaczorowski deserves primary credit for his "prodigious archival ef-
forts" in revealing the Justice Department's substantial efforts to enforce civil rights in
its early years, 1870-1873. See Goldstein, supra note 210, at 475 n.25; see also R. KACzOR-
owslu, supra note 239, at 81-112. In 1870, the Justice Department prosecuted 43 civil
rights violators. In 1871, United States Attorney General Ackerman directed that the
full force of federal power should be employed against the Klan, and the number of
prosecutions increased to 271. Id at 83, 87. The backlog was substantial, with only
one-quarter of the cases completed, primarily because of a lack of funds, court conges-
tion, and constitutional challenges in Alabama and Mississippi. Id. at 88-89. In 1872,
the number of prosecutions almost doubled, with 555 cases being prosecuted.
259 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 537.
260 R. KoczoRowsKI, supra note 239, at 106; id at 104 (456 white defendants out of
505 tried were convicted by jury verdict in 1872). United States attorneys in South Car-
olina and Mississippi were particularly successful. In South Carolina, juries convicted
9017 of 105 defendants, id at 105; in Mississippi, 73%o of 356 defendants were found
guilty. Id.
In 1873, 537 cases were tried before ajury; the conviction rate was 92%. Id. The
United States Attorney's office in North Carolina had an astonishing 98% conviction
rate (263 of 269 cases), and Mississippi convicted 184 of 234 defendants tried. Id. at
107.
261 Id at 393.
262 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 458 (citing FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 377 (1962)).
263 R. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 239, at 102, 107-12. Professor Kaczorowski de-
scribes the difficulties faced by Justice Department attorneys in prosecuting civil rights
violations because of a shortage in resources, and a lack of congressional support. Id at
83-87, 102, 109. Despite the lack of adequate resources, Attorney General Ackerman
pursued an aggressive prosecution policy until he abruptly resigned in late 1871. His
successor, George Williams, ordered a stricter policy of selective prosecution. More
than 40% of the civil rights criminal docket was nolle prosequi in 1872, and in 1873, that
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year 1872 also marked the beginning of Supreme Court judicial de-
cision-making which -would soon eviscerate the substantial gains
made by blacks in the courtroom in the short period since the thir-
teenth amendment was passed in 1865.
E. Judicial Interpretation 1872-1874
1. Blyew v. United States264
Justice Swayne's warning in Rhodes that future courts might
tamper with the thirteenth amendment's intended legal protections
for the black race proved all too prescient.265 Beginning with the
Supreme Court's 1872 decision, Blyew v. United States, the thirteenth
amendment's broad promise to abolish slavery and grant freedom
was whittled away and soon lost altogether. Although the Court's
decision in Blyew upheld the 1866 Civil Rights Act's constitutional-
ity, it severely restricted the federal removal procedure which was
the only means for overcoming state inaction and prosecuting white
offenders in federal court.2 66
In Blyew, the Court reviewed the federal conviction of two white
defendants for axing to death a black married couple, their son, and
his ninety-seven-year-old, blind grandmother. The only witnesses
to the crime were two of the couple's children who had managed to
escape. Under Kentucky law, the defendants could not have been
prosecuted because Kentucky courts still did not permit a black per-
son to testify against a white defendant. 267
Sensing that application of state law would result in another de-
nial of justice, Justice Department attorneys assumed jurisdiction
under the Civil Rights Act. Relying on testimony of the two surviv-
increased to 59%. Id. at 106. In the spring and summer of 1873, Attorney General
Williams suspended all civil rights prosecutions and arrests, and President Grant or-
dered that clemency and pardons be considered for convicted offenders. Id. at 110-12.
264 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). For a detailed factual account of Blyew, see
Goldstein, supra note 210, at 469-74.
265 Justice Swayne's concluding remarks in Rhodes warned of the disastrous conse-
quences that would follow were a future Court to circumvent the legislative intent of the
1866 Act: "Blot out this act and deny the constitutional power to pass it, and the worst
effects of slavery might speedily follow." United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794
(C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
266 Professor Goldstein agrees with Professor Kaczorowski regarding Blyew's impor-
tance as the first Supreme Court decision in which the "counterrevolution" began to
limit the federal government's responsibilities in civil rights enforcement. Goldstein,
supra note 210, at 474-75, 506; R. KAczoRowsxi, supra note 239, at 140. Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Blyew, federal criminal prosecutions for violations of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871 were virtually eliminated. Id Previously con-
victed defendants were released by presidential pardon. Id. at 142.
267 Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 10 (1867). In addition to preventing
the child witness's testimony, Kentucky's discriminatory law precluded the admissibility
of the oldest child's dying declaration. Goldstein, supra note 210, at 471.
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ing family members, they successfully prosecuted both defendants,
who were then sentenced to death by United States District Court
Judge Ballard. On appeal, the defendants attacked the federal
court's claim to jurisdiction. They also maintained that the federal
removal statute did not apply to the two child witnesses because
they were not "affected" persons within the language of the Act.268
United States Solicitor General Bristow argued that "the his-
tory of the times ... the object to be accomplished forbid this con-
struction, ' 269 and insisted that Congress's intent in conferring
federal jurisdiction in the Civil Rights Act was to protect a citizen's
right to testify as among "those rights which.., are.., essential to
the perfect enjoyment of freedom. '270
The Supreme Court's majority opinion acknowledged the his-
torical denial of legal protection to the black citizenry that led to the
Civil Rights legislation. 271 Yet the Court's awareness was transpar-
ently selective. It referred to a black defendant's due process rights
under the Act, but ignored Congress's overriding intent to protect
the life and personal security of blacks from random, unredressed
violence committed by whites. The Court upheld federal removal of
cases only in situations where a criminal defendant's right to ajury
trial or to receive equal protection during sentencing might bejeop-
ardized by state court procedures;272 it rejected the Act's underlying
premise that a black crime victim should enjoy federal protection
where a state's evidentary rules precluded a black person's testi-
mony against those responsible.2 73 The Court made no reference to
268 Blyew, 80 U.S. at 585-88 (argument presented in defense brief); id at 582 (argu-
ments presented in government's brief). For a full discussion of the defense and prose-
cution's arguments in Blyew, see Goldstein, supra note 210, at 490-99.
269 Brief for the United States at 26, Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581
(1872).
270 Id
271 Blyew, 80 U.S. at 593.
272 Id at 592-93.
273 The Court accomplished this result by narrowly constraining the "causes affect-
ing persons" language of the 1866 Act to apply only to the technical parties of record,
the accused and the government, and not to witnesses who "are no more affected ...
than is every other person." Id at 591. Under the Court's interpretation, the ninety-
seven-year-old grandmother "victim of the frightful outrage ... [was] beyond being
affected by the cause itself." Id. at 594. The Court's logic led it to conclude that the
federal removal statute applied only to "persons in existence," id. at 594, and not to
cases where black people had been murdered by whites.
Professor Goldstein persuasively argues that the Supreme Court wrongfully con-
strued the "affecting jurisdiction" removal remedy and significantly undermined the
meaning of Reconstruction policy, i.e., to guarantee federal enforcement of civil rights
and equality when states failed to do so. Goldstein sharply critiques the Court's mis-
placed reliance on United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (I 1 Wheat.) 467 (1826) for limiting
the legislative intent of the "cause affecting jurisdiction" language. Goldstein, supra
note 210, at 503-04; see supra note 241.
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the consequences that flowed from its decision: a white person in
Kentucky could continue to kill blacks with immunity as long as the
only witnesses to the crime were also black.
The dissent, written by Justice Bradley and joined by Justice
Swayne, spared few words against the Court's construction of the
legislative intent of the 1866 Act.274 The dissenting Justices re-
minded their brethren that Congress's main object in proposing the
thirteenth amendment was not to "merely strik[e] off the fetters of
the slave" but to remove the "incidents and consequences of slav-
ery." 275 The dissenting opinion noted that one of Congress's most
important objects in passing the 1866 Bill was to guarantee equal
justice for persons of African descent and to "place [them] on an
equality of rights and privileges with other citizens. ' 276 TheJustices
stressed the importance of giving all citizens the right to enter "a
complaint before a magistrate, or the grandjury, and [appear] as a
witness on the trial of the offender." 277
Justices Bradley and Swayne viewed the unpunished act of mur-
dering a black person as "a case of denial of rights to the colored
population of that State" 278 because it left the life of every black
person vulnerable to similar attack. When a white person was not
prosecuted because a court automatically rejected the testimony of a
black witness, the resulting wrong "deprive[d] a whole class of the
opportunity of th[e] right [of bringing the offender to justice]"2 79
and perpetuated a stigma of black inferiority which could only be
erased by a successful criminal prosecution.
For the dissenters, the majority holding restored an "incident"
of slavery that the Civil Rights Act had intended to abolish-the de-
nial of a black person's access to the courtroom. "If ... doors of
justice [are] shut in [a black person's] face on the ground that he is a
colored person, and cannot testify against a white citizen, it seems
... almost a stultification of the law to say that the case is not within
274 "To say that actions or prosecutions intended for the redress of such outrages
are not 'causes affecting the persons' who are the victims of them, is to take... a view of
the law too narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view."
Blyew, 80 U.S. at 599 (Bradley, Swayne, JJ., dissenting).
275 Id at 501.
276 Id at 595.
277 Id. at 598.
278 Id at 598 (Bradley, Swayne, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters declared that
... to refuse their evidence and their sworn complaints is to brand them
with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish
assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unpro-
tected. It gives unrestricted license and impunity to vindictive outlaws
and felons to rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay them at
will, as was done in this case.
Id at 599.
279 Id.
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its scope. '280
Scrambling to save the abolitionist vision of the thirteenth
amendment subsequent to Blyew, Republican Congressmen increas-
ingly turned to the fourteenth amendment for power to issue pro-
liberation legislation. 281 But the Supreme Court that issued Blyew
marched steadily backwards in decisions issued over the next decade
and, despite congressional efforts, fully executed a general retreat
from the national goal of liberating the black race from slavery and
inferior citizen status.
2. The Slaughterhouse Cases282
The Court's 1873 decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases repre-
sented another majorjudicial milestone in the retreat to the "Demo-
cratic Conservative ideology of states' rights." 283 The Slaughterhouse
Cases returned control for enforcing civil rights to the same state
forces that had previously enslaved African-Americans. 284 In these
cases, white butchers challenged a Louisiana law that granted mo-
nopoly rights to a slaughterhouse corporation as violating their
right as United States citizens to pursue an occupation. The Court
rejected the butchers' claim and thus limited the reach and meaning
of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause.2 85
Dicta in the Court's decision, however, established the theoretical
grave in which the thirteenth amendment would lay buried for the
next century.
The butchers had argued that the Louisiana law violated the
thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.
They claimed that the monopoly arrangement revived a form of feu-
dal land and property relations which violated the thirteenth amend-
ment by granting a powerful corporation special privileges at the
expense of individuals' right to use their own land and property.2 86
Although the majority opinion described the thirteenth amendment
280 Id.
281 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; see supra note 227, infra notes 303-15
and accompanying text.
282 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
283 Kaczorowski, supra note 184, at 938.
284 By 1873, Democrats had regained governorships in Tennessee, Georgia, and
Virginia, and had a substantial voice in state legislatures in Alabama, Florida, North
Carolina and Tennessee. Republicans enjoyed undisputed control only in Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. E. FONER, supra note 14, at 539.
285 In Slaughterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that the butchers' right to pursue
their occupation was a privilege and immunity that "belong[s] to citizens of the States
... and [is] left to the State governments for security and protection." 83 U.S. at 78.
Federal protection of a citizen's privileges and immunities was narrowly defined to in-
clude doing business with the government, traveling on the high seas, gaining access to
seaports, and assembling and petitioning for redress of grievances. Id. at 78-79.
286 Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 49-51.
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as a "grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the
human race," 28 7 it limited the amendment's prohibition against in-
voluntary servitude to the abolishment of chattel slavery and noth-
ing more.28 8 In finding that the state law did not violate the
thirteenth amendment, the majority stated that it "requires an ef-
fort" and "a microscopic search ... to find in [the amendment] a
reference to servitudes, which may have been attached to
property." 28 9
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases provided
a glimpse of the sweeping restrictions that the Court would later
place on the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against badges and
incidents of slavery in the Civil Rights Cases. 290
3. United States v. Cruikshank291
Supreme CourtJustice Bradley, sitting on a federal lower court,
generated a final spark of recognition of the power of the thirteenth
amendment in United States v. Cruikshank.
Cruikshank concerned the criminal prosecution of a group of
300 to 400 Ku Klux Klansmen who had engaged in "[t]he bloodiest
single instance of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era."'292 A
federal grand jury indicted ninety-seven individuals and charged
each with murder and conspiracy. Only nine defendants were actu-
ally tried in federal court and each was ultimately acquitted on the
murder charges. One jury, however, did find three of the defend-
287 Id at 69.
288 In the lower court decision, The Slaughterhouse Cases, 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C. La
1870) (No. 8408), Supreme Court Justice Bradley and Circuit Court Justice Woods
struck down the state law as violating the individual's right to pursue an occupation
under the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause, and under the thir-
teenth amendment's 1866 Act. Id. at 655. However, the Supreme Court majority in
Slaughterhouse reversed the lower court's finding, and concluded that the prohibition ap-
plied only to human beings and not to an individual's property right to choose an occu-
pation.
In dissent, Justice Field pointed out liberty implications when a monopoly license
required a "person... to pursue only one trade or calling, and only in one locality of the
country." Justice Field explained that "to labor even for his own benefit only in one
direction... [was] almost as oppressive and nearly as great an invasion of his liberty as
the compulsion which would force him to labor for the benefit or pleasure of another,
and would equally constitute an element of servitude." 83 U.S. at 90-91.
289 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 69.
290 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
291 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), aff'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
292 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 437. Following a disputed governor's election in
Louisiana, the Klan attacked and overwhelmed Republican forces in an attempt to
regain white rule and install the Democratic nominee in office. Despite the official Re-
publican surrender, the Klan army mutilated and murdered 60 of the black Republican
resisters. The notorious nature of these crimes persuaded the Justice Department to
modify the non-enforcement policy it had followed since 1873. R. KACZOROWSKI, supra
note 239, at 178.
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ants guilty of conspiracy. 293
Although Justice Bradley reversed the defendants' convictions
on the ground that the indictment was vague, he laid a conceptual
foundation for federal prosecution of racially motivated violence
based on the "affirmative operation" 294 of the thirteenth amend-
ment. The amendment's guarantee of liberty gave Congress au-
thority to "place the other races on the same plane of privilege as
that occupied by the white race."' 295 Prosecuting those who violated
a citizen's rights and privileges was necessary to guarantee full
"equality before the law" and to eliminate the "badge of servi-
tude" 296 in the form of violence against black citizens. Unlike "ordi-
nary" crimes such as murder, assault, and theft, crimes directed
against a victim's race or prior enslavement were within federal pro-
tection because they sought to deprive "the colored citizen's enjoy-
ment and exercise of his rights of citizenship and of equal protection
of the laws."' 297
Although Justice Bradley's opinion upheld the thirteenth
amendment as the source of constitutional authority for federal
prosecutions of racially motivated violence against black people,298
his freeing of the white defendants was received as a blow against
national enforcement of civil rights. The publication of the decision
in June 1874 was greeted by widespread violence, terrorism, and
intimidation against blacks, which continued even as Congress en-
acted a new Civil Rights Act in 1875.299
293 Id at 175-78.
294 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 711. Justice Bradley also found authority in the fifteenth
amendment for federal prosecution of voting right violators. Id at 713.
295 Id
296 Id at 711.
297 Id at 712. In such cases, Justice Bradley wrote:
[MThe war on race, whether it assumes the dimensions of civil strife or
domestic violence, whether carried on in a guerrilla or predatory form, or
by private combinations, or even by private outrage or intimidation, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the government of the United States; and
when any atrocity is committed which may be assigned to this cause it
may be punished by the laws and in the courts of the United States ....
Id at 714.
298 In 1876, the Supreme Court affirmed Justice Bradley's dismissal of the indict-
ment in Cruikshank, but made no reference to the thirteenth amendment as a source of
congressional legislative power. Nor did the decision comment on justice Bradley's dis-
tinction between "ordinary crimes" which would be tried and punished in the state
courts, and "crimes of race" which would be prosecuted by federal authority. United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
299 Following the Cruikshank decision, "violence, terrorism and intimidation became
widespread [as] organized bands of guerrillas patterned after the Ku Klux Klan sprang
up to overthrow Southern Republican governments and restore white rule." Louisiana,
Alabama, South Carolina, and Tennessee were the scenes of white violence against
blacks in 1874. R. KAcZOROWSKI, supra note 239, at 188, 189-92. In Mississippi, the
following year, crimes "were committed in broad daylight by undisguised men, as if to
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F. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
During Reconstruction, several southern states abolished the
all-whitejury system that had existed throughout the 200 years pre-
ceding the Civil War.300 In 1872 and 1876, Democratic conserva-
tives rode the crest of Klan violence and dissatisfaction with
Republican reconstruction policy, regaining control of state govern-
ments in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia.301 Following the Supreme Court's 1873 deci-
sion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, white conservatives had primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing and protecting civil rights. This return to
power, accompanied by increasing white mob violence after the
Cruikshank decision in 1874, threatened to reverse many of blacks'
newly won rights. All-white juries once again absolved white people
who engaged in violence against the black citizenry and Republican
Party leaders. The United States Attorney of the Southern District
of Alabama wrote that "'any man may murder a Republican, for
political reasons without the slightest reason to fear that he will be
punished, but with every reason to believe that he will be applauded
for the act.' "302
In 1875, the Republican Congress responded by introducing
new national civil rights legislation to protect black citizens' right to
serve as jurors in state court proceedings. Modeled after the 1866
Civil Rights Act, section four of the 1875 Act subjected public offi-
cials to misdemeanor charges for disqualifying any citizen from serv-
ing as grand or petit jurors "on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude." Individual state officials, however, still de-
termined whether a citizen "possess[ed] all other qualifications
underscore the impotence of local authorities and Democrats' lack of concern about
federal intervention." E. FONER, supra note 14, at 559; see also United States v. Butler, 25
F. Cas. 213 (C.C.S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700) (describing violence against blacks in South
Carolina).
300 See supra notes 228-38, 254-61 and accompanying text.
301 J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 327-28. Klan violence made it almost impossible
for Republicans to campaign in many parts of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida during the
elections of 1869 and 1870. E. FONER, supra note 14, at 442-43. In 1870 state elections,
Democrats regained political power in border states like Maryland, West Virginia, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, and Delaware, and in upper South states such as Virginia and Tennes-
see. Id. at 421-22, 441-42. In 1873, Texas and Virginia were firmly in control of the
Democratic party, while Arkansas and Alabama were "redeemed" in 1874, and Missis-
sippi in 1875. Id at 549-53. Only Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, and North Caro-
lina were "unredeemed" states prior to elections in 1876. Id. at 511, 569.
302 R. KAczoRowsri, supra note 239, at 189-90 (quoting the letters from the Chair-
man of the Alabama Republican Executive Committee to United States Attorney Gen-
eral Williams in September and December of 1874); see United States v. Butler, 25 F.
Cas. 213, 220 (C.C.S.C. 1876) (No. 14,700) (jury unable to reach a verdict against white
defendants charged with killing 13 black men; defendants described as "leading rascals
of the Republican party").
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which are or may be prescribed by law."3 0 3
Supporters of the new legislation recognized the connection
between the 1866 Act's guarantee that black people could testify in
court, and the need to assure that black jurors would evaluate that
testimony. Senator Edmunds argued that "if it be... constitutional
to say that there shall be equal rights in respect to calling of wit-
nesses, then it must follow that there must be equal rights in the
same degree in respect of the selection ofjurors."3 0 4 Indiana Sena-
tor Morton declared that the inclusion of black jurors was necessary
to overcome the still prevailing attitude among "[white] men who
have been educated and taught to believe that colored men have no
civil and political rights that white men were bound to respect."30 5
He asserted that all-white juries had failed to guarantee a black per-
son's right to a fair trial because the white race was "filled with a
prejudice and passion.., that would prevent them from doing jus-
tice"30 6 in cases involving black defendants or black complainants:
Now, I ask, if with the prejudices against the colored race enter-
tained by the white race, even in some of the Northern States and
certainly in all of the Southern States, [how can] the colored man
enjoy[] the equal protection of the laws, if the jury that is to try
him for a crime or determine his right to property must be made
up exclusively of the white race.307
Other proponents of the Act targeted individual Democrat-con-
trolled southern states as the focus of the statute's objective. Missis-
sippi Congressman Lynch argued that "[tihe opposition to civil
303 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335.
304 3 CONG. REC. 1866 (1875) (statement of Sen. Edmunds). Tennessee Congress-
man Lewis also echoed the theme of the 1866 Civil Rights Act: "Unless we are prepared
to give to the colored man the same protection and the same legal rights we gave the
white man, our professions as a nation of loving liberty and respecting justice are but
miserable falsehoods, hypocritical and detestable." Id at 998 (statement of Rep. Lewis).
South Carolina Congressman Cain recalled the nation's promise a decade earlier
when it abolished slavery and granted freedom to African-Americans:
I think this country owes it to [black people]. Having lifted them out of
slavery, having emancipated them, having given them manhood in a
sense, I regard it as essential to the interests of the country that they shall
make them citizens of this country, with all that that word imports, and
that they shall guarantee to them the protection necessary for their lives
and for their property.
Id at 957; see id at 958 (statement of Rep. Harris, who argued that the abolition of
slavery meant that all "distinctions of color" should be destroyed).
305 Id. at 1795 (statement of Sen. Morton).
306 Id. at 1863.
307 1& at 1793. During the debate, Connecticut Senator Eaton asked Senator Mor-
ton: "Would the passage of this law give the negro the slightest benefit in an attempt to
be placed in a jury-box in Indiana?" Senator Morton responded "I should think it
would if he is not allowed that privilege already." Id at 1864; see also id. at 1865 ("[A]
law of this kind... is an absolute necessity for the protection of these people even in the
[Connecticut] Senator's own state.... .") (Senator Logan's response to Senator Eaton).
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rights in the South... is confined almost exclusively to States,..
where the Legislature has failed or refused to pass a civil-rights
bill."' 308 Congressman Lynch also spoke about the farce of a black
person seeking justice in Kentucky's state courts, "where the deci-
sion of the judge is virtually rendered before he enters the court-
house, and the verdict of the [all-white] jury substantially rendered
before it is impaneled."30 9 Senator Morton identified North Caro-
lina and South Carolina as states where a black person could never
receive a fair trial or legal redress as long as white people were given
"the exclusive right.., to sit upon juries and to adjudicate upon the
rights of colored men." 310
The congressional debate preceding the passage of the Act was
politically charged and highly partisan. Democratic senators, such
as Pennsylvania Senator Merriman, accused the Republicans of sup-
porting the legislation's "extreme measures" for the sole purpose of
"secur[ing] the vote of eight hundred thousand or a million ne-
groes." 31 1 Republican Senator Edmunds from Vermont countered
by charging that the Democratic opposition had "stood together"
and resisted proposed civil rights legislation "year after year" be-
cause they still questioned "the fundamental propriety" of abolish-
ing slavery.3 12
The Democratic opposition argued that only the fourteenth
amendment could be a possible basis for constitutional authority,
but they rejected it as justification for federal intervention in the
selection of state jurors. For example, Ohio Senator Thurman de-
clared that only the first section of the fourteenth amendment guar-
anteeing citizenship could "give the slightest color" to support the
anti-discrimination statute. The Senator concluded, however, that
the amendment's citizenship clause "confers no right to be selected
or to act as jurors" because if construed literally, it would also enti-
tle women and children, as United States citizens, to sit as jurors.313
Crude racism was apparent in the objections of some senators. Sen-
308 Id. at 947. Mississippi Congressman Lynch was one of seven black congressmen
who sat in the 43rd Congress. Each of these congressmen was a persuasive advocate of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Congressman Lynch and South Carolina Congressman
Cain addressed the anti-discriminatoryjury selection statute; the others focused remarks
on the Act's anti-discriminatory public accommodation sections.
309 Id. at 945; see also South Carolina Congressman Cain's statement in which he
refers to "the tales of horror now being brought out by the investigating committees in
the South... [and] the fact that it is not the northern people or the republican party that
makes this strife in the country." Id. at 956.
310 Id. at 1863.
311 Id at 1797.
312 Id at 1869.
313 Id at 1791-92; see also id. at 1796 (statement of Sen. Merriman); id. at 1791, 1866
(statement of Sen. Thurmond); id at 1861 (statement of Sen. Carpenter).
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ator Hamilton raised the specter that the statute would lead to a
"white race of commingled blood," and would "extinguish" the
white race by causing "equality among races." "Nature," said the
Senator, "will settle a question that you cannot by law."3 14 Virginia
Congressman Whitehead struck a similar chord when he asserted
that the equal rights object of the bill would never satisfy "the
colored man... because the Almighty has given him what he cannot
get rid of-a black skin."31 5
G. Judicial Interpretation of the Jury Anti-Discrimination
Statute 1880-1881
Opponents had warned that the jury anti-discrimination statute
would be found unconstitutional and would only "involve the
colored man in litigation in which he is certain to be defeated."31 6
However, this prediction proved false. In Ex Parte Virginia3 17 and
Strauder v. West Virginia,318 both decided on March 1, 1880, the
Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to enact an anti-discrimi-
nation jury selection statute and struck down a West Virginia state
law that excluded all black citizens from jury duty.
In two other Supreme Court cases, Virginia v. Rives,3 19 also de-
cided on March 1, 1880, and Neal v. Delaware,3 20 decided the follow-
ing year, the forecast of the futility of litigation under the Act on
behalf of blacks proved accurate. Court cases failed to achieve ra-
dally integrated juries, the clear goal of the Act. The Court's con-
ceptual analysis in Rives eliminated federal removal relief in cases of
discriminatory juror selection;3 2' in Neal, the Court developed an
almost impossible evidentiary standard for proving intentional dis-
crimination and establishing an equal protection violation.3 22 Con-
sequently, for most of the next century, a state's racially
exclusionary practices during jury selection became virtually im-
mune from federal statutory or constitutional challenge.
In Strauder v. West Virginia, the defendant sought, under the fed-
eral removal statute, to remove his trial to federal court.3 23 He ar-
gued that the West Virginia courts' systematic exclusion of black
314 Id at 116 (appendix).
315 Id. at 953.
316 Id at 1863 (Statement of Sen. Carpenter).
317 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
318 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
319 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
320 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
321 See infra notes 332-37 and accompanying text.
322 See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
323 Strauder relied on the removal statute included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, and subsequently reenacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch.
114, §§ 16-18, 16 Stat. 140. Under the 1870 Enforcement Act, Congress eliminated
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jurors, pursuant to statute,324 violated the 1875 anti-discrimination
Act and denied him" 'full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings . . .for the security of his person.' ",325 The state trial court
denied the defendant's application, and an all-white jury convicted
him of murder.
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court
first reviewed the "history of our times" when the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments were passed. The Court concluded that the
amendments' "common purpose .. . [was] securing to a race re-
cently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been
held in slavery, all the civil rights the superior race enjoy."3 26 "The
true spirit and meaning of the amendments" were to protect against
"[s]tate laws [that] might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the
[legal] distinction that had before ... regarded [blacks] as an infer-
ior or subject race." 327 The Court concluded that, by excluding all
persons of Strauder's race, the West Virginia statute violated black
citizens' fourteenth amendment equal protection right to "exemp-
tion from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them
to the condition of a subject race." 328
Though explicitly relying on the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause, the Strauder Court recognized that the exclusion
of blacks from jury duty threatened to perpetuate black inferiority,
the ideological underpinning of slavery. The thirteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against maintaining badges and incidents of slav-
ery was clearly addressed by the Court in finding the West Virginia
law unconstitutional:
post-conviction relief; otherwise it followed, with some modification, the language of the
1866 Act.
When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any State
court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is denied or can-
not enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the part of the State
where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right secured to him by any law
providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States .... such
suit or prosecution may ... be removed, for trial, into the next circuit
court to be held in the district where it is pending."
Revised Statutes § 641 (1875) (emphasis added) (emphasized language replacing the
following language from the 1866 Act: "rights secured to them by the first section of
this act").
324 The West Virginia law stated that "[a]ll white male persons, who are twenty-one
years of age, and not over sixty, and who are citizens of this state, shall be liable to serve
as jurors, except as hereinafter provided." 1872-1873 W. Va. Acts 102.
325 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1880).
326 Id at 306.
327 Id
328 Id. at 308.
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The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors, because of their color .... is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority and
a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to se-
curing individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims
to secure to all others.3 29
In the second case upholding the constitutionality of the anti-
discrimination Act, Ex Parte Virginia,33 0 the Supreme Court affirmed
the federal conviction of a Virginia state judge who had been in-
dicted for violating section four of the 1875 Act by failing to select
qualified black citizens as grand or petit jurors.
The Court ruled that the anti-discrimination jury selection stat-
ute was "appropriate legislation" by which to enforce the fourteenth
amendment's equal rights protection. The civil rights statute was
necessary, the Court explained, to reverse "that condition of inferi-
ority and servitude"3 3 1 which existed prior to the thirteenth amend-
ment when slave defendants were not entitled to a trial by jury,
much less the right to insist upon ajury which did not purposefully
exclude members of their own race.
Thus, the Act survived two constitutional attacks. First, in
Strauder, the Court recognized that when a state law excluded blacks
from jury duty, the defendant was entitled to employ the federal
remedy of removal. Second, in Ex Parte Virginia, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of empowering the federal government to in-
dict state officials who violated the Act by purposefully excluding
black jurors.
Despite the broadly liberating interpretation of the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments underlying these decisions, the actual
fate of the Act was sealed in the third Supreme Court decision is-
sued on March 1, 1880. In Virginia v. Rives,3 32 the Supreme Court
eliminated the use of the federal removal remedy whenever exclu-
sion resulted from a state official's practices, rather than from a state's
law or "legislative impediments." 3 3 3 In Rives, the defendant as-
serted in his removal petition that no black person had ever served
329 Id.
330 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
331 Id. at 344. The Court stated that the "one great purpose" of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments was "to raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority
and servitudes in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil
rights with all other persons .... They were intended to take away all possibility of
oppression by law because of race or color." Id at 344-45. The antidiscrimination jury
selection statute guaranteed "an impartial jury trial by jurors indifferently selected or
chosen." Id at 345.
332 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
333 Id. at 320.
1990]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
on a criminal or civil jury in Patrick County, Virginia. Federal Cir-
cuit Court Judge Rives granted removal following the defendants'
conviction by an all-white Virginia jury. The Supreme Court re-
versed, stating:
[W]hen a subordinate officer of the State, in violation of State law,
undertakes to deprive an accused party of a right which the statute
law accords to him .... it can hardly be said that he is denied, or
cannot enforce, "in the judicial tribunals of the State, the rights
which belong to him." In such a case, it ought to be presumed the
[state] court will redress the wrong.3 3 4
The Supreme Court's willingness in Rives to entertain this base-
less presumption33 5 made the federal removal statute inapplicable
when the practices of a state official, rather than the state's laws or
constitution, excluded blacks from juries because of race.
The denial of federal removal relief in Rives gave considerable
comfort to state officials who engaged in practices which excluded
blacks from jury duty: they did not have to fear federal prosecution
under section four of the 1875 Act.336 For most of the next century,
the Supreme Court refused to find violations of statutes which
would require removal under the Rives test, regardless of evidence
showing that blacks had been systematically excluded from jury se-
lection.33 7 Ex Parte Virginia was thus left behind as "solitary and ne-
334 Id. at 321.
335 The Democratic Party of the post Civil-War era had always stood for "states'
rights," a return to local self-government, and non-intervention by the federal govern-
ment in the southern states' treatment of their former slaves. See E. FONER, supra note
14, at 500, 509 (quoting Indiana Senator Oliver Morton: "Whenever certain people talk
about local self-government by the people.., they mean the white people"); supra notes
157, 215-22 and accompanying text. The South's resistance to the thirteenth amend-
ment-as exemplified by the Black Codes-was clear evidence against the Court's ideal-
istic presumption that state courts would protect the rights of the blacks once the federal
presence was removed. When federal indictments against Klan violence were dismissed
in United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), aft'd, 92
U.S. 542 (1875), United States Attorney Minnis told United States Attorney General
Williams that leaving protection of civil rights to state courts would "render them worth-
less." R. KAczoaowsKI, supra note 239, at 184 (citingJuly 3, 1874 letter).
Following a disputed Presidential election in 1876, Republican Rutherford Hayes
gained the presidency when Justice Bradley cast the decisive vote as the final person
selected to the fifteen-member Electoral Commission. Hayes ordered the removal of
the northern army from the South in 1877. The removal of federal troops ended a
fourteen year Reconstruction policy to secure federal protection of citizens' fundamen-
tal rights. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1579-80 n.28 (5th Cir.
1984); E. FONER, supra note 14, at 575-82. For a detailed account of the "Compromise"
of 1877, see C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION 188-96 (1956).
336 One commentator summarized the Strauder-Rives rulings as "recogniz[ing] re-
moval when it is least needed to protect federal rights and deny[ing] it when it is needed
the most." Schmidt, supra note 229, at 1437.
337 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Rives, federal removal became avail-
able only when state law or a state court decision denied jury eligibility, and not when
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glected authority" for using the criminal remedy to directly enforce
the right of black persons to sit on juries.338
The Rives opinion had one further consequence for the four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause. The defendant in that
case had sought, in his removal petition, the assurance that blacks
would constitute one-third of the federal trial jury selected. The
Court ruled that equal protection under the fourteenth amendment
only protected against exclusion because of race, and rejected the
notion that a black defendant had a "right to have the jury com-
posed in part of colored men." "A mixed jury in a particular case,"
said the Court, "is not essential to the equal protection of the
laws." s33 9 Thus, the Rives Court curtailed equal protection chal-
lenges to jury composition.
The burial of federal relief was deepened in 1881, in Neal v.
Delaware,340 when the Supreme Court established an insurmounta-
ble constitutional standard for establishing an equal protection vio-
lation.3 41 In Neal, the State did not rebut the defendant's evidence
that no black person had ever served as a juror in Delaware,
although blacks constituted one-fifth of the State's population. Del-
aware's Chief Justice explained the exclusion of blacks as "in no
wise remarkable in view of the fact-too notorious to be ignored-
that the great body of black men residing in this State are utterly
unqualified by want of intelligence, experience or moral integrity, to
state practice systematically excluded African-Americans from jury selection. See, e.g.,
Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898);
Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 593 (1896);
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883).
Federal removal remained unavailable for state criminal defendants until 1966,
when the Supreme Court reexamined the constitutional reach of the federal removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443 (1958). The Court's review followed southern states' strategy of
prosecuting civil rights demonstrators who were engaged in constitutionally or federally
protected activities. Some commentators urged the Court to reconsider the narrow in-
terpretation it had previously given to removal relief. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Crimni-
nal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 803 (1966) ("§ 1443 is
plagued by unlikely constructions which leave it impotent to cope with any state in-
fringements of civil rights save those which state ingenuity outgrew three quarters ofa
century ago").
The Court, however, reaffirmed the Rives doctrine in Peacock v. City of Greenwood,
384 U.S. 808 (1966) (denying removal relief when defendants alleged that they could
not enforce their federal right to engage in a voter registration campaign). The Court
breathed some life back into the removal remedy in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780
(1966) (defendants demonstrated that a state court's criminal trespass prosecution had
denied their exercise of the federally protected right to use public accommodations).
338 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 303 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
339 Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
340 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
341 See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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sit onjuries."3 42 The Supreme Court rejected this explanation, call-
ing it a "violent presumption" and concluded that "the showing
thus made ... presented a prima facie case of denial ... of that
equality of protection.., secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States."3 43
Although the Court reversed the defendant's conviction, it im-
posed a nearly impossible burden of proof on the defense. To suc-
ceed, a defendant was required to show uncontroverted evidence of
the total exclusion of African-Americans from juries over a substan-
tial period of time.3 44 To this day, this evidentiary burden has made
successful equal protection challenges to the trial jury a rarity, de-
spite revision of the standard by the Supreme Court in 1935 in Nor-
342 Neal, 103 U.S. at 393-94.
343 Id. at 397.
344 In general, southern state courts denied defendants' equal protection challenge
to the jury venire unless state officials admitted that blacks were excluded from jury duty
because of their race: "With almost absolute uniformity, the State courts have held that
there is no ground for quashing the indictment unless it is shown that Negroes were
kept off the juries purposely and because of their race or color." GILBERT THOMAS STE-
PHENSON, RACE DISTINarIONS IN AMERICAN LAw 250 (1910).
Texas officials appeared to be the most candid in admitting their reason for not
selecting blacks to serve as jurors. See Smith v. State, 77 S.W. 453 (Tex. Crim. 1903)
(only black selected for jury duty was one who had either moved out of the county, and
thus could not serve, or who was dead); Smith v. State, 69 S.W. 151 (rex. Crim. 1902)
(state officials testified that blacks were excluded from jury duty because their presence
would create a racial conflict injurious to blacks); Leach v. State, 62 S.W. 422 (rex.
Crim. 1901) (commissioners admitted that they wouldn't select a black for jury duty if
they were aware of his race); Kipper v. State, 62 S.W. 420 (Tex. Crim. 1901) (jury com-
missioners testified that they kept blacks off the juries because their presence "would be
offensive to the white jurors"); Whitney v. State, 59 S.W. 895 (Tex. Crim. 1900) (state
jury commissioners admitted they excluded blacks because they considered them unfit).
In Hanna v. State, 105 S.W. 793 (Tex. Crim. 1907), a Texas Appeals Court rejected
uncontroverted evidence that no black had served on a jury for two years, stating that
the evidence failed to show the alleged discrimination in the absence of a state official's
admission.
Other state courts made similar findings. In Royals v. State, 75 So. 199 (Fla. 1917),
the Supreme Court of Florida accepted ajury commissioner's testimony that he did not
racially discriminate in selecting jurors, despite testimony from a deputy sheriff that he
could not remember any blacks serving as jurors in 27 years, and from a doctor who
stated "there are many hundred [blacks] qualified for jury duty." Id at 200. In Ransom
v. State, 96 S.W. 953 (Tenn. 1906), a Tennessee defendant submitted nine affidavits,
including one from a black attorney, attesting to having never "known, heard, or seen a
colored man called as juror, grand or petit" in the past ten or so years, including him-
self. Id at 955. The Supreme Court of Tennessee rejected the sufficiency of the evi-
dence presented, stating that "it only appears from said affidavits that the affiant during
the period mentioned by them, had not seen or heard a colored man called to serve on
thejury." Id at 956. Similarly, Missouri's highest court, in State v. Thomas, 157 S.W.
330 (Mo. 1913), affirmed a lower court's opinion that rejected evidence showing that
900 blacks had never been called for jury duty, although qualified to serve, because it
only "tended to prove that the negro race had been discriminated against in the past,....
not ... in the particular panel ofjurors ... from which a jury was drawn to try defen-
dant." Id. at 334.
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ris v. Alabama.3 45
H. The Obliteration of the Thirteenth Amendment
1. The Civil Rights Cases3 4 6
Having effectively eliminated use of the federal removal remedy
to enforce nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures, the
Supreme Court in 1883 rendered its final blow against the thir-
teenth amendment in the Civil Rights Cases. Although the Court was
not directly concerned with a state's exclusion of black jurors,3 47 its
decision finalized the "juridical rational for the abdication of na-
tional responsibility" for the enforcement of civil rights protec-
tions.3 48 By limiting the meaning of the thirteenth amendment's
prohibition against the badges and incidents of slavery, the Court
rendered the amendment ineffectual as a civil rights tool until it de-
cidedJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 4 9 eighty-five years later.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases had this disastrous effect despite
consensus by the eight-Justice majority that the thirteenth amend-
ment was meant not only to remove the shackles of slavery, but also
"to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain
to the essence of citizenship . . . the enjoyment or deprivation of
which contributes to the essential distinction between freedom and
slavery. 350 Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley declared that
the amendment "establish[ed] and decree[d] universal civil and
political freedom.., and cloth[ed] Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States."135 '
In finding a strong theoretical foundation for the potential
reach of the amendment, Justice Bradley seemed to be building
345 293 U.S. 552 (1935).
346 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
347 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), involved a consolidation of five crimi-
nal and civil cases brought under the first two sections of the 1875 Act, which outlawed
discrimination in the use and enjoyment of public accommodations. The Court's deci-
sion in the Civil Rights Cases declared these sections unconstitutional. Id at 25; cf. Ex
Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (upholding the antidiscriminatoryjury selection pro-
cedures of the 1875 Act); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (same).
348 Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387
(1967). The majority opinion limited the constitutional reach of the fourteenth amend-
ment when it characterized the amendment as "only... corrective in ... character,
addressed to counteract and afford relief against State regulations or proceedings." The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23. This interpretation limited the fourteenth amendment
to state, rather than individual, action, and prevented direct federal intervention in the
absence of state action.
349 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
350 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
351 Id
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upon his dissents in Cruikshank and Blyew. 35 2 Bradley's majority
opinion, however, wholly ignored the Court's prior recognition in
Dred Scott v. Sandford that discriminatory laws and practices were
proof of the "enduring marks of inferiority and degradation"3 53
against the entire African race. Instead, Bradley presented a radi-
cally revised version of history:
There were thousands of free colored people.., before the aboli-
tion of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and
property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time,
thought it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman
because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white
citizens. 354
Declaring that "mere discriminations on account of race or
color were- not [then] regarded as badges of slavery,"35 5 Bradley
concluded that the thirteenth amendment "merely abolishe[d] slav-
ery"35 6 and did not guarantee a citizen's equal rights. In an exercise
of judicial activism, the majority rejected Congress's determination
that racial discrimination was a principle incident and badge of slav-
ery.3 57 Rather, the Court concluded that "it would be running the
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination .... ,3 5 8 The Court's final message admonished the
federal government to cease its efforts to protect the rights of the
black citizenry:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benefi-
cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of
that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his eleva-
tion when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws .... 359
352 Justice Bradley had written expansively on the thirteenth amendment power to
deter "the war on race" in United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874)
(No. 14,897), aff'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), and in United States v. Blyew, 80 U.S. 581
(1872) (Bradley J., dissenting), where he argued that the amendment authorized re-
moval legislation against racial discrimination. For a discussion of Cruikshank see supra
notes 291-99 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Blyew, see supra notes 264-81
and accompanying text. Professor Scott provides an excellent analysis of Mr. Justice
Bradley's journey which led to his narrow interpretation of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments in the Civil Rights Cases. John A. Scott,Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the
Fourteenth Amendment: From the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 15 RurTGERS L.
REV. 552- (1971); see also E. FONER, supra note 14, at 579-80; Kinoy, supra note 348, at
404-06.
353 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416 (1856).
354 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
355 Id
356 Id.
357 Id. at 22-23.
358 Id
359 ad. at 25.
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In his scathing dissent, Justice John Harlan mentioned Brad-
ley's eleven-year-old dissenting opinion in Blyew:, "The opinion in
these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too nar-
row and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance
and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been
sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism."36 0
Harlan argued that the majority had "departed from the... full
effect" of the "rights inhering in a state of freedom" that the Ameri-
can people had sought to accomplish when they ratified the thir-
teenth amendment.36 ' Justice Harlan agreed with the Bradley
majority that the thirteenth amendment had established "universal
freedom" and empowered Congress to remove certain "burdens
and disabilities [which were] the necessary incidents of slavery. '"362
But he believed that Congress's authority included the power to is-
sue anti-discrimination legislation that would "uproot the institu-
tion of slavery wherever it existed in the land" and destroy its
foundation, which "rested wholly upon the inferiority as a race of
those held in bondage."363 He believed that when the government
promised universal freedom to black people, it "necessarily involved
immunity from, and protection against, all discriminations against
them because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong
to freemen of other races. '3 64
Harlan predicted that the majority decision would usher in "an
era of constitutional law, when the rights of freedom and American
citizenship cannot receive from the nation that efficient protection
which heretofore was unhesitatingly accorded to slavery and the
rights of the master. t365 Indeed, his warning was correct. Law en-
forcement officials stood passively by as white vigilante groups cele-
brated the Supreme Court's endorsement of states' rights by
unleashing a new form of systematic terror: the lynch mob. In the
thirteen-year period that followed the Court's decision in the Civil
Rights Cases, white southern mobs acted with virtual immunity and
lynched more than 2500 people.3 66 Of the thousands of whites who
360 Id at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
361 Id.
362 Id at 20-21 (majority opinion).
363 Id at 35-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
364 Id For Justice Harlan, discrimination in the use of public conveyances was one
of the "burdens which lay at the very foundation of the institution of slavery as it once
existed." Id at 39.
365 id at 57.
366 The Archives at Tuskegee Institute maintain statistics of lynchings that occurred
between 1882 and 1968. ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCH-
ING, 1909-1950, at 6-7 (1980) (citing the Tuskegee Institute's statistics). Unlike murder
that "operated in secrecy to evade the law," a lynching was "carried out in public fash-
ion with scores, hundreds, and often thousands of eye-witnesses." Id Between 1883
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participated in these crimes, the states successfully prosecuted less
than one percent. 367
2. Plessy v. Ferguson 68
In 1896, the Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson that seg-
regating black and white railway passengers was a constitutional ex-
ercise of a state's police powers. By this time, courts had construed
the thirteenth amendment so narrowly that the eight-Justice Plessy
majority did "not understand [why] the Thirteenth Amendment is
strenuously relied upon by the plaintiff ... ,"369 Justice Bradley
having retired, Justice Brown wrote for the majority. He did not
even mention the thirteenth amendment's guarantee of "universal
civil and political freedom... to obliterate slavery with all its badges
and incidents." 70 Instead,Justice Brown further restricted the thir-
teenth amendment by limiting it to cases involving compulsory ex-
ploitation of labor and peonage.371 The majority unabashedly
proclaimed that the drafters of the thirteenth amendment never in-
tended that racially discriminatory state laws should be affected by
the abolition of slavery. The Court concluded that a "legal distinc-
tion.., founded in the color of the two races,.. . must always exist
and 1896, when the South regained local rule, the Institute recorded 2310 lynchings. IdL
Though the majority of victims were African-Americans, more than 40y (1023) were
white supporters of Reconstruction policy. Id Of the more than 2000 victims lynched
between 1900-1935, 93% were African-Americans. Id; see IDA WELLS BAxr'rN , CRU-
SADE FORJUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA WELLS BARNETT 47-53 (Alfred M. Duster
ed. 1970); NEIL MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CRow 229 (1989) (describing white violence in Mississippi between 1889 and 1945 that
accounted for nearly 13% of all lynchings).
367 "[M]ore than ninety-nine percent of those responsible escaped arrest, prosecu-
tion, conviction, and punishment." R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 10; see NAACP,
THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918, at 11-28 (1919).
368 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
369 Id. at 543.
370 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-21.
371 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542. The Brown majority opinion stated that "slavery implies
involuntary servitude-a state of bondage, the ownership of mankind as chattel or at
least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and services." After
Pessy, the Supreme Court continued to apply a narrow definition of the thirteenth
amendment's prohibition on slavery and its badges and incidents. See Corrigan v. Buck-
ley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (refusing to find that a racially restrictive covenant was an inci-
dent of slavery because it prevented blacks from owning or transferring property);
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (dismissing indictments against white de-
fendants who physically forced black workers to abandon their jobs); see also Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (Court applied a limited definition to the thirteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275
(1897); cf. United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (D. Ct. E.D. Ark. 1903) (the only federal
case upholding federal power under the thirteenth amendment to prosecute whites who
interfered with African-Americans' fundamental right to lease lands and to be employed
as laborers).
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... [and] has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two
races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. '372
Justice Harlan, again the lone dissenter, predicted that the ma-
jority decision would, "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case [sic]." 373 He
also predicted that "the present decision... will not only stimulate
aggressions... upon the admitted rights of colored citizens," but
would also "arouse race hate [and] create and perpetuate a feeling
of distrust between these races." 374 TheJustice maintained his con-
sistent belief that the thirteenth amendment prevented "the imposi-
tion of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery
or servitude." 375 He suggested that under the Plessy majority's rea-
soning, a state could provide for the separation of black and white
jurors during deliberation. 376 This speculation foreshadowed seg-
regationists' reliance on Plessy to justify an even graver indication of
legal inferiority: the virtual exclusion of black citizens from serving
as jurors.
IV
POST-RECONSTRUCTION: THE INSTITUTION OF
THE ALL-WHITE JURY
Beginning in the early 1880s, the former confederate states de-
veloped and implemented strategies to disenfranchise blacks and to
prevent them from sitting as jurors. Bolstered by the decisions in
the Civil Rights Cases3 77 and Virginia v. Rives,378 state legislatures re-
lied on gerrymandering, reapportionment, and confusing election
schemes. 379 The following year, Mississippi lawmakers amended
372 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543. The Court also stated that it was clear that a segregation
law, which made it a crime for black and white people to sit together, "did not stamp the
colored race with a badge of inferiority." Id at 551. Even "if this (were] so," said the
Court, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id.
373 Id at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
374 Id. at 560.
375 Id at 555.
376 Id at 562. Justice Harlan elaborated:
May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men of the dominant
race, who affect to be disturbed at the possibility that... its supremacy
will be imperiled, by contact... with black people, will endeavor to pro-
cure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be separated in the jury
box by a "partition," ... to prevent black jurors from coming too close to
their brother jurors of the white race.
Id.
377 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For discussion of the Civil Rights Cases, see supra notes 346-
67 and accompanying text.
378 100 U.S. 313 (1879). For a discussion of Rives, see supra notes 332-39 and accom-
panying text.
379 J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 334.
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the state constitution to include "special" voting requirements.
These constitutional requirements limited voting and jury duty to
citizens who could pay a poll tax, who had never been convicted of
any larceny-related offenses, who could read and write, and who un-
derstood all sections of the state constitution.380
In 1892, Mississippi's legislature further restricted black jury
participation by passing another law vesting discretion in three state
officials to select jurors based on their "good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character." 381  Other Southern states later
adopted similar regulations. In the 1898 case of Williams v. Missis-
sippi,3 82 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Missis-
sippi's discretionary jury selection statute and voting requirements,
despite the effect they had in disqualifying most of Mississippi's
190,000 previously eligible black citizens from jury duty. The Court
rejected the defendant's contention that the state had violated his
equal protection rights when all-white grand and trial juries indicted
and convicted him. The Court reasoned that Mississippi's constitu-
tional requirements applied to "weak and vicious white people,
380 Id. at 339. Mississippi's 1890 constitution stated that "every elector shall... be
able to read any section of the constitution of this State; or he shall be able to under-
stand the same when read to him." Miss. CONST. art. 12, § 244 (1890) (cited in Williams
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 217 n.1 (1898)). For an excellent review of Mississippi's
disfranchisement of the black voter, see Morton Stavis, A Centuty of Struggle for Black En-
franchisement in Mississippi: From the Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 1965-And
Beyond, 57 Miss. L.J. 591-673 (1987); see also N. MCMILLEN, supra note 366, at 38-44.
In one of the first published accounts, Charles Spahr described the disfranchise-
ment process in Mississippi:
[A]n uncommonly bright negro over in Mississippi who was determined
to vote, studied the Constitution thoroughly before applying for his pa-
pers. He brought his tax receipts with him, and they were all found to be
properly made out. Then came the questioning to determine whether he
"understood" the Constitution. "What," began the judge, "are the pro-
visions of Magna Charta [sic], incorporated in the fundamental law of Mis-
sissippi?" The negro stood blank for a moment, and then answered in
despair, "I dunno, judge, unless it is that no coloured person shall vote in
this State." "That's right," exclaimed the judge handing him his papers,
"you are the first n- r that has answered it."
CHARLES B. SPAHR, AMERICA'S WORKING PEOPLE 105-06 (1900).
I thank Mari Matsuda for her thoughtful advice against spelling out racial slurs "to
avoid harm to others, and to prevent desensitization to harmful words." Mari J. Mat-
suda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320,
2329 n.49 (1989).
381 In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589 (1896) and in Smith v. Mississippi,
162 U.S. 593 (1896), the Supreme Court denied defendants' federal removal petitions,
which challenged the constitutionality of the all-white jury chosen pursuant to Missis-
sippi's new jury selection procedures. The defendants asserted that blacks had been
eliminated from service as jurors "for a number of years." In rejecting the defendant's
petition the Court reasserted the Strauder-Rives doctrine, that in the absence of state law
denying blacks the right to serve on a jury, a defendant's only remedy was state court
review.
382 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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too."3 83
The Court also rebuked the defendant's argument that the state
had administered the jury selection standard of "good intelligence,
sound judgment, and fair character," in an evil and discriminatory
manner.3 84 Despite Mississippi officials' flagrant "presumption"3 85
of blacks' ineligibility for jury service, the Justices unanimously con-
cluded that Mississippi's laws were constitutional because "it has not
been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil
was possible under them."38 6
Following this decision, other state legislatures added similar
requirements to their state constitutions. By 1910, South Carolina,
Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and
Oklahoma had all disenfranchised blacks.3 87 The effect was a stun-
ning reversal of blacks' ability to exercise their voting rights. 388 The
link between voter and juror eligibility, combined with administra-
tion of discretionary juror selection statutes, virtually eliminated
black citizens' participation in the administration of justice.38 9 In
383 Id at 222.
384 Ida at 213.
385 See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881), discussed supra notes 340-43.
386 Williams, 170 U.S. at 225.
387 J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 340-41.
388 In Louisiana, 130,000 blacks had been registered to vote and represented a ma-
jority in twenty-six parishes. In 1900, two years after Louisiana incorporated a "grand-
father clause" into its constitution, fewer than five percent remained eligible to vote and
were not a voting majority in any parish. Similarly, in 1900, only 3000 of 181,000 age-
eligible Alabama blacks were qualified to vote after that state repealed its constitution.
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Similar patterns were present throughout the seg-
regated south. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 340-41.
389 A survey conducted during the first decade of the twentieth century indicated
that few blacks sat as jurors in the south. See G. STEPHENSON, supra note 344, at 253-72.
Stephenson's survey targeted counties where blacks constituted one-half or more of the
population in 1900. In Alabama, three responding counties said blacks had never sat on
juries; in one community where blacks outnumbered whites 5 to 1, a court official said it
would be considered "farcical" if a black ever served. Id. at 253-54. In Arkansas, blacks
had not sat on juries in one county since 1894, and did not "serve in [another] county on
regular juries" despite outnumbering whites eight to one. Id. at 154-55. In Georgia's
eleven counties, not one black citizen had ever served on a state jury, according to the
recollection of responding officials. Id at 256-58. The survey reported similar findings
in Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id at 259-63,
263-65, 265-67, 267-68, and 269-71. In Florida, three of the five counties reported that
blacks had not served on juries for "many years" because it was "a thing of the past"
during "the days of Carpetbag Rule;" in the other two counties, the clerks answered that
a "large number" served on federal juries, although "it is very rare" in the state courts
because "there are but few Negroes, about one per cent," who have the "approved in-
tegrity, fair character, sound judgment and intelligence" to serve as jurors. IdL at 255-
56.
In some states, there were exceptions to this general phenomenon. One Louisiana
county reported that blacks represented one half of trial jurors and "a much smaller
proportion" on the grand jury; the remaining parishes followed the general pattern of
few blacks serving as jurors. Id. at 258-59. In two Texas districts, blacks comprised 257o
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this way, the United States Supreme Court decisions from Blyew to
Williams functioned as a springboard for state reversal of civil rights
gains of the Reconstruction Era. °90 Consequently, as the nation
moved into the twentieth century, the all-white jury was firmly re-
entrenched in the southern courtroom. Although it was common
for blacks to have served as jurors during Reconstruction, they vir-
tually disappeared from the southern jury box by 1900, even in
counties where they constituted an overwhelming majority of the lo-
cal population.3 91
At the same time, the southern states reduced protections for
African-Americans against white mob terror and violence. In the
four years followingJustice Harlan's 1896 warning that racial segre-
gation would "stimulate aggressions... and arouse race hate,"
3 92
white mobs lynched more than 400 black people.393 In virtually
every one of these cases, and in 2000 lynchings of black people that
followed between 1900 and 1935, souther 3 9 4 and northern
3 9 5
and 10% of thejurors selected. Id. at 268-69. And in Oklahoma, some blacks served on
grand and trial juries "nearly every term", id. at 267, although, in a 1910 case, an
Oklahoma state judge discharged ajury for which four blacks had been selected because
"he would not insult white men by making them serve on a jury with Negroes." fI at
252 (citing News and Observer, Feb. 17, 1910 (Raleigh, N.C. newspaper)).
390 Following Williams v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court rarely interfered with a
state official's administration of its jury selection laws until 1935. A state official's denial
that blacks were disqualified from jury service because of their race was sufficient to bar
Supreme Court review. Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909). Only when state court
procedure denied a defendant the opportunity, futile as it might be, to prove an equal
protection violation did the Court invoke its review powers. See Carter v. Texas, 177
U.S. 442, 448 (1900) (state court refused to hear evidence that blacks had been system-
atically excluded from serving as grand jurors "for a great many years" in Galveston
County, Texas); Rogers v. Alabama, 142 U.S. 226 (1904) (Supreme Court similarly over-
ruled a state court ruling which had deprived the defendant of even raising the issue of
discrimination injury selection); John R. Gillespie, The Constitution and the All-WhiteJury,
38 Ky. LJ. 65 (1950).
391 See E. FONER, supra note 14, at 595; supra note 389 (discussing state-by-state sur-
vey of black exclusion from jury selection).
392 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 560 (1896).
393 R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 6-7.
394 Confident that they had immunity from criminal prosecution, southern whites
terrorized black communities in Wilmington, North Carolina and Lake City, South Caro-
lina in 1898, and in New Orleans in 1900. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 341. In 1904, in
Statesboro, Georgia, white mobs lynched two convicted black men by burning them
alive. They also generally engaged in "wholesale terrorism" against African-Americans
by killing a married couple, assaulting other blacks, and destroying the homes of numer-
ous black families. Two years later, in Atlanta, Georgia, white mobs went on an even
worse rampage. They burned black citizens' homes and businesses and attacked "every
black person they saw" as police officers refused to respond. Two days later, the vio-
lence spread to an Atlanta suburb where whites, aided by local police, killed four "sub-
stantial" black citizens and injured many others. In each of the three Georgia anti-black
riots, public officials failed to prosecute and punish the perpetrators. Id. at 440-41; RA-
CIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 44-46 (Alan D. Grimshaw ed. 1969) [hereinafter
RACIAL VIOLENCE].
395 Beginning in the 1890s, and peaking just after World War I, many African-Amer-
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states failed to arrest and prosecute tens of thousands of whites who
engaged in these and other open acts of brutality. In the rare situa-
tion when a locality initiated a criminal prosecution, all-white juries
assured acquittal of the white defendants.3 96
Following the return of black soldiers after the first World War,
white mob violence intensified in both the North and South.3 97 In
1919, more blacks were lynched than in any of the preceding eleven
years, but local law enforcement and all-white juries combined to
absolve virtually every responsible white attacker.398 Congressional
icans migrated to the North. They sought to escape the South's economic hardship,
terror, and denial of legal protection. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 471-72; R.
ZAGRANDO, supra note 366, at 26. In the early 1900s, in Philadelphia and in towns in
Ohio and Indiana, northern whites greeted the blacks with violent attacks and
threatened their lives. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 443. In 1908, national attention
was drawn to anti-black violence in Abraham Lincoln's hometown of Springfield, Illi-
nois. When a white citizen attempted to rescue two convicted black prisoners from a
white lynch mob, the enraged mob hanged two other black men, destroyed 15 black
businesses and homes, and caused death and injury to many others before the state
militia established order. A grand jury denounced the failure of local police to stop
rioters, and indicted 50 of the 100 people arrested. The leaders of the mob went unpun-
ished. Id at 443-44; RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra note 394, at 51-56. The Springfield riot led
to the creation of the NAACP in 1910. See J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 286-88; R.
ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 22-23. In 1913, in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, a mob of
4000 white people lynched a black man who was chained to a bed and threw him three
times into a bonfire. Local juries failed to convict any of those involved. Id. at 26-27.
396 Only 0.8% of the white criminals responsible for lynching 2000 black men and
women between 1900-1935 were successfully prosecuted and convicted. JAMES H.
CHADBoURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAw 14 (1933). Such white defendants were convicted
at a similar rate between 1882 and 1933. MICHAEL BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SotrrH-
ERN ORDER 9 (1987). In total, only 40 convictions resulted from the 5150 recorded
victims of mob terror. Id
397 In the summer of 1919, the nation witnessed 25 anti-black riots throughout the
nation as blacks coming home from the war found whites "determined to see that there
should be no wholesale distribution of the blessings of liberty." JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
BLACKS IN AMERICA 194 (1971); seeJ. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 480-81. Chicago was
the scene of the worst violence in the north. Over 13 days, 38 people were killed, 15 of
whom were white and 23 black; 1000 homes, mostly those of black people, were de-
stroyed. RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra note 394, at 97-105. Two years earlier in East St.
Louis, Illinois, white rioters killed 40 blacks and destroyed 312 homes. A congressional
report attributed the violence primarily to the hiring of black workers, who were part of
the "Great Migration" north. More than 300,000 African-Americans left the South at
the peak of migration in 1917. J. MCPHERSON, supra, at 185.
In the South, an allegation of police brutality in Houston, Texas in 1917 led to a
confrontation between armed black soldiers and white police and citizens; in the shoot-
ing that ensued, twelve whites and one black person were killed. The Army prosecuted
the black soldiers "with only a pretense of a trial." Thirteen soldiers were executed and
41 others received life sentences. Id at 75-87; seeJ. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 460. In
1919, in Elaine, Arkansas, black farmers attempted to unionize. A confrontation with
local police ensued, and a deputy sheriff was killed. White mobs murdered more than
200 African-Americans, but no whites were prosecuted. Id at 315. However, 79 blacks
were convicted of the sheriff's murder, and 12 were given death sentences. These
sentences were subsequently overturned in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see
RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra note 394, at 51-73.
398 In 1919, 76 black people were lynched; this was the highest number since 1908,
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attempts to pass an anti-lynching statute failed in the early 1920s.399
The debate and outcry, however, led southern states to "abandon
the use of the rope and faggot for pragmatic reasons," and to re-
place lynchings with a more "[humane] . . .method of racial con-
trol"-the judgment and imposition of capital sentences by all-white
juries.400 Faith in the all-white jury's verdict against accused blacks
made lynching a less preferred response to charges of interracial
violence after 1935,401 although it remained in use as one form of
terror against those seeking to fulfill the thirteenth amendment's
promise of "universal freedom" and equal rights later in the
century. 40 2
when 89 were murdered. R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 6-7. Although most whites
who participated in anti-black violence escaped punishment, the Illinois Attorney Gen-
eral successfully prosecuted 20 white men (and 11 black men) for their actions during
the East St. Louis, Illinois violence. See supra note 397 for a discussion of the East St.
Louis incident.
399 The anti-lynching movement was spawned in the post-Reconstruction period by
black clergy and journalists. In the 1890s, Ida Wells Barnett actively campaigned in
favor of a federal anti-lynching law. R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 13; see generally IDA
WELLS BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS (1969). In 1918, the NAACP began lobbying for an
anti-lynching bill. In 1921, the House of Representatives passed a federal statute, but a
filibuster by southern senators succeeded in defeating the Bill. Other legislative efforts
in 1935 and 1940 were also rebuffed by the filibuster tactics of southern democrats. J.
FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 486-87; R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 41-71.
400 M. BELKNAP, supra note 396, at 22-26 (citing WALTER WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOT,
A BIOGRAPHY OFJUDGE LYNCH (1929)).
Prior to 1890, states rarely imposed death sentences. Beginning in the 1890s, the
number of death sentences increased sharply. In the 1920s, juries sentenced 1038 peo-
ple to die, about two-thirds of whom were African-Americans. For the first time, the
number of executed blacks exceeded the number of blacks killed by white mobs. WIL-
LIAM S. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN STATE IMPOSED EXECU-
TIONS 36-37, 59 (1974). In the 1930s, all-white juries convicted and sentenced more
people to death than in any other decade in United States history. African-Americans
represented more than two-thirds of the 1523 people who were executed. Southernjury
verdicts accounted for more capital sentences than in the North and West combined (a
trend that was maintained through the 1960s). Id.
Although southern states began in the 1930s to rely on the legal process to prose-
cute black defendants, lynch mobs continued to murder with impunity. Carleton Beals
& Abel Plenn, Louisiana's Black Utopia, 141 THE NATION 503-05 (Oct. 30, 1935). In addi-
tion, some southern states' law enforcement methods were condemned by the United
States Supreme Court. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Four Negroes, THE NATION 269-70 (Feb. 24, 1940); THE NA-
TION, 674-76 (Dec. 31, 1935). In reviewing this history, the United States Civil Rights
Commission concluded that, although whites are not immune from public brutality,
"Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality, proportionately more than any other group
in American society." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1961, at 1, col. 2.
401 Prior to 1935, lynch mobs murdered 5643 people throughout the United States.
W. BOWERS, supra note 400, at 36. After 1935, the jury verdict became the primary
mechanism for imposing death sentences against southern defendants. Of 64 citizens
killed by white mobs after 1935, all but seven were African-American. See R. ZAN-
GRANDO, supra note 366, at 6-7.
402 Following the second World War, southern whites revived the lynch mob and
delivered a message to returning black soldiers that they "must not expect or demand
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A. From Norris to Swain: Equal Protection Challenges 1935-
1965
From 1880 until 1935, the Rives-Neal doctrine made it all but
impossible to challenge the elimination of blacks as trial jurors. In
the 1935 case of Norris v. Alabama,403 the Supreme Court provided a
basis for court challenges to the systematic exclusion of blacks and
other racial minorities from the venire of prospective grand and
petit juries. As a result of these challenges, the Supreme Court in-
validated exclusionary jury selection procedures in several states,
leading to modest changes that allowed one or more blacks to serve
as grand jurors and to be called as members of the trial jury venire.
While the Court's decisions whittled away at the Rives-Neal bar-
rier to the jury room, they proved woefully incapable of assuring
that blacks actually served on trial juries. In the wake of Norris,
states turned to a new procedural weapon, the peremptory chal-
lenge, to strike prospective blackjurors. The Supreme Court's 1965
decision in Swain v. Alabama40 4 once again reinforced the constitu-
tionality of the all-white trial jury when it sanctioned the rearguard
exclusion of prospective black jurors from the jury box through the
use of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge.
B. The Norris v. Alabama Breakthrough
Norris v. Alabama405 grew out of the nationally known Scotts-
boro trial in which nine black men were tried for allegedly raping
two white women. At that trial, the nation watched as "southern
justice" denied the nine defendants effective assistance of legal
counsel, and then condemned them to die following a trial de-
scribed as a "legal lynching. '406 Following the United States
any change in their status from that which existed before they went overseas." R. ZAN-
GRANDO, supra note 366, at 174. In July, 1946, a white mob lynched two married black
couples in Walton County, Georgia. See H. William Fitelson, The Murders at Monroe, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1946, at 258. In August, a Louisiana mob lynched a black vet-
eran and an Alabama mob assaulted numerous black servicemen. Whites also murdered
a black union organizer in Gordon, Georgia, and a black man who attempted to vote in
Athens, Tennessee. The most notorious, and internationally reported, brutality in-
volved Isaac Woodward. Three hours after Woodward's army discharge, he was brutally
assaulted by two white South Carolina policemen who gouged out Woodward's eyes and
denied him medical treatment. R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 174; see infra notes
432-34 and accompanying text (describing the usual acquittals of white defendants
charged with interracial violence in the South between 1955 and 1965).
403 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
404 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
405 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
406 R. ZANGRANDO, supra note 366, at 99. See DAN T. CARTR, ScoTrsBoRo: A TRAG-
EDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979), for complete details of the case, including the one-
day trials held in a "mob" atmosphere in which all-white juries convicted eight of the
nine young black defendants. The United States Supreme Court reversed the jury ver-
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Supreme Court's reversal of their convictions, 40 7 the defendants'
strategy was to challenge Alabama's all-white jury system, which
would ultimately retry them.
Uncontradicted evidence indicated that no black person had
served as either a trial or grand juror in two Alabama counties dur-
ing a fifty-year period.408 Nonetheless, in denying the defendants'
equal protection argument that racial discrimination was responsi-
ble for the blacks' exclusion, Alabama courts accepted the standard
explanation offered by the counties' jury commissioners: that no
African-Americans in the counties were fit to discharge the duties of
a juror.40 9
Faced with overwhelming evidence that this philosophy had sys-
tematically barred black jury service since at least the turn of the
century, the Supreme Court found "it impossible to accept such a
sweeping characterization.., so contrary to the evidence as to the
many qualified negroes [living there] ... -"410 The Court's opinion
in Norris restated its rejection of "the violent presumption" 411 be-
hind the total exclusion of blacks from jury service. The opinion
also indicated that the Court would no longer defer to a state offi-
cial's perfunctory denial that racial discrimination had caused the
exclusion: "If ... mere general assertions by officials of their per-
dict in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), finding that the defendants' Tennessee
defense attorney was unprepared for trial and unaware of Alabama criminal procedure.
Carter was less legalistic when he described the attorney as "so stewed he could hardly
walk straight." D. CARTER, supra, at 22. The case became an internationally cause
celebre when the Communist Party intervened, called the charges "trumped up," and
provided new counsel through its International Labor Defense (ILD) committee. The
NAACP entered the case soon thereafter, and accused the Communist Party of using the
case for propaganda purposes. The ILD argued Powell before the Supreme Court and
gained reversal of the defendants' convictions. Thereafter, ajoint defense trial team was
formed, led by anti-communist attorney Samuel Liebowitz. See D. CARTER, supra, at 316-
34; GENNA REA McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 109-11, 119-21 (1983).
407 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (first case in which the Supreme Court
held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause guarantees an accused the
right to counsel when charged with a capital crime in a state proceeding).
408 At a pretrial hearing, several state officials testified that there had never been a
black juror "on any grand or petitjury... within the memory of witnesses who had lived
there all their lives." Norris, 294 U.S. at 591. One jury commissioner added that all-
white trial and grand juries had been the rule in every trial held during "the entire
history of th[e] county." Id.
The defendants in Norris also challenged the exclusion of black trial jurors in Mor-
gan County where the jury trial was scheduled to be held. The uncontradicted testi-
mony of witnesses who "were over fifty years of age and had always lived in Morgan
County" established that "no negro had ever served on a jury in that county" within
their memory. Id. at 596-97.
409 Id. at 598-99.
410 Id. at 599.
411 Neal v. Delaware 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881); Bernard S.Jefferson, Race Discrimina-
tion in jury Service, 19 B.U.L. REV. 413 (1939).
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formance of duty were to be accepted as an adequate justification
for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision . . . would be but a vain and illusory
requirement." 4 12
The Norris decision paved the way to successful challenges of
state court convictions in other cases where African-Americans had
been systematically excluded from jury duty. In the twelve-year pe-
riod following Norris, the nation's highest court affirmed its "solemn
duty to make independent inquiry and determination of the dis-
puted facts," 413 and reversed all-white jury convictions of black de-
fendants in capital cases in Oklahoma,4 14 Kentucky, 415 Louisiana,4 16
Texas,4 17 and Mississippi,4 18 where all-white juries had sat uninter-
rupted for decades. In each case, the defendants established a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing the long-continued
exclusion of Negroes from jury service, and states were unable to
rebut this evidence by proving that nondiscriminatory factors were
responsible.
The Supreme Court's decision in Norris v. Alabama eased the
evidentiary burden for establishing a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination. Once a defendant presented statistical evidence of
total exclusion of blacks from juries, the burden shifted to the state
to provide nondiscriminatory reasons for the fact that only whites
had served as grand or trialjurors. In this sense, Norris represented
a constitutional leap forward in successfully challenging and modify-
ing state selection procedures which had prevented black people
from being included in the venire panel.
Two Texas cases decided during this post-Norris period illus-
412 Norris, 294 U.S. at 598.
413 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939) (footnote omitted).
414 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935) (Court reversed conviction after
finding that black citizens were excluded from jury service "for a long period").
415 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 614-15 (1938) (no black person had served as a
trial or grand juror in the county during a 30-year period between 1906 and 1936, de-
spite constituting 700 out of the 6700 qualified jurors and 16% of the overall
population).
416 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359 (1939) (only one black person had been
called for grand or petit jury during a 40-year period between 1896 and 1936 despite
constituting almost 50% of the population).
417 Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 403 (1942) (an assistant district attorney testified he
never knew of a black person serving as grand juror during his 16 years as a judge and
27 years living in Dallas County where 61,000 blacks lived, including 19,000 men);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129 (1940) (although African-Americans constituted 20%
of population and 10% of poll taxpayers, only five served as grand jurors out of 384
selected during a seven-year period; in those five grand juries in which there was one
black member, the same individual served three times).
418 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947) (where Justice Black found an
"uncontradicted showing that for thirty years or more no Negro had served as ajuror in
the criminal courts of Lauderdale County").
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trated the limitations on the Court's willingness to use its power to
overrule the dominance of the white juror. In 1945, in Akins v.
Texas,4 19 the Court sanctioned Dallas County's plan to "comply"
with prior Supreme Court rulings420 by seating only one token black
person on each grand jury. The Court upheld this selection
scheme, despite testimony by Dallas's jury commissioners that they
"had no intention of placing more than one negro on the panel. '421
In the five-year period after Akins, Dallas jury commissioners se-
lected a single black juror to serve on each of twenty-one consecu-
tive grand juries, a practice that the Court again refused to condemn
in Cassell v. Texas.422 Although these cases concerned the selection
of grand jurors,423 the message that tokenism was sufficient to shield
419 325 U.S. 398 (1945). The Akins case is discussed in George C. Edwards, White
Justice in Dallas, 161 THE NATION 253-55, 301 (Sept. 15, 1945).
420 The Akins decision was a significant departure from two prior Supreme Court
cases, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942),
which rejected explanations provided by Texas state jury commissioners for why so few
black citizens were selected as grandjurors. In Smith, state officials testified that "chance
and accident," and not racial discrimination, were responsible for their selecting only
three black people as grand jurors in Harris County over an eight-year period. Smith,
311 U.S. at 131. The Court dismissed the argument. "Chance and accident alone could
hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few negroes from
among the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifica-
tions for jury service." Id. In Hill, the Court likewise rejected testimony by Dallas
County jury officials who attributed the absence of any black grand juror over a sixteen
year period to the fact that they "did not know of a qualified negro that... would make a
good grand juror" among the more than 19,000 black men over 21 years of age living in
the county. Hill, 316 U.S. at 402.
421 Akins, 325 U.S. at 406. A second commissioner added: "[W]hen we found one
with all the qualifications of a grand juror we felt like that was satisfactory representa-
tion." Id at 406-07. DissentingJustice Murphy concluded that "clearer proof of inten-
tional and deliberate limitation on the basis of color would be difficult to produce." Ide
at 410 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the sixJustice majority remained "uncon-
vinced that the commissioners deliberately and intentionally limited the number of Ne-
groes on the grand jury list" and affirmed the state court conviction. Id. at 407.
422 339 U.S. 282 (1950). A Texas jury commissioner testified that he was not "per-
sonally acquainted with any negro citizen of Dallas County that [he] thought was quali-
fied to sit on the Grand Jury, at that time." Id. at 288 n.23. The Court concluded that
the commissioners' failure "to familiarize themselves fairly with the qualifications of the
eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color" resulted in racial discrimi-
nation in juror selection. Id at 289. Despite reversing the defendant's conviction, the
Supreme Court's decision did not condemn the obvious tokenism in Dallas's grand jury
selection.
423 After Cassell and Akins, the Court found equal protection violations where state
officials denied even token participation by African-Americans on grand juries and state
selection practices revived the "violent presumption of group ineligibility to serve as
trial jurors." Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881). In practically every one of
these cases, the Court reversed indictments and convictions rendered by all-white juries
against black defendants in capital cases, when members of the defendant's race had
been systematically excluded from eligibility to serve as trial or grand jurors. See, e.g.,
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) (the Court reversed defendant's conviction on the
ground that defendant was deprived of his opportunity to challenge the grand jury se-
lection in Cobb County, Georgia, which had excluded blacks from serving as grand ju-
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racist jury selection procedures from constitutional challenge also
applied to the selection of a trial jury.
This loophole allowed the all-white jury to remain a firmly en-
trenched institution in the South during the thirty-year period fol-
lowing Norris. Under the progeny of Norris, a state could withstand
constitutional scrutiny by accommodating one or more black per-
sons on a grand jury, where their votes would be powerless to
change the outcome of the predominantly white body's decision.
The Norris equal protection standard for selecting trial jurors was
fulfilled simply by including a minuscule number of black persons
on the trial panel from which the jury was chosen. To assure that
not one of these prospective black jurors actually sat as a trial juror,
states relied on a prosecutor's peremptory challenge.424
rors for 18 years despite the presence of a substantial black population); see also Arnold
v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
The Court also invalidated Georgia's jury selection practice of using yellow cards
for prospective black jurors and white cards for prospective white jurors because the
practice made it "easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). In Avery, not one of the 60 trial jurors
selected was a black person. Id. at 561. See also Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967)
(only one black on grandjury); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (only three of 33
potential grand jurors were black); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) (using
white and yellow tickets, court picked only blacks out of 120 potential jurors). But c.f
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (denying challenges to convictions based on the
low number of black jurors in proportion to population).
424 Within days of the Alabama Governor's announcement that he would comply
with the Supreme Court's decision and "observe the supreme law of America," N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1935, at 1, col. 3, southern news correspondents reported that some
politicians were seeking new ways to exclude blacks. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1935, § 4, at
6, col. 1. While some in the southern press urged that "the [Norris] decision... be
accepted in dead earnest," id., these same editorials recognized that the prospective
black juror "may [now] be subject to a personal examination ... not commonly applied
to white persons." N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1935, § 4, at 8, col. 2.
Seven months later, a New York Times reporter reviewed the results of the com-
bined "personal examination" and peremptory challenge "device." He concluded that
"a Negro on a trial jury is as rare as ever in the deep South.... In both criminal and civil
cases .... Negroes ... can be - and are - easily eliminated by one or both sides
through the striking privilege." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1935, § 4, at 7, col. 1. The re-
porter noted the limited impact of the Norris decision: "It is a long cry from the jury roll
to ajury room, and thus far few Negroes have made it .... Negroes are just about as
consistently excluded from jury duty in this part of the South today as before the
Supreme Court decisions." Id. His interviews with southern lawyers left the reader with
a lasting impression of an equally bleak future. One attorney explained, "There are
enough loopholes and human ingenuities at hand to keep them excluded.., for a long
time to come." N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1935, § 5, at 7, col. 1.
The few who made it into the jury box appear to have been selected in cases where
both parties in a criminal or civil case were African-Americans. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1945, at 14, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1936, at 27, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1936; N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1935, at 2, col. 3.
If a black person was selected to sit as a trial juror in an interracial crime, he was the
"token" representative acceptable by the court system. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
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Indeed, scholars had predicted that the Court's decision would
have minimal impact. One explained that Norris would "not create
any radical change in the negro's actual rights [of serving as jurors]
in the South. At best, most negroes who qualify may be barred from
jury service by challenge, peremptory or with cause." 425 Charles
Mangum's comprehensive 1940 study concluded that the Supreme
Court's jury discrimination decision would not change the practice
of eliminating blacks as trial jurors, but would merely lead the states
to rely on the peremptory challenge to eliminate any black person
who qualified to serve as a trial juror.426
C. Southern Violence 1945-1965
Following the second World War, all-white juries continued to
acquit white southerners who engaged in interracial violence.
Newspaper articles reported in 1946 that an all-white Mississippi
jury deliberated ten minutes before rejecting a black widow's testi-
mony and acquitting five white men, including two deputy sheriffs,
charged with killing her husband. 427 The following year, the twenty
men who were accused of lynching Willie Earle were acquitted by a
South Carolina all-white jury whose members apparently disre-
garded the defendants' signed confessions. 428 Incidents of this kind
were common and continued well into the second half of the twenti-
eth century.429 During this same period, all-white juries carried out
1938, at 1, col. 2 (referring to an Arkansas rape trial in which the black juror was a 66-
year-old man "whose success as a farmer and timber man is known throughout the
State").
425 Comments on Recent Cases, 24 ILL. B.J. 233, 234 (1936).
426 CHARLES S. MANGUM JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 308, 333 (1940).
427 Trial and Terror, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1946, at 33. For a description of other inci-
dents of racial violence in the summer of 1946, see infra note 462.
428 Twelve Good Men and True, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1947, at 9.
429 Three years later, an Alabama jury deliberated for one hour and twenty minutes
before acquitting two white police officers accused of beating a black man to death while
he was in their custody. Little Scottsboro, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 1951, at 31. In 1951, an
all-white Florida coroner's jury freed a sheriff who had shot two black prisoners, killing
one, while transporting them to court for a new trial following the Supreme Court's
reversal of their conviction. Ocala: Echo of Injustice, THE NATION, Mar. 1, 1952, at 203.
The following year, an all-white Florida jury convicted a black man of raping a white
woman despite the lack of persuasive evidence. Id. at 204. In 1955, an all-white Missis-
sippijury acquitted several white men charged with killing 14-year-old Emmett Till after
he allegedly wolf-whistled at a white woman. CONRAD LYNN, THERE Is A FOUNTAIN: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 155 (1979). Derrick Bell relies on various
sources in concluding that Till was brutally murdered not primarily because of his con-
duct toward the woman, but because he refused to grovel or to plead for mercy. DER-
RICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 68 n.19 (2d ed. 1980). In 1957, an all-
white jury acquitted two white men accused of bombing a black church in Montgomery,
Alabama. AMERICA, June 15, 1957, at 316 reports that "the defendants made no serious
attempt to disclaim the crime as charged. Rather, they were proud they had committed
this outrage." Despite the apparent evidence of guilt, the jury acquitted the defendants
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a policy of imposing death sentences where black defendants were
accused of committing capital crimes against white people, whereas
southern whites who committed capital offenses against black peo-
ple were almost never sentenced to death.430
During the post-World War II period, some changes occurred
in the southern jury. Black jurors occasionally appeared in signifi-
cant numbers,431 and an all-white jury did not necessarily mean that
every white offender would escape punishment.432 Usually, how-
ever, an all-white jury would free "one of their own." During the
ten-year period ending in 1965, southerners were charged with
committing fifty-eight civil rights killings; only six people were ever
convicted of these crimes, and fewer still received prison
sentences. 433
After all-white juries refused to convict a white deputy sheriff
in one hour, thirty-five minutes. Trial byJury, THE NEW REPUBLIC,June 10, 1957, at 4; see
also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963,
199-201 (1988) (describing criminal act and its aftermath).
430 Death penalty statistics indicate the disproportionate capital punishment
sentences that southern juries have imposed on black defendants. Prior to 1968, 543
defendants were sentenced to die after a rape conviction; in 90% of the cases, the defen-
dant was a black man and the crime victim was a white woman. In southern murder
cases, two-thirds of the defendants sentenced to die were African-Americans. W. Bow-
ers, supra note 400, at 36-37.
431 In 1951, a North Carolina jury consisting of eight white and four black men
deadlocked in the trial of Mack Ingram. Defendant Ingram, a black sharecropper and
father of nine children, was charged with assault for having "leered" at a "pretty 17-
year-old blonde" white woman. He "looked at me funny," said the girl, although "he
got no closer than 75 feet." The two jury holdouts for conviction were both black ju-
rors. Deadlock in Yanceyville, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1951, at 25-26. In Frankfort, Kentucky,
an all-black jury apparently accepted a black defendant's self-defense claim when it
found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not first degree murder, in the killing of a
white man. Report of Racial Trends, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1949, at 23.
432 In 1959, an all-white Florida jury convicted four white men for the sexual assault
of a black college woman; each was sentenced to life imprisonment. LIFE,June 29, 1959,
at 38; THE COMMONWEAL,June 26, 1959, at 316-17. THE COMMONWEAL article indicated
that a white man had never been executed for raping a black woman, although all-white
Florida juries had imposed death sentences on 37 black defendants convicted of raping
white women. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1958, at 12, col. 5 (all-white jury convicted
four Klansmen in the beating of a black man; state court judge sentenced each to prison
terms of from one to six years).
When the crime did not involve a white person, all-white southern juries did not
always convict black defendants, even those as politically unpopular as Martin Luther
King. In 1960, an all-white jury acquitted Dr. King of perjury in connection with the
filing of his tax returns. T. BRANCH, supra note 429.
433 Opening a Second Front, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1965, at 33. Of the six convicted, the
punishment ranged from a seven month suspended sentence to a single life term for
murder. In the 34 killings that occurred after 1960, "the perpetrators .. . have, with one
exception, never served a day in prison." AMERICA, Dec. 18, 1965, at 768. Among the
more notorious crimes in which all-white juries failed to convict defendants were the
murder of civil rights leader Medgar Evers in 1963, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at B9,
col. 1, and the murder of Army reservist Lemuel Penn in 1964, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11,
1964, at 23-24.
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and a Klansman leader in the killings of two civil rights workers in
1965, 43 4 President Lyndon Baines Johnson addressed the recurring
"injustice to Negroes at the hands of all-white juries" 435 and spoke
in favor of introducing new federal legislation to end jury discrimi-
nation: "If [the trial jury's] composition is a sham, its judgment is a
sham. And when that happens, justice itself is a fraud, casting off
the blindfold and tipping the scales one way for whites and another
way for Negroes." 436 President Johnson's hopes for jury reform,
however, were not realized. 43 7 In 1965 the United States Supreme
Court sanctioned the prosecutor's peremptory challenge in Swain v.
Alabama, thus assuring that all-white juries would continue to reign
in most states, at least until the Court's 1986 decision in Batson v.
Kentucky.
D. Exclusion of Black Jurors in the North
The South's official segregation policy and its failure to redress
violence against African-Americans made it an obvious target for
legal challenges. Several of these Supreme Court decisions focused
the public's attention on the instrumental role that all-white juries
played in denying legal protection to black defendants and crime
victims, particularly in cases involving interracial violence.
During most of this century, little attention has been paid to the
black juror's status in the North. Research describing the racial
composition of northern trial juries during the first half of the twen-
tieth century is almost nonexistent. 43 8 There are only a few re-
434 In September, 1965, an all-white jury in Lawndes County, Alabama deliberated
for one and one-half hours before acquitting volunteer deputy sheriff and "prominent
citizen" Thomas L. Coleman in the fatal shooting ofJonathan Daniels, a white Episcopal
seminarian from New Hampshire. Daniels was active in the voter registration campaign.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1965, at 24, col. 3.
In October, 1965, a Hayneville, Alabama all-white jury acquitted Klansman Collie
Leroy Wilkins in the murder of white civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo who was returning
from the Selma-Montgomery civil rights march. Kenneth Crawford, Kurtainsfor the Klan,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1965, at 34. Two months later, a federal trial jury convicted Wil-
kins and two other Klansmen of conspiracy for violating the worker's civil rights. Fed-
eral District Court Judge Frank Johnson sentenced each defendant to the maximum ten
year prison term. Id. On the previous day, an all-white state jury in Anniston, Alabama
convicted a white "night-rider" of second degree murder for gunning down a black
man. Despite the guilty verdicts, one newspaper called the convictions "too little and
too late," noting that each defendant would be eligible for parole in just over three
years. AMERICA, Dec. 18, 1965, at 768.
435 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1965, at 1, col. 4.
436 Id.
437 The House of Representatives voted to pass the jury reform bill, but it failed to
gain the required votes in the Senate. See CONG. GLOBE, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1866).
438 One researcher's comments indicate his dissatisfaction, both with the available
literature and with the difficulty of learning whether black citizens actually served on
northern trial juries during the first half of this century: "Asking, then, what has been
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ported state court decisions pertaining to a defendant's challenge of
a northern state's jury selection.4 9
Although the paucity of court challenges and published mate-
rial may initially suggest that racial discrimination did not exist in
the selection of northern juries, careful examination of the available
evidence leads to the opposite conclusion. Anti-black hostility
greeted many African-Americans when they moved north and west
at the beginning of this century and in the twenty-five-year period
following World War I.440 As extreme manifestations of this hostil-
ity, racial violence erupted in Chicago in 1919, in New York City in
1935, and in Detroit and New York City again in 1943.4 4 1
In this setting, northern jury officials were charged with select-
ing jurors who met the "intelligence, experience and integrity"
test,44 2 the same discretionary standard that southern commission-
done, one can summarize: little on the specific question of blacks and thejury." ALFRED
SCHAUFELBERGER, BLACKS AND THE TRIAL BY JURY (1973).
I am fortunate to have discovered a 1924 study ofjuror composition in seven north-
ern and mid-west cities. CLARENCE CALLENDAR, THE SELECTION OFJURORs-A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF THE METHODS OF SELECTION AND THE PERSONNEL OF JURIES IN
PHILADELPHIA AND OTHER CITIES (1924). Although this study does not discuss the racial
composition of juries, its analysis of class and gender considerations provides useful
information in gaining a sense of the typical northern juror during the first decades of
this century. In 1959, Jack Greenberg attempted to learn the extent of African-Ameri-
cans inclusion as trial jurors in northern cities. JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND
AMERICAN LAW (1959). For additional background on northern juries, see C. MANGUM,
supra note 426, at 308-55.
439 See, e.g., People v. Dukes, 19 Ill. 2d 532, 169 N.E.2d 84 (1960), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 830 (1961); People v. Harris, 17 Ill. 2d 446, 161 N.E.2d 809 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 928 (1960); People v. Douglas, 709 Il1. 230, 99 N.E.2d 13 (1951); People v.
Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.W.2d 466, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749, reh'g denied, 323
U.S. 815 (1944); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 999, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 893 (1964); Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 391
Pa. 141, 137 A.2d 236, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 945 (1958).
440 See supra notes 395 & 397 for a discussion of violence against blacks in the North
during the first two decades of this century. Racial violence usually followed African-
Americans' migration to northern cities. In Chicago, the black population doubled just
prior to the 1919 violence; 50,000 blacks moved to Detroit during the three years pre-
ceding the 1943 riot; and in New York and Los Angeles, sharp increases in the black
population were followed by racial violence.- J. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 250, 309,
391.
441 In 1943 in Detroit, President Roosevelt called in 6000 soldiers to restore order
after white mobs had roamed the streets for 30 hours, assaulting many black people. J.
FRANKLN, supra note 57, at 403-04. Police violence killed 17 people, all of whom were
black, and caused extensive property damage. RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra note 394, at 140-
44. Two black men were later convicted of being the "principle incitors" of the riot.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1943, at 28, col. 8. For an account of the 1943 New York violence,
see Walter White, Behind the Harlem Riot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1943, at 220.
442 C. CALLENDER, supra note 438, at 10. Callender studied jury selection procedures
in seven cities, and found that every city except Philadelphia relied on discretionary
standards to select qualifiedjurors: New York, id. at 52 ("intelligent, of sound mind and
good character"); Chicago, id. at 61 ("fair character .... approved integrity .... sound
judgment"); Boston, id. at 68 ("good moral character, of sound judgment"); Pittsburgh,
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ers had used to eliminate almost every black citizen from the south-
ern trial venire. In one of the first published studies on jury
composition in northern cities, Clarence Callender described the
strong class and gender bias that characterized the discretionary se-
lection process. In each of seven northern cities, state jury officials
demonstrated their clear preference for choosing professional and
semi-professional jurors, and for rejecting those employed as
skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled workers. 443 In all but one city, jury
commissioners also systematically excluded women from jury
duty.44 4 Considering the "elite" nature of jurors, it was extremely
unlikely that African-Americans were included. Indeed, according
to African-American attorney Conrad Lynn, who began practicing in
New York City in 1933: "It was unthinkable that a black person
would ever serve as a juror in any felony case in which another black
person was being tried prior to World War II."44
Between 1911 and 1933, many northern states passed legisla-
id. at 64 ("sober, intelligent, and judicious persons"); Baltimore, id. at 72 ("intelligence,
sobriety and integrity of such persons"); and St. Louis, id. at 75 ("sober and intelligent,
of good reputation"). Philadelphia selected jurors "divid[ed] ... fairly equally between
the several divisions of [each] ward.... [T]he judge [then] determine[d] ... the relative
proportion of men and women jurors and the proportion of different occupations." Id.
at 16.
443 Callendar divided male jurors into four categories (A-D), based on their occupa-
tions. Category A represented professional men (e.g. corporate officials, bankers, engi-
neers, publishers, real estate, insurance); category B consisted of semi-professionals
(e.g., bookkeepers, salesmen, foremen, secretaries); category C referred to skilled and
semi-skilled workers (e.g., bakers, blacksmiths, conductors, electricians, machinists); and
category D contained unskilled workers (e.g., laborers, porters, janitors, drivers). Id. at
20-21.
Women, who served only on Philadelphia juries, were divided into three categories:
business women (e.g., clerks, bookkeepers, teachers, saleswomen), manual workers (e.g.,
skilled and unskilled laborers, dressmakers, domestic servants), and housewives and "la-
dies". Id. at 21-22.
Callender's study reveals that, in each city, working people (categories C and D)
were disproportionately excluded from juries. Id. at 23. Consequently, a typical 12 per-
son Philadelphia jury consisted of three professional men, three sales/supervisory men,
four skilled/semi-skilled workers, and a twelfth juror who may have been an unskilled
laborer or a "business" woman. Id.
All-male juries in Boston, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Baltimore, and St. Louis were
roughly comparable to Philadelphia's professional and semi-professional dominatedju-
ries. New York City's jury was the most skewed against including skilled, semi-skilled, or
unskilled workers as trial jurors. Ninety-four percent of the trial jurors selected were
men "from the better class of residential sections... [and] from the higher grade occu-
pations" Id. at 53.
444 Philadelphia women constituted 12.1% of trial jurors; a "business" woman's
chances for selection were considerably greater than a woman manual worker or house-
wife. Id. at 23; see N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1941, at 40, col. 3 (the first black woman jurors
were called during World War II because of the shortage of male jurors).
445 Telephone interview with Conrad Lynn, Esq. (Oct. 13, 1988). Mr. Lynn recalled
first seeing black jurors serving on some civil and criminal cases in Harlem Municipal
Court in the 1930s. Callender explained that "a limited number of persons were taken
from each of the sections of the city populated by laboring classes and foreign elements
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tion that was aimed at eliminating discrimination in jury selection
procedures. These statutes were often modeled after section four of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.446 It is fair to assume that these laws
were a response to the existence of discrimination in using a discre-
tionary method of selecting jurors.447 Ironically, the state anti-
discrimination laws proved to be as ineffective as the 1875 federal
statute had been: not one state commenced a criminal prosecution
alleging violation of these laws.448
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Norris v. Alabama,
northern defendants duplicated southern legal strategies and began
to challenge selection procedures that resulted in all-white grand
and trial juries. As in the South, however, these challenges failed
whenever a northern court determined that "one or more" AfTican-
Americans were included on state jury venires.449 As black citizens
for service upon municipal court juries which are to serve in those sections of the city."
C. CALLENDAR, supra note 438, at 58.
African-American senior citizens confirmed Lynn's recollection. In a random series
of interviews with 23 New Yorkers ages 70 to 88, not one remembered a single African-
American called to serve on a trial jury prior to World War II (my thanks to research
assistant Marjorie Modestil who travelled to three day care centers to obtain this infor-
mation). In "important" criminal cases, such as murder or conspiracy, New York City's
jury commissioner selected special blue ribbon juries that consisted of 97% professional
males who worked in business, finance, banking, insurance and sales. The Supreme
Court upheld the "blue-ribbon" trial jury in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, reh'g denied,
332 U.S. 784 (1947); this "special" jury was eventually eliminated on September 1,
1965. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1965, at 29, col. 6.
446 C. MANGUM, supra note 426, at 312, cites the following criminal statutes as evi-
dence of jury selection discrimination in the North: IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-903 (Bums
1933); 1930 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ch. 7 § 13; MICH. CoMP. LAWs § 16, 811 (1929); NJ.
CoMP. STAT. p. 1442, § 3 (1911); OHIo CODE § 12,868 (Throckmorton, 1929); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 4692 (1923).
447 Evidence of the black juror's disappearance from state grand juries is found in
newspaper articles and court cases describing the first black grand jurors in New York
City, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1937, at 23, col. 2; in Nassau County, N.Y., N.Y. Times,July 9,
1947, at 16, col. 3; and in the Bronx, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1950, at 30, col. 4. Other
articles announced the first black grand jury foreman in New York City, N.Y. Times,Jan.
4, 1944, at 11, col. 2; in Brooklyn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1944, at 13, col. 7; and in Union-
town, NJ., JET, Dec. 13, 1956, at 7.
448 See supra text accompanying note 338 (referring to Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
313 (1880) as the only instance in which a state jury commissioner was prosecuted under
section four of the 1875 Act).
449 Illinois appellate courts consistently rejected defendant challenges to exclusion
of African-American trial and grand jurors between 1939 and 1969. See People v. Price,
371 Ill. 137, 20 N.E.2d. 61 (1939); People v. Rhode, 403 Ill. 41, 85 N.E.2d 24 (1949);
People v. Cross, 40 Ill.2d 85, 237 N.E.2d 437, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 221 (1968); People v.
Gregory, 95 Ill. App.2d 396, 237 N.E.2d 720 (1968); People v. Davenport, 111111. App.
2d 197, 249 N.E.2d 328 (1969).
State courts in Pennsylvania, NewJersey, and Rhode Island have also denied similar
challenges. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Tolliver v. Ashe, 336 Pa. 206, 8 A.2d 541
(1939); State v. Smith, 93 A. 353 (S. Ct. R.I. 1915); N.Y. Times, May 7, 1935, at 10, col.
3; N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1935, at 8, col. 4. But cf Dixon v. State, 224 Ind. 327, 67 N.E. 2d
138 (1946) (court upheld challenge on due process grounds).
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reached the jury box, the prosecutor's peremptory challenge be-
came the principle weapon for striking prospective blackjurors. Ap-
pellate decisions in Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania upheld the
race-conscious use of the prosecutor's challenge, and denied de-
fendants' challenges to the all-white juries that resulted. 450 In some
northern cities, prosecutors did not have to use their peremptory
challenges; prosecuting and defense attorneys excused each black
juror "by agreement." 45 1
The emerging picture of the northern trial jury resembles the
all-white jury of the South. As discussed below, the extensive use of
the peremptory challenge to maintain all-white juries is measured,
450 The prosecutor's race-conscious use of the peremptory challenge to strike pro-
spective African-American jurors occurred most frequently when an African-American
defendant was charged with violence against a police officer or a white person. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 439; see also Due Process in New Jersey, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1949, at
358 (describing the "Northern Scottsboro" case in which an all-white Trenton, New
Jersey jury found six black men guilty in the killing of an elderly white man); N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1947, at 17, col. 5 (describing a New York City "blue-ribbon" jury's conviction
of two black men for the murder of a police detective).
In some cases, a prosecutor admitted that race considerations motivated his jury
selection strategy. See People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.W.2d 466, 471 (pros-
ecutor explained his reasons for peremptorily challenging "more than thirty" prospec-
tive black jurors: "Every Negro in Detroit is a number or policy player anyhow, and as
such is unfit to serve on a case involving such matters"), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749, reh'g
denied, 323 U.S. 815 (1944).
451 J. GREENBERG, supra note 438, at 406-07 (Chicago's Public Defender referred to
"a time .... and we would have to go back a number of years, that there would be an
agreement between the State's Attorney and the Defense Counsel to excuse all negroes
by agreement.").
Interviews with practicing attorneys and citizens who were ofjury service age during
this period provide further evidence that African-Americans and other people of color
were systematically excluded from serving as criminal trial jurors in the North prior to
1965. Retired New York City African-American Judge William Booth, who started his
legal practice in 1950, describes how the "peremptory was used most of the time by
District Attorneys in New York City's five boroughs and in Nassau County. I always
made a record but it fell on deaf ears." Telephone interview (Oct. 13, 1988). Ernie
Goodman, for example, began trying criminal cases in Michigan in 1929, and remem-
bers "jury panels ... consisting of all or almost all-white members until the late 1960's."
Letter from E. Goodman to author (Oct. 6, 1988). Walter Gerash, whose criminal prac-
tice in Denver, Colorado began in 1955, remembers the exclusion of minority jurors
lasting until 1959. Letter from W. Gerash to author (Nov. 10, 1988). Los Angeles attor-
ney John McTernan stated that in 1933 "very few blacks were on jury panels . . ., and
with the use of peremptory challenges, it was unusual for a black person to be on a jury
in most cases between 1933-1943." Letter fromJ. McTernan to author (Oct. 7, 1988).
Lawrence Kennon, admitted to the Illinois Bar in 1956, recalled no African-Americans
on ajury venire when he began his twenty-two year career as a Cook County prosecutor
in the State Attorney's Office in 1962. When community pressure resulted in calling
some black citizens for jury duty, Kennon remembers how the peremptory challenge
became the principle weapon used by prosecutors and defense lawyers to eliminate each
prospective African-American juror. "I wold challenge the practice in my office and in
the courtroom, but risked being held in contempt by judges and being ostracized by my
colleagues." Interview with Mr. Kennon by Mr. William Boyle, Stanford Law student
(Aug. 4, 1989); telephone conversation with William Kennon (Jan. 4, 1990).
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at least in part, by the many reported state and federal court chal-
lenges that followed the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Swain v. Alabama in 1965 and Batson v. Kentucky in 1986.
E. Swain, Batson, and the Peremptory Challenge
Although the Supreme Court's jury discrimination rulings from
1935 to 1965 allowed some African-Americans to serve as grand ju-
rors or to be included on the trial jury venire, these decisions had
little effect on the racially segregated jury box. As commentators
predicted, prosecutors relied on the unfettered exercise of peremp-
tory challenges as the ultimate trump card for attaining all-whiteju-
ries. The prosecutor's peremptory striking of prospective black
jurors simply replaced the jury commissioner's arbitrary disqualifi-
cation of eligible black citizens to become the primary means for
retaining the "whites-only" jury.
In Norris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court noted that no black
person had served as a juror in Jackson or Morgan Counties for fifty
years. In 1965, thirty years after Norris, the Supreme Court re-
viewed the factual record presented in Swain v. Alabama 452 and dis-
covered that the Court's decisions had done little to change the all-
white jury trial system in Alabama. While the Swain opinion re-
ferred to a recent fifteen-year period in which only whites sat as ju-
rors, the "undisputed" evidence suggested "that no Negro ha[d]
ever served on ajury in the history of the county." 453 The majority
opinion highlighted the important role that the peremptory chal-
lenge had assumed in maintaining all-white juries. As Alabama's
highest court had noted in affirming Swain's conviction, the per-
emptory challenge neutralized the Supreme Court's stated principle
of nondiscrimination in jury selection.454
Despite this acknowledgement of the role of the peremptory
challenge in perpetuating the all-white jury, the Court in Swain v.
Alabama upheld the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge to
remove all of the six black prospective jurors. The Swain Court con-
cluded that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges con-
sistent with their "essential nature ... [to strike jurors] without a
reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control." 455
The Supreme Court's analysis failed to recognize the prosecu-
452 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
453 Id. at 235 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
454 "[N]egroes are commonly on trial venires but are always struck by attorneys in
selecting the trialjury." Swain v. State, 375 Ala. 505, 515, 156 So. 2d 368, 375 (1963),
aff'd, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
455 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
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tor's race-conscious striking ofjurors as a technique to continue the
denial of justice to African-American criminal defendants. Rather,
the Court characterized the peremptory challenge as a neutral pro-
cedure, one "necessary" to "trial by jury. 4 56
The Swain Court's opinion allowed only a slim possibility that a
black defendant would be able to prove that his equal protection
rights had been violated by a prosecutorial use of the peremptory
challenge. In Swain, the defendant alleged that the reason why no
black person had served on a criminal trial in Talladega County for
the past fifteen years was due to prosecutorial elimination of pro-
spective black jurors during jury selection. The Court rejected the
proof offered by the defendant as insufficient to overcome "the pre-
sumption... that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury. '457 It concluded that the defen-
dant's evidence had failed to "show when, how often, and under
what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible for
striking those Negroes who have appeared on petit jury panels in
Talladega County. ' 458
Not surprisingly, the Swain evidentiary rule made it virtually im-
possible for black defendants to prove equal protection violations in
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges. Indeed, during the
next twenty-one years, state and federal courts regularly rejected
such claims.459 Defendants were routinely unable to establish that
over a period of time "the State [had never] seen fit to leave a single
[black person] on any jury in a criminal case" 460 and that the "pros-
ecutor [was] . . . responsible for the removal of Negroes." 46 1
More than two decades passed before the Supreme Court re-
vised its equal protection analysis and allowed the fourteenth
456 Id at 219.
457 Id. at 222.
458 Id. at 224. Justice Goldberg, in dissent, argued that the majority ignored the trial
record regarding "the State's involvement in the total exclusion of Negroes from jury
service.... In Swain, the prosecutor admitted that "we strike ajury different from what if
it was two white men involved or two colored men." Id at 234 (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Goldberg concluded that "in a good many cases Negroes have been ex-
cluded by the state prosecutor, either acting alone or as a participant in arranging
agreements with the defense." Id. at 235.
459 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 n.17 (1986) (listing cases in which de-
fendants failed to satisfy Swain's burden). Swain's standard of proof was exceedingly
difficult to meet. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown,
371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude from Juy
Persons Belonging to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977). One court called Swain's proof
requirement "Mission Impossible." McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir.
1984), reh'g denied, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S.
1001 (1986).
460 Swain, 380 U.S. at 224.
461 Id. at 223.
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amendment claim to take on added significance. Building on sixth
amendment principles and state and federal case law,462 the
Supreme Court modified Swain's "crippling burden of proof"' 463 in
the 1986 case, Batson v. Kentucky. In Batson, the Court set forth a new
evidentiary requirement: the defendant need only show that the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges targeted members of the defen-
dant's "cognizable racial group.''464 If this was shown, a fair infer-
ence would be drawn that those potential jurors were struck because
of their race,465 and the evidentiary burden would shift to the prose-
cutor to "come forward with a [race-]neutral explanation for chal-
lenging black jurors." 466
462 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama, some state courts
built on sixth amendment, fair cross-section principles stated in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975), and guaranteed in their state constitutions to overcome Swain's "insur-
mountable" burden of proving systematic prosecutorial abuse on peremptory chal-
lenges. In People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978),
California's Supreme Court relied on the cross-section requirements of its state consti-
tution to forbid use of the peremptory challenge by either party to strike jurors on the
basis of group identification. The California court created a mechanism for challenging
a prosecution or defense peremptory challenge; this became the basis for the Supreme
Court's equal protection remedy in Batson. The moving party must demonstrate that the
struckjurors belong to a cognizable group, and that they were struck because of group
membership and not for specific bias. Five state and two federal courts followed
Wheeler's sixth amendment analysis. See Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985),
vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 750
F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997
(Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979); State v. Gilmore, 199 NJ. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (1985); State v. Crespin,
94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
The Supreme Court declined in Batson to rule whether the sixth amendment prohib-
ited the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges despite it being the only
ground raised by the petitioner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. Following Batson, the Court
has refused to apply sixth amendment principles to jury selection. See Holland v. Illi-
nois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement does not pre-
vent the prosecution from exercising its peremptory strikes to strike cognizable racial
groups from jury), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1514 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 1771 (1989) (sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement
does not apply to petitjury on writ of habeas corpus); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986) (fair cross-section requirement may apply to jury venires but not to the process
of choosing juries).
463 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
464 Id. at 96.
465 [To] establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection
of the petit jury solely on evidence.., of peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial[,] ... the defendant first must show that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group .... [and] that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the venireman from the petit jury on account of their
race.
ld at 96.
466 Id at 97. Since Batson was decided, some courts have rejected a defendant's
equal protection argument and showing of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
96 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
In Batson, the Court recognized that the prosecutor's pervasive
use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate black jurors could no
longer remain "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 467 By
shifting the burden of proof to the prosecutor, the Court eliminated
the prior insurmountable hurdle that had required defendants to
prove the historical discriminatory practice of their prosecutors.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in concurrence in Batson, applauded
the majority opinion as "a historic step" 468 toward eliminating dis-
criminatoryjury selection practices. Marshall warned, however, that
the Court's remedy might be "illusory" because "any prosecutor
can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror and trial
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons. '46 9
Since Batson, Justice Marshall's fears have been confirmed: the
Batson remedy has proven to be ineffective against prosecutors
whose trial strategy involves the elimination of prospective black ju-
rors. Although the Batson Court intended to create new judicial pro-
tection for accused African-Americans, prosecutors have discovered
a variety of "neutral reasons" for peremptory dismissal. The prose-
cutor's peremptory challenge remains a practice that permits "those
tion, and have not required a prosecutor to provide a "neutral reason" when the prose-
cutor allowed some blackjurors to serve on the trialjury. See, e.g., United States v. Lane,
866 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's reason for striking a prospective black juror
upheld where prosecutor had accepted two other black jurors); United States v. Lance,
853 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
two black persons from jury upheld; court referred to the selection of the black jurors
and an alternate); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987) (court
upheld prosecutor's challenge of five black jurors where four others were selected, stat-
ing there were objective reasons for excusing at least some of the jurors); United States
v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The fact that the government ac-
cepted ajury which included two blacks, when it could have used its remaining peremp-
tory challenges to strike those potential jurors, shows that the government did not
attempt to exclude all blacks, or as many blacks as it could, from the jury.").
Professor Alschuler's warning that these cases suggest that prosecutors may be per-
mitted one or two "free" shots at striking black jurors before a court finds a prima facie
case has apparently been heeded. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 172 n.79 (1989). In
Alvarado v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990), the Supreme Court held that Batson
claims are permitted even where the trial jury selected satisfied sixth amendment fair
cross-section rights. Alvarado is consistent with state and federal court decisions that had
required prosecutors to supply a race-neutral reason whenever they peremptorily excused
a black juror, regardless of whether black jurors had been previously selected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) ("the striking of a single
black juror for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though other
black jurors are seated"); Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1986); State v.
Holloway, 44 Crim. L. Rptr. 2390 (Conn. 1989); Stanley v. State, 542 A.2d 1267 (Md.
Ct. App. 1988); State v.Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 56, 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987); People v.
Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 558 (1990).
467 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
468 Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
469 Id. at 106. For cases supporting Justice Marshall's concern, see supra note 466.
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to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." 470
Trial courts have rejected defendants' Batson challenges and up-
held prosecutors' peremptory challenges because the potential
black juror was young and single,471 was "of age and married but
was too pregnant,"472 or had a last name similar to the defendant's
last name.473 Other courts have accepted a wide range of explana-
tions for the peremptory dismissal of black jurors: they were either
unemployed 474 or underemployed; 475 they worked as social work-
ers,
4 7 6 federal employees,477 scientists, 478 or associates of radio or
470 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953). Although courts have frequently
upheld a prosecutor's "neutral" explanation based on ajuror sharing a common charac-
teristic with a defendant, see infra notes 471-82 and accompanying text, some appellate
courts have rejected similar explanations. United States v. Hughes, 880 F.2d 101 (8th
Cir. 1989) (court found "there is not a sufficient, independent reason, other than race,
for the striking of [three] jurors," and remanded the case to determine if a legally suffi-
cient reason existed for exclusion); United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.)
(court rejected explanations for dismissal of four black jurors, stating that "we will not
accept these racist assumptions and stereotypical reasoning in justifying the Govern-
ment'sjury selection"), reh'g granted, 861 F.2d 514 (1988); State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294,
384 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1989) (South Carolina's Supreme Court disallowed a prosecutor's
disqualification of a black juror because the juror "shucked and jived" while walking to
the jury box); NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 1989, at 6; see also cases cited infra note 479.
471 United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1988) (two black jurors
excluded who were "young, single, and without children or substantial stake in commu-
nity"; each "appeared inattentive... during voir dire"); United States v. Clemon, 843
F.2d 741, 744 (3d Cir.) (striking of two black jurors upheld based on prosecutor's trial
strategy in which he struck "every single person who was nonmarried [sic] and young"),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th
Cir. 1987).
472 United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767, 768 (11th Cir. 1988).
473 United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3176 (1989).
474 Cartlidge, 808 F.2d at 1070.
475 Id at 1071 (prosecutor struck an alternate juror because "she was divorced and
appeared to have a low income occupation").
476 Williams v. State, 507 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (the prosecutor ex-
plained that a black prospective juror "might have a liberal view of sexual behavior and
might not be fair and impartial because of her employment as a social worker").
477 United States v. David, 662 F. Supp. 244, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (trial court upheld
a prosecutor's challenge of a federal worker on the grounds that "government employ-
ees tended to be naive").
478 Branch v. State, 526 So. 2d 605, 606-07 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). Branch is fre-
quently cited as an early example of "the danger that Batson may not change very much."
Alschuler, supra note 5, at 176 n.96 (citing William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing
the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 97). Pizzi summarized the appellate
court's ruling in Branch, which upheld a wide range of prosecutorial "neutral" explana-
tions for peremptorily challenging six prospective black jurors:
One juror was challenged because he was a scientist and it was feared that
his background would put too much pressure on the prosecution. A sec-
ond juror was challenged because he was similar in age and appearance
to the defendant and he might have had a relationship to a person ar-
rested in an unrelated criminal case several months earlier. The third
juror was struck because she had been unemployed and had a kind of
"dumbfounded or bewildered look on her face" as if uncertain about
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television stations that aired programs considered to be anti-law-
enforcement. 479 Courts have also upheld prosecutors' disqualifica-
tions of black jurors living in the same neighborhood or simliar
"high crime" district480 as the accused 48 1 or for not having gradu-
ated from high school. 48 2 The Supreme Court's recent refusal to
establish a constitutional standard for determining race neutrality in
jury selection ensured that trial courts will continue to sanction a
broad array of prosecutorial explanations for peremptorily eliminat-
ing black jurors.48 3
Justice Marshall's deep reservation about the effectiveness of
what she was supposed to do. The fourth juror was struck because she
was a single female about the same age as the defendant and it was feared
that she "might feel as though she were a sister.., and have some pity on
the [defendant]." The fifth juror was struck because it was the prosecu-
tor's general experience that employees of the company where the juror
worked had not been attentive as jurors and some employees at the com-
pany were being investigated for a variety of crimes. Finally, the sixth
juror was struck because he was unkempt in appearance and gruff in man-
ner, which might place him at odds with other jurors.
Pizzi, supra, at 136 (footnotes omitted); see also Wallace v. State, 530 So. 2d 849, 851-52
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (upholding prosecution reasons for challenging six jurors be-
cause one was a homemaker, another a student, a third was a "grandmother" type, the
fourth wore a beard, the fifth was unemployed and the sixth was about the age of the
defendant's mother), cert denied, 530 So. 2d 856 (Ala. 1988).
479 Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 638 (Miss. 1988). But c. Slappy v. State, 503
So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court rejected a prosecutor's explanation
for challenging two African-American school teachers because their occupation sug-
gested "liberalism"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265,
272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Prosecutor removed nurse from jury because "it was the pros-
ecutor's experience that nurses were compassionate and thus inclined to feel sorry for
defendants." Citing Batson, the court held that "the prosecutor's prior experience is not
a reason 'related to the case to be tried.' ").
480 Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (1987).
481 United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1256 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). In Thomp-
son, the prosecutor challenged a black juror because the juror lived in the defendant's
neighborhood, and wore blue jeans to court, which demonstrated the juror's lack of
"respect for the system." Id. at 1256. The Ninth Circuit did not rule on the Batson
challenge, but indicated, in dicta, that these reasons seemed proper under Batson. Id. at
1260.
482 United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989) (Afican-Americanjuror
peremptorily challenged because he had not completed high school and the prosecutor
was "looking for a jury that is all in all a little more educated").
483 In Tompkins v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), an equally divided court declined
to review the legal sufficiency of a prosecutor's "neutral" explanation for excluding 13
prospective black jurors. Among those excluded was a black federal postal employee
who was excused because the prosecutor indicated that he had not "had very good luck
with postal employees." Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 205 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1004, order amended, 486 U.S. 1053 (1988).
During the 1990-91 Term, the Supreme Court's decision to review the sufficiency of
a prosecutor's explanation for excluding Spanish-speakingjurors serving in the case of a
Hispanic defendant may provide greater clarity for lower courts applying Batson's equal
protection standard. People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 552 N.E.2d
621 (1990), cert. granted, Hernandez v. New York, 59 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct 9, 1990)
(No. 89-7645).
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the Batson remedy went beyond the prosecutor who deliberately
challenges prospective African-American jurors. He also feared that
a prosecutor's or judge's "unconscious racism" might result in a
black juror's peremptory dismissal.48 4 As an illustration, Justice
Marshall referred to a prosecutor who might perceive a black juror,
but not a white juror to be "sullen" or "distant," and to a judge
whose "own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to ac-
cept such an explanation as well supported." 485
At least for some prosecutors and judges, Marshall's prediction
of "unconscious racism" has proven accurate. The reasons asserted
by prosecutors and accepted by trial courts read like a litany of racial
stereotypes. For example, courts have approved prosecutors' dis-
missal of black jurors who had a "poor attitude," 48 6 were inatten-
tive,487 appeared "indifferent and hostile," 488s had a kind of
"dumbfounded or bewildered look," 489 "avoided eye contact," 490
had poor "posture and demeanor," 491 or were "fidgeting and look-
ing around. ' 492 Thus, the idea that blacks are inferior jurors sur-
vives Batson, and perpetuates the elimination of most blacks from
the jury panel.
Justice Marshall's concern regarding "the inherent potential of
484 "Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of conscious
intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism... a
challenge I doubt all of them can meet." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986)
(Marshall, J., concurring); see Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
485 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
486 United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Excluding
jurors because of... a poor attitude... is wholly within the prosecutor's prerogative");
United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor felt that the
prospective juror had "a poor attitude in answering voir dire questions").
487 United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor struck
juror who "did not seem to be attentive to the proceedings at hand"), rev'd on other
grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988); see United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir.
1988) (prosecutor struck two jurors who "appeared inattentive to him during voir dire
examination.").
488 State v.Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 253, 368 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3165 (1989); see United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1987);
Mathews, 803 F.2d at 331 (prosecutor peremptorily dismissed a "rude" juror who "spent
a very great deal of time in examining me in a way which I felt was in the end becoming
rather hostile"); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W. 2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (prose-
cutor stated "he had a feeling [the potential juror] was nodding... a little bit too much
toward [defense counsel] and not enough towards me.").
489 Branch v. State, 326 So. 2d 605, 606 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
490 United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987).
491 Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010-11.
492 United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor excused a
juror who was "fidgeting and looking around as he sat in the jury box", which "made the
prosecutor believe that the individual would not be an attentive juror."). But cf. State v.
Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 384 S.E.2d 707 (1989) (prosecutor's claim that prospective juror
"shucked and jived" held evidence of prosector's subjective intent to discriminate).
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peremptory challenges to distort the jury process" 493 led him to call
for the abolition of the peremptory challenge in criminal cases. Ab-
olition has appeal because the prosecutor's peremptory challenge
has been the primary weapon used to disqualify black jurors for
more than fifty years. Acknowledging this abuse-yet recognizing
that the challenge was intended to protect the fair trial rights of the
accused-may have led Justice Marshall to conclude that "the cost
of eliminating the defendant's challenge as well as the prosecutor's
... [would not be] too great a price to pay." 4 94
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall's abolition proposal, with its fo-
cus on ending prosecutorial abuses, undermines the central role of
the defendant's peremptory challenge as an effective safeguard
against government stacking of a trial jury. Despite the often-heard
criticism that jury selection is a wasteful, nonproductive use of
scarce judicial resources,495 the defense challenge represents the
best mechanism for guaranteeing an accused the right to be judged
by impartial jurors.496 The peremptory challenge protects an
African-American defendant's fair trial rights by eliminating at least
some racially biased white jurors. For these reasons, a less drastic
493 Batson, 476 U.S. at 107.
494 Id. at 108.
495 ARTHUR LIMAN, RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY-ExEcUTIVE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1982), cited in Voir Dire:
Who Should Question ProspectiveJurors 14 (CUNY Grad. Center, New York City, Mar.
1, 1984); Half Step, supra note 5, at 1044 ("[A]ttorneys have been criticized for abusing
voir dire privileges by asking inappropriate questions."); Chambers, Who Should Pick Ju-
rors, Attorneys or theJudge, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1984, § II, at 4, col. 3.
496 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 341 ("The peremptory challenge ... has
been considered one of the most effective means of securing an impartial jury and of
satisfying the defendant of that impartiality."); see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Crim-
inal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenge: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102
HARv. L. REV. 808, 827-29, 837-40 (1989). Arguments favoring the use of peremptory
challenges are considered in Half Step, supra note 5, at 1043; Sixth Amendment Remedy,
supra note 8, at 384.
Some have advocated that the peremptory challenge be abolished altogether. See
Alschuler, supra note 5; VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 167-68; Comment, Batson v. Ken-
tucky: A Significant Step Toward Eliminating Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process, 29
ARIz. L. REV. 697 (1987) (authored by Sean Chapman); Note; Discrimination by the Defense:
Peremptory Challenge After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM L. REV. 355 (1986) (authored by
E. Vaughn Dunnigan); Half Step, supra note 5. Several of these commentators advocate
replacing the defendant's peremptory with an expanded "for cause" challenge, and an
attorney-conducted voir dire. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 203-09; Note, The Cross-
Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1555 (1985) (authored by James
H. Druff); Half Step, supra note 5, at 1043-46. Although these reforms will assure a fairer
selection process, there is no reason to believe that trial judges will modify their long-
standing practice of denying defense challenges for cause. See Babcock, supra note 3;
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 340; Sixth Amendment Remedy, supra note 8, at 384. A
thirteenth amendment analysis eliminates race discrimination in jury selection in race-
sensitive crimes, but preserves the peremptory challenge because of its irreplaceable
value to protecting an accused's fair trial rights.
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alternative than Marshall's abolition must be sought. Racial dis-
crimination in jury selection can be reduced and ideally eliminated
by excluding the use of the peremptory challenge whenever the ex-
clusion of African-American jurors perpetuates a primary badge of
the institution of slavery-the denial of justice.
V
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE ALL-WHITE JURY
A. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co..497 The Amendment's
Resurrection
As discussed, the thirteenth amendment's promise of universal
freedom and equal justice had hardly been sealed when doubts
arose as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.498
Fearing that a future Congress might repeal the Act's guarantees,
civil rights proponents included an equal protection clause in the
first section of the fourteenth amendment. 499 Since some legislators
continued to question the effect of the thirteenth amendment, pro-
civil rights congressmen turned to the newly enacted fourteenth
amendment as the constitutional basis for passing subsequent civil
rights legislation. 500
The Supreme Court's 1872 ruling in Blyew v. United States50' did
little to change the legislative uncertainty regarding the thirteenth
amendment's reach. Even though the Court in Blyew upheld the
constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, its narrow interpreta-
tion of the federal removal statute defeated Congress' intent to pro-
vide blacks with legal security against violence by whites. 50 2 Eleven
years later, in the Civil Rights Cases,503 the Supreme Court rendered a
second, devastating blow to the thirteenth amendment when it de-
clared the public accommodation positions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875504 unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the amendment's
prohibition against badges and incidents of slavery did not embrace
all forms of racial discrimination. In 1896, the Court in Plessy v. Fer-
497 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
498 Gressman, supra note 184, at 1329; supra note 227 and accompanying text.
499 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
500 The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause was the primary basis for
the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; the Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99,
16 Stat. 433; and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
501 80 U.S. 581 (1872).
502 See supra notes 266-81 and accompanying text.
503 109 U.S. 3 (1883); for a discussion of the Civil Rights Cases, see supra notes 346-67
and accompanying text.
504 See supra notes 350-60 and accompanying text.
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guson505 completed the evisceration of the thirteenth amendment.
For the next seventy years, the amendment's protection was applied
only to cases involving labor exploitation.
Thus, throughout most of its controversial history, the thir-
teenth amendment's liberating potential remained unfulfilled in the
face of narrow judicial decision-making and legislative paralysis. It
was not until 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,506 that the
Supreme Court began to breathe life back into the amendment's
original guarantee of universal freedom. Although the Brown Court
relied on the fourteenth amendment, 50 7 the decision inspired the
blossoming civil rights movement to press forward in its demand
that African-Americans be freed under the original expansive terms
of the thirteenth amendment. White supremacists, safely protected
by local immunity custom, responded to Brown by engaging in re-
newed anti-black and anti-civil rights violence. 508 The civil rights
movement had reawakened the national conscience, and by the mid-
1960s, the federal government was forced to reassert its interven-
tionist role as a guarantor of civil rights.50 9
505 163 U.S. 537 (1896); supra notes 368-76 and accompanying text.
506 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of the political considerations that led the
Justice Department to seek reversal of Plessy's "separate-but-equal" doctrine in Brown v.
Board of Education, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN L.
REV. 61 (1988).
507 The Court avoided references to the history of equal protection rights for Afri-
can-American people that legislators addressed during the debates accompanying pas-
sage of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments and the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See
supra notes 150-51 & 208-28. It dodged the historical circumstances surrounding adop-
tion of the post-Civil War amendments by referring to the legislative history as inconclu-
sive. Jay I. Sabin, Clio and the Court Redux: Toward a Dynamic Mode of Interpreting
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 369, 378 (1990).
508 See JUAN WiLLmAs, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARs, 1954-
1965 (1987).
509 During the 80-year period following the Supreme Court decisions in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), the
federal government maintained a nonintervention policy, despite the southern states'
refusal to prosecute whites for acts of violence against African-Americans. See KENNETH
O'REILLY, RACIAL MATTERS: THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972
(1989). Following an all-white Mississippi jury's acquittal of those charged with murder-
ing civil rights workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman in
1964, federal prosecutors charged three law enforcement officials and 15 white individu-
als with federal criminal violations. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), the
Supreme Court upheld federal authority to prosecute private individuals and state offi-
cials under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242
(1988)). "We think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give § 241 the scope
that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language ...
[P]articularly since the violent denial of legal process was one of the reasons motivating
enactment of the section." Price, 383 U.S. at 801 (footnote omitted).
As the Justice Department modified its prosecutorial policy, Congress passed major
civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1968 barring discrimination in housing, employment,
and voting rights. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988));
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As Congress and the Executive Branch were re-evaluating the
nation's commitment to racial equality, the Supreme Court's 1968
decision inJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 5 10 resurrected the thirteenth
amendment's promise of freedom from the constitutional grave-
yard. InJones, a black family that was denied the opportunity to buy
a house because of its race sued a private housing developer under
the almost-forgotten Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Jones relied heavily upon the
century-old legislative debates that led to the passage of the thir-
teenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In a decision
"[r]ivaling Brown in historical import,"5 1' the Court ruled that the
refusal to sell a home to a black family was among the "badges and
incidents of slavery" proscribed by the Act.512 The majority rea-
soned that the thirteenth amendment's guarantee
[a]t the very least ... includes the freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live.
If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this
much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Na-
tion cannot keep.513
For the first time since the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Congress's power to "determine what are the badges and
the incidents* of slavery," 51 4 and to "pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States." 515 TheJones Court highlighted the original meaning
placed on the enabling clause by Illinois Senator Trumbull, who as
Chair of the Judiciary Committee introduced the thirteenth amend-
ment and was the floor manager for the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Trumbull stated:
I have no doubt that under this provision.., we may destroy all
these discriminations in civil rights against the black man; and if
we cannot, our constitutional amendments amount to nothing. It
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). For a bibliography on the period
referred to as "America's Second Reconstruction", see J. FRANKIN, supra note 57, at
684-86.
510 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
511 Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 10, at 1019.
512 Jones, 392 U.S. at 441.
513 Id. at 443. The Court stated that "when racial discrimination herds men into
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too
is a relic of slavery." Id at 442-43.
514 Id. at 440.
515 Id. at 439 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). Justice Doug-
las, concurring inJones, referred to blacks' exclusion from juries "solely on account of
their race" as one of many examples of slavery's badges existing at the time of the
court's opinion. Id at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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was for that purpose that the second clause of that amendment
was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by ap-
propriate legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting
slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to
be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to
adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that
it be a means to accomplish the end.5 16
Thus, in Jones, the Court rejected nearly a century of prior Supreme
Court jurisprudence that had severely restricted congressional
power under the amendment's enabling clause.
The Jones Court did not merely declare that civil rights legisla-
tion, based on thirteenth amendment guarantees, was constitu-
tional. Significantly, the Court revived a meaning of freedom that
went far beyond simply releasing African-Americans from the
shackles of slavery. No longer would "the Thirteenth Amendment
merely authorize[ ] Congress to dissolve the legal bond by which the
Negro slave was held to his master. '5 17 Instead, the Court re-
minded the nation that the thirteenth amendment "[b]y its own un-
aided force and effect . . . abolished slavery, and established . . .
universal freedom." 518 The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
probe further to discover "[w]hether or not the Amendment itself
did any more... [because this was] a question not involved in this
case .... "519
Nevertheless, scholars greeted the decision with jubilation, be-
cause they knew that thirteenth amendment guarantees were "un-
doubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation"'5 20 and
therefore represented the most "powerful weapon ... for fighting
the inequities of racial discrimination."5 21 Seizing upon the Court's
516 Id. at 440 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866)).
517 Id.
518 Id. at 439 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20).
519 Id
520 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
521 Professor Arthur Kinoy expressed the sentiment of those who viewedJones as a
landmark historical and constitutional breakthrough:
[I]t is impossible.., to overstate the potentially profound importance of
this first formal recognition by the Court that the most pressing domestic
problems today, erupting from the cauldrons which are our urban and
rural ghettos, are "relics" of the slave system and the results of the con-
tinued existence of "badges and indicia" of the supposedly banned way
of life.
Arthur Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV.
475, 479 (1969) (referring to slavery's relics in the areas of "housing, employment and a
minimum income"); see also Robert L. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come
Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 300 (1969) ("the legis-
lative history clearly justifies the Court's application of the Act... [Bly using the legisla-
tive history properly, the Court could have extended the Act still further," and
authorized federal prosecutions against private individuals who violate another's civil
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unelaborated reference to the thirteenth amendment's unkept
"promise" of freedom, these scholars speculated about the "relics
of slavery" that "ha[ve] remained in the minds and hearts of many
white men"522 and were now ripe for congressional action and con-
stitutional challenge. At the same time, other commentators de-
cried the Supreme Court's opinion for overreaching its proper
constitutional role,5 23 a criticism also directed at the Court's deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education.524
For twenty years afterJones, the Supreme Court recognized "the
broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded
by section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"525 and consistently
upheld civil rights claims of race discrimination. During the 1988-
89 term, however, a newly reconstituted Supreme Court, one mark-
edly hostile to civil rights, decided to review the historical underpin-
rights absent the need to establish state action); Comment, Developments in the Law-
Section 1981, 15 Hv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29 (1980); Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruc-
tion, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE LJ. 541 (1989);
Anti-Discrimination Laws, supra note 10, at 1023, 1026-27 (suggesting that slavery's badges
and incidents might also extend to African-Americans' "unemployment, poor schools
and housing, and lack of a place in the body politic .... [The thirteenth amendment
might] empower the national government to guarantee other elements of a decent life to
all Americans, such as education, employment and a minimum income").
522 Jones, 392 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
523 Articles critical of the Supreme Court's decision inJones include SamJ. Ervin, Jr.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:JudicialActivism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REv. 485, 502 (1969)
("When all is said, Jones illustrates judicial activism run riot. It is, indeed, enough to
make historical, linguistic, and constitutional angels weep."); Louis Henkin, The Supreme
Court-1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63 (1968); A Preliminary
Analysis, supra note 10.
524 After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided, Professor
Wechsler criticized the Court for not following a "neutral principles" approach in justi-
fying its decision. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-34 (1959). For a response to Wechsler, see Charles L. Black,Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421, 429 (1960).
525 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (upholding a
§ 1982 claim based on a corporation's refusal to approve an assignment of membership
granting access to recreational facilities solely on account or race); see also Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (broadening scope of § 1982 to encompass
ajewish congregation's claim against individuals who sprayed racist graffiti on the walls
of the congregation's synagogue); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431 (1973) (protecting a black homeowner's right to purchase a community swim-
ming pool membership under §§ 1982 and 1981).
Prior to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), Supreme Court
decisions relied onjones and recognized § 1981 race discrimination claims based on the
making and enforcement of private contracts. See E. Richard Larson, The Development of
Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-G.L. L.
Rav. 56 (1972); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (prohibiting
discrimination in labor unions); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604
(1987) (extending protections of § 1981 to include Arab-Americans); Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibiting racial discrimination by private schools); John-
son v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race).
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nings of Jones. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,526 this Court
reconsidered whether the 1866 Act protected against private dis-
crimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 527 Even
though the Patterson Court created an "ingenious analytical instru-
ment" to limit the protection of the 1866 Act,528Jones was one of the
few precedents that survived intact during the spring 1989 term.529
Thus, the Jones recital of reconstruction history remains "good law,"
despite the Supreme Court's recent assault on established civil
rights doctrine.
Prior to the present constellation of Justices, the Supreme
Court refrained from expanding the Jones thirteenth amendment
analysis to encompass other situations which could be classified as
"relics of slavery." SinceJones, the Court has explicitly rejected thir-
teenth amendment badge-and-incident arguments in the two cases
presenting this issue: Palmer v. Thompson 530 and City of Memphis v.
Greene.5 3 1
526 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
527 In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976),Justice White argued in dissent that
§ 16 of the Voting Rights Act of 1870, the basis for § 1981, applies only to state action,
and not individual discrimination. Id. at 195-201. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), the Supreme Court asked the parties to address whether Runyon
v. McCraty, and thus the legislative and historical analysis developed inJones, had been
wrongly decided. Sixty Senators, 47 state attorneys general, the American Bar Associa-
tion, prominent historians, and over 100 civil rights, religious, and civic groups filed
amicus briefs and urged the Court not to overrule Runyon. N.Y. Times,June 24, 1988, at
1, col. 4. On June 18, 1989, the Court unanimously upheld Runyon, but severely limited
§ 1981 protection.
528 In Patterson, the Supreme Court ruled that § 1981 applies only to the initial for-
mation of employment contracts, and does not cover racial harassment in the workplace.
Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court held open the possibility that such discrimina-
tion may be prohibited in instances of promotion involving a "new and distinct relation
between the employee and the employer .... " Id. at 2377.
529 The Supreme Court decided several cases during the 1988-89 term that repre-
sent a substantial rollback of civil rights gains since the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed:
Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989) (municipal and state govern-
ments not liable under § 1981 for their employees' discriminatory actions); Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989) (plaintiffs must file a challenge to a facially
neutral seniority system when the system is first adopted, not when they learn of its
adverse effects); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (white firefighters, not parties to
the original lawsuit, may collaterally attack a consent decree calling for equal hiring and
promotion of black and white firefighters); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989) (limiting the use of statistical analysis in establishing a disparate impact
under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), thereby making it more difficult
for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and placing
burden of persuasion on an employee to establish that there was no legitimate business
justification for an employer's racially discriminatory practice); City of Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (city affirmative action plan for minority-owned busi-
nesses held unconstitutional and strict scrutiny standard established to determine con-
stitutionality of non-federal affirmative action legislation).
530 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
531 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
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In the 1970 Palmer case, Jackson, Mississippi closed its swim-
ming pools to avoid implementing a court desegregation order.
The plaintiff argued that denying blacks the right to swim with
whites was a badge or incident of slavery and thus violated the thir-
teenth amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed Congress's thir-
teenth amendment power to pass anti-discrimination laws, but in
the absence of relevant federal legislation, rejected the argument
that maintaining public swimming pools was within the meaning of
universal freedom. "To reach that result from the Thirteenth
Amendment would severely stretch its short simple words and do
violence to its history .... [it would grant the Court] law-making
power far beyond the imagination of the amendment's authors. '53 2
Similarly, in the 1981 case of Greene, African-American residents
and civic associations brought suit against the city of Memphis when
it closed a street connecting an all-white community with a black
neighborhood. The plaintiffs argued that the street closing was
aimed at preventing black citizens from driving through the white
neighborhood, and therefore constituted a badge of slavery. The
City contended that its action was legitimate because it enhanced
children's safety and neighborhood tranquility.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, stating that
the street closing had only "symbolic significance" 533 and was not
"a form of stigma" 534 within the meaning of the thirteenth amend-
ment. Although acknowledging that black drivers would be most
affected by the street closing, the Court stated that the "inconven-
ience cannot be equated to an actual restraint on the liberty of black
citizens that is in any sense comparable to the odious practice the
Thirteenth Amendment was designed to eradicate." 535 To declare
the roadblock an incident of slavery "would trivialize the great pur-
pose of that charter of freedom." 53 6
In both Greene and Palmer, the Supreme Court narrowed the pa-
rameters of the badges and incidents of slavery which are prohibited
by the thirteenth amendment in the absence of relevant federal leg-
islation. Closing city streets or swimming pools did not alone con-
stitute badges of slavery, even though the disparate impact on the
532 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226-27.
533 Greene, 451 U.S. at 128. Professor Charles Lawrence properly characterizes the
wall that separated the black and white communities as "a symbol of [white] superior-
ity," and a stigma of blacks' inferiority. Lawrence, supra note 484, at 357, 363-64.
534 Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
535 Id Finding insufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive, or a contrived or
pretextual reason for the city's actions, the Court concluded that legitimate interests
were served and that the disparate impact on black citizens was a "routine burden of
citizenship." Id. at 129.
536 Id at 128.
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black citizenry was significant. In Greene, the Supreme Court noted
that two other roads connected the black community with the white
neighborhood, and characterized the street dosing as merely sym-
bolically important. In Palmer, the Supreme Court recognized the
racially inspired consequences of a city closing its only public swim-
ming pools, yet found there was an insufficient nexus between this
form of racial discrimination and the institution of slavery. Thus, in
the absence of both federal legislation and a clear historical nexus
between slavery and access to swimming pools, the Court refused to
accept the thirteenth amendment analysis.
The prohibition against the all-white jury fits neatly within the
Jones-Palmer-Greene parameters. There is a link between the all-white
jury and the badge of slavery that denied African-Americans re-
course to legal justice. This badge of slavery effectively branded
blacks inferior and unsuitable to serve as jurors; surely, that link is
neither tenuous nor symbolic. The all-white jury's origins are
clearly traceable to the institutionalization of slavery and its denial
of legal justice to slaves. In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Congress recognized that the denial of legal process and access to
courtroom justice were "inseparable concomitants" 53 7 of the insti-
tution of slavery. Congress explicitly intended that the thirteenth
amendment encompass access to justice for African-Americans by
guaranteeing that they receive the "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property."53 8
In our legal system, access to justice depends on the impartial-
ity of the jury verdict. When a citizen's personal liberty or security is
at stake, whether as an accused or as a victim, all other guarantees of
justice are meaningless if the trier of fact is biased. Throughout this
country's history, the all-white jury has prevented impartial verdicts
from being rendered to African-American defendants and crime vic-
tims. Recent sociological studies also offer direct evidence that
when African-American jurors are dismissed from jury duty in inter-
racial cases, impartial jury verdicts are virtually unattainable. 53 9 Yet,
as the more blatant barriers to justice have been declared unconsti-
tutional, the racially discriminatory peremptory challenge has be-
come the primary means for perpetuating the all-white jury.540
The all-white jury also differs from the street dosing in Greene in
that it acts as an absolute bar to justice and leaves open no alterna-
tive routes. Impartial justice is so fundamental to our ordered sys-
tem of liberty that tainted verdicts are the type of "restraint on...
537 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
538 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
539 See infra notes 548-64 and accompanying text.
540 See supra notes 474, 481, 486-92 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76:1
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
liberty... that is... comparable to the odious practice the Thir-
teenth Amendment was designed to eradicate."' 4 1 Even if there had
not been congressional action on this score, the thirteenth amend-
ment should operate through the courts to prohibit all-white juries.
Unlike the Supreme Court's conclusions in Palmer and Greene con-
cerning swimming pool and street closings, the denial of crucial lib-
erty interests must be seen as "doing violence" to the thirteenth
amendment's central theme of freedom and equal rights.
In a 1984 Fifth Circuit opinion, the thirteenth amendment's af-
firmative powers were recognized to apply to employment discrimi-
nation against blacks today. In Williams v. City of New Orleans,54 2 six
judges advanced a thirteenth amendment analysis in joining an en
banc plurality opinion that upheld affirmative hiring and promoting
of black police officers. Although the plurality upheld the district
court's consent decree solely on Tide VII grounds,5 43 these six
judges concluded that the thirteenth amendment also upheld the
decree. 544 In a separate opinion, they reviewed the city's historical
practice of preventing African-Americans from becoming police of-
ficers, and found that the current "under-representation of blacks
on the force.., is a badge of slavery: it is a sign, readily visible in
the community, that attaches a stigma upon the black race." 545
The judges' thirteenth amendment analysis first acknowledged
slavery's denial of equal economic opportunities, which included
disqualifying African-Americans from government jobs that re-
quired the exercise of authority. They proceeded to establish the
541 Greene, 451 U.S. at 128.
542 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).
543 In a 9-4 vote, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that Tide VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 permitted an affirmative, race-conscious consent decree and did
not limit redress to actual victims of past employment discrimination. Judge Williams,
writing for the plurality, rejected the Department ofJustice's argument that affirmative
group-based remedies are not permissible under Tide VII. However, the plurality dis-
agreed as to whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to uphold the
promotional aspects of the consent decree. In a 7-6 vote, a majority ruled that the dis-
trict court had not abused its discretion. See infra notes 54446.
544 Judge Wisdom, writing on behalf of the six, argued that the consent decree's
affirmative and color-conscious hiring and promotion guidelines were constitutional
under a fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis as necessary "to remove the
effects of prior inequality." Williams, 729 F.2d at 1573 (footnote omitted). The opinion
also stated that:
[w]holly aside from the fourteenth amendment, the thirteenth amend-
ment is an affirmative grant of power to eliminate slavery along with its
"badges and incidents" and to establish universal civil freedom. ...
When a present discriminatory effect upon blacks as a class can be linked
with a discriminatory practice against blacks as a race under the slavery
system, the present effect may be eradicated under the auspices of the
thirteenth amendment.
Id at 1577 (footnote and citation omitted).
545 Id at 1580.
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connection between the New Orleans Police Department's current
discriminatory- policy and the period after the Civil War when Afri-
can-Americans were disqualified from becoming New Orleans po-
lice officers.546 Thus, the link between the historical practice of
excluding blacks from the police force and their current under-rep-
resentation constituted the thirteenth amendment violation. The
six judges also relied on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
pointing out that Tide VII "legislation is supportable.., under the
enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment. 54 7 Specifically, they
reasoned that because Congress had addressed race discrimination
in employment, and because the practice of excluding African-
Americans from the New Orleans police force was traceable to prac-
tices under slavery, the affirmative action plan represented an ap-
propriate remedy to the thirteenth amendment violation.
The discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to exclude
African-American jurors clearly fits the Jones legislative criteria as
elaborated in Williams. In Williams, Congress's potential powers
under the thirteenth amendment's enabling clause were sufficient to
justify judicial reliance on the amendment when it was not the actual
basis for passing the Title VII legislation. Denying justice to
African-Americans was a linchpin of the institution of slavery, and
Congress directly addressed this linchpin by relying on its thirteenth
amendment powers to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
B. Empirical Evidence: The All-White Jury Is Not Always
Impartial
As documented above, the all-white jury has played an historic
role in denying justice to African-Americans unfairly accused of
crimes or victimized by racial violence. In 1976, criminology began
to provide direct statistical evidence of the effect that a jury's racial
composition has on the outcome of trials involving African-Ameri-
cans. Since that year, a substantial body of empirical evidence has
developed which shows that all-white juries are not impartial when
deciding cases involving interracial crimes.5 48 Indeed, Professor
546 Judge Wisdom reviewed the history of denying African-Americans equal eco-
nomic opportunities during slavery, and the "dose linkage between the discrimination
against blacks in the New Orleans Police Department and the Black Codes andJim Cro-
wism, which were substituted for slavery." Id. at 1579.
547 Id. at 1577.
548 See Johnson, supra note 6. Professor Johnson reviews case studies of criminal
trials in the 1950s and 1960s (few in number but "probative... when considered...
with the outcomes of controlled experiments," id. at 1619), mock jury experiments ("the
strongest evidence" of jury racial bias, id. at 1625), and conclusions from general re-
search on racial prejudice, including Kalven and Zeisel's finding that trial jurors' views
of black defendants were extremely unsympathetic, and had resulted in several unjust
convictions. Id at 1619-20 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
110 [Vol. 76:1
1990] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Sheri Lynn Johnson, the main legal scholar to interpret this data,
concludes that a critical mass of at least three black jurors is neces-
sary to ensure impartiality in such cases. 549 This data, and its subse-
quent scholarly interpretation, significantly substantiate this
Article's contention that all-white juries deny justice to black de-
fendants or complainants, and thus function as lingering vestiges of
slavery.
In a series ofjury experiments, white subjects assumed the role
ofjurors in criminal cases and consistently returned more guilty ver-
dicts against black defendants than they did when white defendants
were charged with identical crimes. 550 In one research study, white
jurors' discrimination was identified as being most significant in
JURY 343-44 (1966)), 1639-40, 1643-50. Johnson relies less on death penalty studies,
which she "caution(s) ... hatve] a somewhat attenuated relationship to the question of
whether guilt determinations are racially biased" as compared with a jury's decision to im-
pose the death penalty. Id. at 1622 (emphasis added). A recent GAO Report concluded
that a (white) victim's race influences the likelihood of a defendant being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death penalty in 82%o of 28 studies reviewed. UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING (1990).
ProfessorJohnson argues that the intent to discriminate is proven when the defen-
dant is African-American, Native-American, Hispanic-American or Asian-American, and
the prosecutorial challenge is used to strike jurors of the defendant's race. Id. at 1695-
99. She concludes that the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to equal protection
prohibits the prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in
such cases. Id. at 1657.
549 Id. at 1694.
550 Johnson cites nine mockjury studies in which white jurors' racial bias resulted in
higher conviction rates for a black or Hispanic defendant than for a white defendant. In
each experiment, the subject reviewed either a trial transcript or a recorded videotape,
and was asked to determine whether the defendant was guilty. The studies randomly
changed the defendant's race while keeping other factors constant. The researcher then
compared the subject's race and the judgment of guilt, and correlated for statistical sig-
nificance.
The majority of the studies tested juror differences in cases involving a black and a
white defendant. See J.L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of
Jurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 103 (1979); Hubert S. Field, Rape
Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant and Case
Characteristics, 3 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 261, 271 (1979); Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chain-
blin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOLOGY 47
(1982); Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and
Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1982); Richard P. McGlynn,
James C. Megas & Daniel H. Benson, Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribution of
Insanity in a Murder Trial, 93J. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1976); Marina Miller &Jay Hewitt, Con-
viction of a Defendant as a Function ofJuror-Victim Racial Similarity, 105J. SoC. PSYCHOLOGY
159 (1978); Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution
of Legal Responsibility, 15J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1979).
One study focused exclusively on racial prejudice against a Hispanic defendant.
Jack P. Lipton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISPANIC J. BEHAVIORAL
Sci. 275 (1983). Another study tested juror reactions to a Cuban, a white American, and
an African-American defendant accused of shoplifting, and found white subjects most
often convicted the accused black defendants. J. Solernou & R. Bray, Effect of Ethnic
Group Membership on Attribution of Guilt, Sentence Length, and Liking for the Defen-
dant (unpublished dissertation).
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cases where the evidence of guilt against a black defendant was "too
close to call." It was in these crucial instances that the all-white jury
refused to give the benefit of the doubt to a black defendant, but
found the same evidence insufficient to convict a white person.551
After analyzing the "convincing" results of these studies, Johnson
concluded that when "a black defendant faces an all-white jury, he
faces a substantial risk that the assessment of his guilt will be af-
fected by his race." 552
When black subjects were tested as trial jurors, their judgments
were distinguishable from the white jurors' in two important re-
spects. First, black jurors gave black defendants "the benefit of the
doubt" in close cases. 553 Second, the black jurors' identification
with black crime victims resulted in a substantially higher conviction
rate in black victim crimes regardless of the accused's race. In one
study, for example, eighty percent of the black jurors convicted a
black defendant of raping a black woman, compared with a thirty-
two percent conviction rate by white jurors.554
These studies target race as a significant factor in jurors' ver-
dicts against black criminal defendants. The results in other jury
experiments suggest that the influence of race is minimized when an
all-white jury is replaced by one that is racially mixed. In one mock
jury experiment, five juries with varying racial compositions watched
a videotaped trial in which the defendant, who was charged with as-
saulting a police officer, claimed he was a victim of police brutality
and provocation. 555 Prior to jury deliberation, individual white ju-
551 Ugwuegbu found that 256 white, midwestern college students returned similar
verdicts where the evidence of guilt was strong or near zero against a black or a white
defendant, but acquitted only the white defendant when the evidence was less convinc-
ing. Ugwuegbu, supra note 550, at 138-39.
552 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1656, 1704.
553 Id at 1627 (citing Ugwuegbu, supra note 550, at 142 (196 black undergraduates
acquitted a black defendant more frequently than a white defendant in cases when the
proof of guilt was "too dose to call" and when the evidence against the black defendant
was strong)).
554 Miller & Hewitt, supra note 550, at 159; see Foley & Chamblin, supra note 550, at
49 (black Florida college student jurors were more likely to convict a black defendant
accused of sexually abusing an 11-year-old black child than were white jurors);
Ugwuegbu, supra note 550, at 139, 141 (blackjurors convicted a black defendant accused
of a crime against a black person more frequently than white jurors). Although black
jurors appear more ready to convict a black defendant when the crime victim is also
black, the converse is also true: white jurors lean toward acquitting a white person
charged with crimes against a black person but will convict when the victim is white. See
Klein & Creech, supra note 550, at 24 (white jurors acquitted a white defendant far more
frequently when accused of rape, murder, or burglary that involved a black complainant,
but convicted when the complainant was white).
555 See Bernard, supra note 550. Bernard divided his subjects into five juries: one
was all-white, another all-black, a third divided equally between white and black jurors,
the fourth had 25% black and 75% white jurors, and the fifth consisted of 75% black
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rors predictably found the black defendant guilty more frequently
than they did the white defendant. When white jurors discussed the
case with black jurors, however, many of their opinions changed:
four of the six "mixed" juries acquitted both the white and black
defendants, and the other two "mixed" juries could not reach a
unanimous verdict. Perhaps most significantly, the only one of ten
jury verdicts that found either defendant guilty was the all-white
jury's conviction of the black defendant. 556
In a second study, the mediating role of the racially mixed jury
was the subject of a similar experiment involving juror evaluations
of white and Hispanic defendants who faced identical charges. 557
The researcher found that the white jurors' pre-deliberation hostil-
ity and distrust toward the Hispanic defendant was neutralized if
they sat on integrated trial juries.558 In each of these studies, the
racially mixed jury sharply lessened the influence of race on white
jurors who judged a non-white defendant.
Thus, sociological research supports the historical evidence
that all-white juries are not able to guarantee impartiality when
black persons' freedom or personal security is at stake. In the re-
ported studies, the all-white juries acted as insurmountable obsta-
cles for the black defendant to overcome, and were not responsive
to vindicating the black crime victim's rights. "The most obvious
counterbalance to the bias of white jurors," according to Professor
Johnson, "is the mandatory inclusion of black jurors in the decision-
making process. '5 59 Based on the dynamics involved in group
decision-making, Johnson suggests that a minimum of three black
jurors is necessary to guarantee a fair jury verdict in cases when the
accused is black.560 According to several commentators, these ju-
and 25% white jurors. Each was asked to return two verdicts, one involving a black
defendant and the other against a white defendant.
556 1& at 110. In addition to the all-white jury's guilty verdict, 15% of the individual
subject-jurors maintained a defendant's guilt after jury deliberations. They, too, were
exclusively white, and their guilty determination involved the black defendant. Id- at
109.
557 Upton, supra note 550. Lipton varied the composition of Hispanic and Anglo
jurors in the six-person juries he created. Three juries had one Hispanic and five white
jurors; three had five Hispanic and one white juror; and six were evenly divided. Each
jury was asked to return verdict against a Hispanic and a white defendant.
558 Lipton found that white jurors' racial prejudice against the Hispanic defendant
was reduced during jury deliberation. Conversely, after discussing the case with His-
panic jurors, white jurors appeared less biased in favor of the white defendant-many
more found him guilty than they had prior to deliberations. Id. at 282.
559 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1694.
560 Johnson cites studies indicating that three racially similar jurors are necessary to
withstand the group pressure of a nine-person white majority. I& at 1698-99 (citing H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 548, at 463); see M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 16-18 (1977);
S.E. Asch, Effect of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion ofJudgments, in GROUP
DYNAMics 151, 152-55 (Dorwin Cartwright ed. 1953); Dale W. Broeder, The University of
1990]
114 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1
rors would bring "relevant insights" to juries' evaluations of the de-
meanor and credibility of the black defendant and witnesses.5 61 The
multiracial jury is the best guarantor of overcoming one legacy of
slavery: the conclusive presumption that black persons' testimony is
not worthy of belief.
In the few reported studies of cities that have increased the rep-
resentation of blacks on trial juries, the "new, racially integrated
jury" was reluctant to convict unless persuaded by a prosecutor's
"hard evidence."5 62 Unlike the predominantly white jury, the mixed
Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 748 (1959); RitaJames Simon & Prentice Mar-
shall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTs OF THE ACCUSED 211, 227 (Stuart S. Nagel ed.
1972). These studies found that one or even two jurors are unlikely to maintain their
own "not guilty" verdict in the face of opposition by the remaining jurors, much less
change the others' opinion (contrary to the Hollywood version that a singlejuror is able
to convince his fellow jurors to reverse their original guilty verdicts, as Henry Fonda did
in Twelve Angy Men. Sidney Lumet, the film's director, recently revealed that he "always
felt Twelve Angry Men was romantic, and in a sense, unrealistic. I had no illusions even
then. It's hard enough to find a jury with even a single unprejudiced person." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1989, § 2, at 20, col. 4).
561 Johnson cites psychological studies indicating that racially similar jurors are
often better able to correctly interpret a defendant's demeanor than are jurors of a dif-
ferent race than the defendant. Johnson, supra note 6, at 1706; see Marianne LaFrance &
Clara Mayo, Racial Diferences in Gaze Behavior During Conversations: Systematic Observational
Studies, 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 547 (1976).
Commentators have recognized that an all-white jury is most likely to disbelieve a
black defendant's witnesses when those witnesses are also black. Kuhn, supra note 4, at
241 n.30; S.W. Tucker, Racial Discrimination injuy Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. Rv. 736,
742-45 (1966). This perceived non-trustworthiness of the black witness is one of slav-
ery's remaining vestiges in the courtroom today.
Van Dyke argues that black jurors may be happy to supply "relevant insights" about
subcultural patterns that are unavailable to an all-whitejury. In one case, a black juror's
explanation to his fellow jurors allowed them to understand the non-criminal circum-
stances in which a black defendant was found in a white neighborhood at four o'clock in
the morning. J. VAN DYa, supra note 4, at 33; see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04
(1972) (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.) ("When any large
and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to
remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experi-
ence, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."); VALERIE HANS & NEIL
VIDMAR,JUDGING THE JURY 138-40 (1986); Ralph Davis & Barbara Lyles, Black Jurors, 30
GUILD PRAC. 111, 118-19 (1973); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prjudices of the Commu-
nity, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1718-19 (1969) (authored byJennie Rhone).
562 J. VAN DYa, supra note 4, at 34 (quoting a black Baltimore prosecutor who be-
lieved that African-American jurors required stronger evidence of guilt before convict-
ing a criminal defendant). In 1969, Baltimore revised its jury selection procedures, and
selected registered voters to serve as jurors instead of personally selecting "key-men."
The difference increased black jury representation from 30% to 46.7% in the years 1969
to 1974. During this period, the prosecution's conviction dropped from over 80% to
about 65%. Id at 33-34, 375-79. In Los Angeles County, the selection of more black
and Hispanic jurors between 1970 and 1972 significantly changed the trial jury's racial
composition, which had been 85% white. During the one full year when the "new"
integrated jury functioned, the conviction rate fell from 67% to below 50%. Id at 34-
35, 377-81; see supra note 577 (describing higher acquittal rate for Bronx, New York
juries which usually have a majority of Black and Hispanic jurors).
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jury questioned the strength of a prosecutor's case where the only
evidence against the accused was the testimony of a police officer or
a single eyewitness.5 63 Thus, the peremptory striking of black pro-
spective jurors resulted in exclusively or predominantly white juries
that drew unfavorable inferences against black victims or defend-
ants. The following section explains why the racially inspired per-
emptory challenge violates the thirteenth amendment whether used
by the prosecutor or the defense lawyer in a civil action involving
civil rights violations.
C. The Unconstitutionality of the Racially Inspired Peremptory
Challenge
The thirteenth amendment analysis in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.5 64 reveals that the peremptory challenge is unconstitutional
whenever it is used to disqualify prospective black jurors from cases
in which African-Americans either stand accused or seek vindication
against white civil rights violators. Although the all-white jury is
deeply embedded in our history and thus stands as the prototype of
American justice, it has consistently acted to deny African-
Americans equal justice and legal protection, particularly in cases of
interracial violence.
As a result, the all-white jury's predictable verdict perpetuates
one of slavery's core principles: the denial of justice to African-
Americans. Although it is generally considered a sixth amendment
right, the right to an impartial jury verdict intersects with a central
theme of the thirteenth amendment-equal justice under the law.
The legislative history of the thirteenth amendment and the 1866
Civil Rights Act emphasized that freedom encompassed the right to
be judged fairly when accused, and to expect vindication when in-
jured.5 65 In the 1866 Civil Rights Act, legislators specifically enu-
merated guarantees fundamental to the concept of freedom,
including the right to "full and equal benefit of all law ... for the
security of person and property. ' 566 As one scholar has said, it
would be "child's play" to apply the Act's guarantee of "security of
person and property" to the citizen who seeks an evenhanded, im-
563 J. VAN DyxE, supra note 4, at 34.
564 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
565 Proponents of the thirteenth amendment viewed equal justice under the law as
one of the "new institutions of freedom" necessary to "upturn[ ] the roots of this poi-
sonous plant to dry and wither." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864)
(statement of Sen. Clark); see supra notes 151-53, 175-77, 212-13 and accompanying text.
The importance of providing legal redress for a black crime victim is explained in United
States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) and in Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872) (dissenting opinion).
566 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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partial jury verdict. 56 7
Despite these goals of the thirteenth amendment and the 1866
Act, the all-white jury maintained whites' legal immunity during the
next century by acquitting virtually every white person charged with
committing violence against African-Americans.568 The all-white
jury also upheld slavery's tradition of summarily convicting black
defendants on the accusation and testimony of whites. Conse-
quently, all-white jury verdicts reinforced the stigma of black inferi-
ority by denying African-Americans legal protection from physical
attacks and criminal accusations by whites.
Peremptory striking of prospective black jurors is a badge and
incident of slavery because it perpetuates blacks' inferiority. Be-
cause the jury is considered the most democratic of American insti-
tutions,56 9 jury service is regarded as one of a citizen's highest
duties. During the era of slavery in this country, blacks were viewed
as intellectually and morally inferior to whites, and incapable of ren-
dering judgments against them. The thirteenth amendment
granted freedom for black slaves by promising equal protection and
equal rights under the law.57 0 When the peremptory challenge is
used to systematically strike black citizens from the jury box, how-
ever, the message that black citizenship is inferior to white citizen-
ship is resoundingly dear: only white people are qualified to sit in
judgment of others. The denial of justice and the badge of inferi-
ority form the historical context in which the current use of the per-
emptory challenge must be analyzed.
The post-1935 reliance on the peremptory challenge to unseat
black citizens from the jury box has been a subtler subterfuge than
the sweeping disqualification practices previously used by legisla-
tors, prosecutors, and judges. Current usage of the peremptory
challenge does not bar every African-American from serving as a
juror, as slavery did for over 200 years. Nor does it prevent African-
Americans from being included in the jury venire, unlike states' dis-
567 See supra note 229, referring to Professor Benno Schmidt who argued that an
equal right to serve on juries is within the family of rights covered by the 1866 Act
because it is essential to full and equal benefit of all laws providing for security of person
and property.
568 See supra notes 366-67, 398, 432-34 and accompanying text.
569 J. VAN DxK, supra note 4, at 1, 8-9. LordJustice Patrick Devlin has called "trial
by jury... more than an instrument ofjustice and more than one wheel of the constitu-
tion: It is the lamp that shows that freedom lives." SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY
164 (1956); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("For racial discrimination to result [injury selection] ... is at war
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government");
Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant
at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1317-27 (1987).
570 See supra notes 151-83 and accompanying text.
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enfranchisement laws and discriminatory selection practices that
were first introduced during the post-Reconstruction period.
The peremptory challenge stands ready, however, to strike any
individual black juror who reaches the jury box in a case involving a
black person's rights. Used for this purpose, it is as effective a dis-
qualifier of the African-American juror as the exclusionary methods
it replaced. Since the peremptory challenge is a continuation of the
colonial practice of excluding African-American jurors, it can be un-
derstood as an "inseparable concomitant" 571 of slavery subject to
thirteenth amendment challenge. When African-Americans are in-
cluded on a jury venire with an understanding that they will never
serve as trial jurors, the humiliation of participating in this legal cha-
rade is as great "a stimulant to ... race prejudice [and] an impedi-
ment to securing . .. equal justice" 572 as when black jurors were
never even on the jury roll.
Eliminating potential black jurors means that the trial jury ulti-
mately selected will never be "indifferently chosen" 573 when the fate
of a black defendant or crime victim is at stake. The peremptory
challenge has been the primary weapon for maintaining the all-
white jury system in today's race-sensitive cases. Unless black jurors
are significantly represented on juries deciding these cases, the thir-
teenth amendment's intent to ensure equal justice for African-
Americans and to eliminate the stigma of racial inferiority will re-
main just another "promise the Nation cannot keep." 574
D. The Thirteenth Amendment's Prohibition of the
Peremptory Challenge in Criminal and Civil Cases
There are three situations in which the peremptory challenge of
prospective African-American jurors violates the thirteenth amend-
ment: first, in criminal cases where the defendant is black and the
prosecutor excuses black jurors ("defendant-centered"); second, in
both criminal and civil cases where the victim is black and defense
counsel for a white defendant seeks to eliminate black jurors ("vic-
tim-determinative"); and third, when a prosecutor or either civil
party peremptorily strikes prospective black jurors, regardless of the
defendant's race ("juror-focused").
In the first two examples, the thirteenth amendment's prohibi-
571 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
572 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 499 (1972) (exclusion "stigmatizes the whole class [of African-Americans], even
those who do not wish to participate."); Laurie Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purg-
ing the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 1081,
1101 (1987) ("excluded jurors are branded with a stamp of inferiority").
573 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 343 (1760).
574 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
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tion against badges and incidents of slavery is triggered because of
the all-white jury's present inability to assure impartial verdicts to
African-Americans when they are accused, or have been victims, of
crime. In the "defendant-centered" criminal model, the fair trial
guarantees for accused blacks cannot be assured when they are
judged by an all-white jury. The risk of racial bias is greatest when
the crime victim is white or when the black defendant is charged
with a crime regarded as heinous or a threat to state security. But it
also exists when the defendant's accuser is black or of some other
nonwhite race. In this case, an all-white jury's guilty verdict may
reflect slavery's legacy of black people's dehumanization in which
the life and freedom of black persons were regarded as less impor-
tant than those of white persons. Consequently, whether the crime
is interracial or intraracial, the thirteenth amendment should work
in combination with the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by an
impartial jury of one's peers.575 This combination of constitutional
rights assures that prosecutorial peremptory challenges will not be
used to eliminate prospective black jurors solely for purposes of
having an all-white jury determine the outcome.
In the victim-determinative criminal model, the peremptory
challenge has become the white defendant's primary weapon for ex-
cluding prospective black jurors and for assuring that the all-white
jury immunizes "crimes of the deepest dye" against the black citi-
zenry. During slavery, whites were rarely prosecuted for commit-
ting crimes against blacks; from post-Reconstruction to the present,
all-white juries have consistently rejected African-Americans' testi-
mony and acquitted white defendants accused of interracial crimes.
Consequently, when the accused is a white person charged with
a crime against a black person, the defense lawyer's peremptory
challenge should not be used to disqualify prospective black jurors
in order to create a predominantly white jury. Notwithstanding the
peremptory challenge's historic importance in securing the accused
an impartial jury576 a white defendant's racially discriminatory use
of the challenge violates the thirteenth amendment. The resulting
all-white jury prevents a black crime victim from achieving vindica-
tion and communicates to whites that blacks are fair game as targets
of crime.
This is an exception to the centuries-old sanctity of the criminal
defendant's peremptory challenge. The thirteenth amendment pro-
hibits badges and incidents of slavery, and the all-white jury's link to
perpetuating injustice toward black crime victims is well docu-
mented. Consider, however, a situation where an African-American
575 See supra note 462.
576 See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
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defendant charged with crimes against whites peremptorily chal-
lenged prospective white jurors and selected a predominantly non-
whitejury.577 In this case, the thirteenth amendment would provide
no support for a prosecutor seeking to prevent this defensive use of
the peremptory challenge. Simply stated, no historical justification
exists for the prosecution's intrusion on the black defendant's right
to choose a jury he believes is impartial. The predominantly black
jury was neither a badge or incident of slavery nor a symbol of
whites' second-class citizenship; the white crime victim would find it
extremely difficult to discover historical evidence showing that
predominantly nonwhite juries have been unable to reach impartial
verdicts.
In civil cases, the "defendant-centered" and "victim-determina-
tive" thirteenth amendment models also apply when one of the par-
ties is black and the other is white. A primary badge and incident of
slavery prevented African-Americans from seeking judicial interven-
tion to protect against a white person's mistreatment or civil
breach.578 Although the 1866 Civil Rights Act guaranteed court ac-
cess, the all-white jury remained an insurmountable obstacle for
black litigants in civil proceedings involving a white person. In such
cases, the thirteenth amendment precludes a white party's use of the
peremptory challenge to strike prospective black jurors because it
perpetuates the badge of slavery.
The third and final example of a thirteenth amendment viola-
tion in a criminal or civil case is "juror-focused": the constitutional
violation centers on blacks' exclusion from sitting in judgment of a
white defendant, and does not concern the all-white jury's inability
to guarantee legal protection for African-Americans. In fact, this
situation contemplates that neither the defendant nor the crime vic-
577 During jury selection in People v. Larry Davis, 142 Misc. 2d 881, 537 N.Y.S.2d
430 (Sup. Ct. Bronx 1988), defense lawyers used their peremptory challenges to dismiss
eight white prospective jurors. The Judge ruled that Batson v. Kennedy applied to the
defendant's peremptory challenges, as well as to the prosecution, and removed the six
jurors already selected. He ordered a "completely fresh" trial, and required the defense
attorneys to provide a race-neutral reason whenever striking a whitejuror. N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1988, at B3, col. 1. Thejury ultimately selected included African-American and
Hispanic-American jurors. They returned a not guilty verdict on the attempted murder
charges and convicted Davis of weapons possession, prompting a former police detec-
tive to accuse the Bronx jury of returning a "racist" verdict. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988,
at B2, col. 3. New York Police Commissioner Ward also criticized the verdict because he
believed that non-acceptance of police officer testimony was "a phenomenon occurring
in this country." Id. According to Davis's attorney, Bronx juries are "'80% Black and
Latino' . . . [and] are 'more understanding of defendants and the circumstances that
bring them to court."' Bronx juries' acquittal rate of 42y was significantly higher than
the citywide average of 297, and the 25% figure in the adjacent suburb of Westchester.
GuARDAN, June 15, 1988, at 7, col. 4; see supra notes 561-62.
578 See supra notes 74-84, 123-29, 209-13 and accompanying text.
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tim is African-American. State law and custom traditionally re-
garded blacks as morally and intellectually unfit to render
judgments against a white person. When the prosecutor perempto-
rily challenges most or all prospective black jurors in the trial of a
white defendant, this reminder of blacks' subordinate status and in-
feriority is subject to the defendant's thirteenth amendment chal-
lenge through a Batson-type inquiry.579 Similarly, either civil party's
challenge of black members of a trial venire may also be subject to a
thirteenth amendment challenge.
E. The Remedy for a Thirteenth Amendment Violation
As discussed in Batson, Justice Marshall advocates abolishing
the peremptory challenge in every criminal case as the "price" for
eliminating the long-standing, racially discriminatory use of
prosecutorial challenges. While Justice Marshall's frustration with
prosecutorial practice is understandable, his suggestion that the de-
fendant's peremptory challenge also be eliminated goes far beyond
what is required to accomplish the goal of a racially neutral jury ver-
dict. The defendant's peremptory challenge need only be elimi-
nated when used to keep blacks from serving as jurors when the
defendant is white and the crime victim is black. Marshall's remedy
also fails to address the racially discriminatory use of the peremp-
tory challenge in civil cases.58 0 Therefore, it falls short of assuring a
579 The prosecutor's peremptory challenge has been the primary method used to
exclude African-Americans from jury duty. The stigma of racial inferiority is strongest
when state policy affirmatively maintains the discriminatory practice against an entire
group. Consequently, by requiring the prosecutor to explain the peremptory challenge
of a blackjuror in every criminal case, the judiciary serves as a curb against perpetrating
the prosecutor's racially discriminatory challenge.
The historic importance of the defendant's peremptory challenge to protect an ac-
cused's fair trial rights makes it immune from court scrutiny, except when used by a
white defendant to eliminate black jurors from sitting in a criminal case when the victim
was also a black person. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text. Although de-
fense lawyers used the challenge to dismiss prospective African-American jurors, their
reasons reflected, in part, the futility of placing a single AfTican-Americanjuror on ajury
while segregation was the law of the land. In United States ex. rel Goldsby v. Harpole,
263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959), Judge Rives acknowledged "that lawyers residing in many
southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from juries 'because it would generate enormous public
prejudice.' "
580 Batson did not address whether a civil litigant's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude African-American jurors is subject to equal protection analysis. Some courts
applying Batson have found that the state's involvement in the civil jury selection process
demonstrates sufficient "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes. See Reyn-
olds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822
(1 th Cir. 1989); Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986); Comment,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc.: Can the "No State Action " Shibboleth Legit-
imize the Racist Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Action, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 271
(1990) (authored by David Pork); Comment, Recent Cases, 103 HARv. L. REV. 586-91
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racially neutral jury verdict in a civil proceeding where one of the
parties is black.
Criminal defendants generally rely on the peremptory chal-
lenge to assure that the selected jurors will be fair and impartial.581
Because of a strong, pro-prosecution bias among prospective ju-
rors,58 2 this is difficult to accomplish. Most prospective jurors enter
the courtroom prepared to convict an accused, notwithstanding
legal and evidentiary protections. 58 3 Although a juror's bias, racial
or otherwise, may be exposed during the voir dire,5s 4 responses
(1989); Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further
Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 891, 949-55 (1988)
(authored by Gerard G. Brew). Other courts and commentators have concluded that
Batson is inapplicable in civil trials. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308
(5th Cir. 1988), rehk granted, 895 F.2d 218 (1989) (en banc); Esposito v. Buonome, 642
F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986); Timothy Patton, The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges in Civil Litigation: Practice, Procedure and Review, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 921, 929-30
(1988); Note, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Actions, 61 'ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155,
163 (1986) (authored by David Kaston).
581 J. VAN DYXE, supra note 4, at 139 ("[m]any attorneys believe that trials are fre-
quently won or lost" during jury selection); see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
296-97 ("right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused"); Pointer v.
United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("one of the most important rights secured to
the accused"); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) ("the right of [pe-
remptory] challenges ... has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury");
Hans Ziesel & Sheri Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Ver-
dicts: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 518-19 (1978).
582 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIc TECHNIQUES 3-5 (2d ed. 1987)
(indicating that in a case where a black defendant was accused of assaulting a white
police officer, half of 32 prospective jurors were predisposed to convict while only one
prospective juror began with a pro-defendant bias).
583 NATIONAL JURY PROJECT AND NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, THE JURY SYSTEM 2
(1975) (finding that 60% of prospective jurors were unable to follow court instructions
that a defendant is presumed innocent and that the prosecution, not the defense, has the
burden of proof in a criminal case).
584 Courts are not required to permit defense voir dire questioning of prospective
jurors solely because a black defendant is charged with a crime against a white person.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-98 (1976). However, when the defendant claims the
criminal charge is based on racial prejudice, and requests that such questioning be per-
mitted, the court (not the defense) must conduct a voir dire. Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973). If the charge involves a violent, interracial crime, a federal
court is required to make a similar inquiry. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 189-92 (1981). In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33-37 (1986), the Supreme
Court slightly modified the Ristaino rule for state court criminal trials; a defendant ac-
cused of a capital crime is permitted to submit a single question on the issue of sentenc-
ing, but not on the issue of guilt.
It is unlikely that a court's limited inquiry will expose ajuror's prejudice. Forjury
selection to be meaningful, the defense attorney must conduct the voir dire. Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) ("voir dire play a critical function in
assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will
be honored"). In some situations, the juror inquiry should be held outside the presence
of the remaining jurors and the defense attorney should be permitted to submit a pre-
voir dire questionnaire before conducting the examination. Developments, supra note 5,
at 1582-84.
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given during this process are unlikely to result in a successful chal-
lenge for cause. In practice, trial judges commonly reject such chal-
lenges, 58 5 and such a ruling is no less likely when the argument is
based on a juror's perceived racial prejudice. If a judge is con-
sciously or unconsciously racist, he or she will have even more diffi-
culty identifying racial prejudice as a legally sufficient ground on
which to disqualify a juror.58 6
It is unrealistic to expect that the challenge for cause could
serve as an adequate replacement for the defendant's peremptory
challenge of a juror who is believed to have prejudged guilt. 587 If
the defendant's peremptory challenge was abolished, an accused
would be unable to disqualify someone whom she felt uneasy about
because of that person's "looks and gestures,"588 and would be vul-
nerable to being judged by the first jurors called to jury duty. Pe-
remptory challenges are necessary to protect the defendant's right
to an impartial jury, and must remain immune from prosecutorial or
judicial scrutiny in the ordinary criminal case.
Crimes allegedly committed by white people against African-
Americans are not "ordinary crimes," however. 58 9 When viewed
585 Babcock, supra note 3, at 549-50 (cause challenges are frequently denied when a
juror says she will decide a case on the evidence; cause challenges rarely "screen...
those who share biases and prejudices common to a racial or ethnic group" unless the
jurors admit their biases). Van Dyke refers to 'jurors [who] are likely to answer ques-
tions according to whether they want to serve or not, and may not admit to certain
prejudices, especially race and religious prejudices." J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 162-
63. In People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), the New York Court of Appeals recognized the difficulty of
demonstrating racial bias during jury selection:
First, jurors may be reluctant to admit their prejudices before spectators
or others present during the voir dire. Second, certain prospective jurors
may evade full disclosure of their prejudices in an effort to avoid being
struck from thejury. Finally, other prospective jurors may simply be una-
ware of the existence of certain biases or prejudices they may harbor.
Id, at 547, 443 N.E.2d at 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
586 Batson v. Kennedy, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Courts are generally reluctant to allow an extensive voir dire concerning a prospective
juror's racial prejudice because they claim it takes too much court time and is too sensi-
tive a subject for deeper inquiry. See supra notes 484-92 and accompanying text. It is
also rare that a trial court will grant a challenge for cause based on a defendant's percep-
tion that a juror is racially biased. See supra notes 584-85; infra note 588.
587 See supra note 495.
588 Historically, the defendant's peremptory challenge has been necessary to excuse
prospective jurors whom the accused believes has a pro-prosecution bias. See supra note
32 and accompanying text. In race-sensitive cases, many jurors rarely admit racial preju-
dice; others are unaware that they hold these attitudes. Because defense challenges for
cause are ineffective in removing such jurors, the defendant's peremptory challenge is
the only procedure for dismissing a white prospective juror who evidences racial hostil-
ity toward a defendant. SeeJeffrey Gaba, Voir Dire ofJurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right
of Inquiry Into Preudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 522-25 (1977); Johnson, supra note 6, at
1675; Massaro, supra note 8, at 525.
589 In United States v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods 308, 25 F. Gas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874)
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historically, they reflect a legacy of slavery in which "crimes of the
deepest dye were committed by white men with immunity" against
African-American people. 590 When black jurors are peremptorily
dismissed, the resulting white jury perpetuates this immunity policy
by rarely convicting white defendants accused of crimes against the
black citizenry. If the "war on race" 59 1 is to be won, and the legisla-
tive intent of the thirteenth amendment and subsequent civil rights
legislation is to be realized,59 2 African-Americans must be provided
with legal protection against the criminality of whites. This can be
achieved only by eliminating the racial use of the defendant's per-
emptory challenge.
The most common abuse of the peremptory challenge is by
prosecutors who strike most, if not all, prospective black jurors, par-
ticularly when the defendant is African-American. Since Swain was
decided in 1965, commentators and courts have "spilled much
ink" 59 3 denouncing this practice on equal protection and sixth
amendment grounds. The thirteenth amendment also condemns
the prosecutor's racially inspired peremptory challenge based upon
its unconstitutionality, and thus requires a prosecutor to challenge
African-American jurors only for a race-neutral cause.
When the criminal defendant is not African-American, how-
ever, prosecutors are not automatically prevented from perempto-
rily challenging black jurors. Such challenges may be subject to
defense objections and judicial scrutiny under a Batson-type, juror-
focused inquiry.59 4 According to this juror-focused model, criminal
defendants may seek to establish a prima facie case of racial exclu-
sion whenever prosecutors target black jurors for peremptory dis-
missal. If defendants meet this burden, prosecutors would be
required to provide trial related, nonracial explanations for exclu-
sion. In civil cases, the same procedure would apply: either party
could challenge and require the other to provide a race-neutral ba-
sis for excusing prospective black jurors.
This thirteenth amendment analysis is less drastic than Justice
(No. 14,847), aft'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), Justice Bradley distinguished between a citizen's
"ordinary crimes" and those he characterized as "crimes of race." In arguing that un-
redressed violence against African-Americans represented a badge and incident of slav-
ery, Bradley argued that the thirteenth amendment provided federal jurisdiction for
prosecuting crimes involving interracial violence. See supra notes 291-99 and accompa-
nying text. In these race-sensitive cases, the thirteenth amendment and the 1866 Act
require that the peremptory challenge be abolished to assure an impartial jury verdict.
See supra note 297.
590 United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. 28, 27 F. Gas. 785, 787 (C.C. Ky. 1866).
591 Cruikshank, 25 F. Gas. at 714.
592 See supra notes 150-52, 566 and accompanying text.
593 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
594 See supra note 579 and accompanying text.
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Marshall's sweeping elimination of the peremptory challenge, and is
finely tailored to the dimensions of the problem at issue. It main-
tains the peremptory challenge as a time honored, constitutional
protection for an accused, while preventing its abuse in perpetuat-
ing two severe incidents of slavery-the denial ofjustice and the de-
nial of jury participation.
Although barring the peremptory challenge in cases involving
the rights of a black person is necessary to overcome the exclusion
of prospective black jurors, it is only the first step in assuring an
impartial jury verdict. By itself, disallowing the peremptory chal-
lenge will not remedy the constitutional violation. To guarantee
race-neutral jury verdicts, one must combine the power of the sixth
amendment with that of the thirteenth amendment to affirmatively
assure that racially mixed juries are selected.
If "representativeness is the key to impartiality," 595 a race neu-
tral verdict is achieved when at least three black jurors are selected
to judge a criminal or civil case that involves the rights of a black
person. According to studies in group behavior, a minimum of three
people is required to withstand the combined pressures of the ma-
jority on a twelve person jury.596 While this article does not focus
on specific mechanisms that might be used to accomplish this objec-
tive, a logical approach begins by reviewing jury selection measures.
Reforms may be necessary to ensure that African-American juror
candidates comprise at least twenty-five percent of venire panels. In
counties where the African-American population is greater than
twenty-five percent, the jury venire should reflect the actual popula-
tion of African-Americans who are eligible for jury duty. This figure
may then be used as the statistical yardstick597 for ensuring that "the
595 Developments, supra note 5, at 1587 ("If courts are to take seriously the mandate
of eliminating racial bias in the criminal process .... a representative [jury] is required in
every criminal case.").
596 SeeJohnson, supra note 6, at 1694.
597 In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), the Supreme Court applied such a
standard in finding that Mexican-Americans were underrepresented on grand jury
panels. Noting that Mexikan-Americans represented about 80%o of the county popula-
tion, but comprised only 407o of grand juries, the Court stated that "any under-
representation of a cognizable radical group on a jury venire exceeding standard
probability deviations establishes a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. at 496-97. A
similar comparison between African-Americans' percentage of the local population and
their relative numbers in the jury pool would reveal whether underrepresentation exis-
ted prior to jury selection and whether additional jurors should be included in the ve-
nire. Note, Batson v. Kentucky, supra note 5, at 755; Note, The Peremptory Challenge and the
Racially Impartial Jury, 92 N. Ky. L. REv. 91, 123-24 (1987).
In counties where African-Americans represent less than 25%o of the population,
jury venire selection procedures should target eligible African-American jurors in adja-
cent counties to be called for jury duty. Where this proves ineffective or unrealistic, trial
courts should be receptive to granting a defendant's motion for a change of venue to a
county with a more substantial black population.
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makeup of individual juries [will] correspond reasonably with the
community population. '598
When African-Americans are adequately represented on the ve-
nire panel, a jury's verdict should reflect race-neutrality. In addi-
tion, African-Americans' participation in the administration of
justice will help to eliminate the stigma of group racial inferiority.599
Finally, the racially mixed verdict would be a step toward legitimiz-
ing the criminal justice system in the eyes of the African-American
community, which currently has little faith in the legal system's abil-
ity to be fair and to dispense evenhanded justice.600
CONCLUSION
[p]erhaps hereafter some explorer in our history shall find for the
astonishment of his times, deep buried in the strata of political
geology, a monster fossil more wonderful than the mastodon, and
more terrible than the pterodactylus, which shall be recognized as
the last vestige of African slavery.601
One hundred twenty-five years have passed since New York
Congressman Davis realized that in order to "make every race free
and equal before the law ... every vestige of African slavery [must
be removed] from the American republic."60 2 Legislators like Davis
passed constitutional amendments and federal legislation to uproot
the institution of slavery and to destroy the badge of African-
Americans' legal inferiority.605 African-Americans soon discovered
that many of these legal rights and protections were meaningless
because all-white juries denied them impartial justice. Indeed, Leo
Edwards probably spoke for many African-American defendants
faced with an all-white jury at trial when he remarked, "You know
how I felt when I saw the jury? I said, 'I'm dead.' "604
598 Developments, supra note 5, at 1587.
599 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (harm "extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant ... to touch the entire community").
600 Batson recognized that when African-American jurors are peremptorily disquali-
fied from serving as jurors, their exclusion "undermines public confidence in the fair-
ness of our system ofjustice." Id. at 87. In a recent national survey, 807o of the African-
American community surveyed indicated that they believed that blacks are not treated
equally in the criminal justice system. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
601 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1865) (statement of Rep. Davis of New
York).
602 Itd
603 In the ten-year period between 1865 and 1875, Congress passed seven civil
rights statutes and introduced the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to
the constitution.
604 N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at A14, col. 3. Leo Edwards was convicted by an all-
white jury of participating in the shooting death of a white store owner, and was sen-
tenced to death. Until the day he was executed in a Mississippi gas chamber, Edwards
continually maintained his innocence.
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As suggested by relevant sociological data, token representa-
tion of African-American jurors is not enough to ensure an impartial
verdict. 605 Poet Audrey Lorde captured the experience of a lone
black juror who ultimately joined eleven white jurors and acquitted
a white police officer for fatally shooting a ten-year-old black child:
Today, that 37 year-old white man with 13 years of police forcing
has been set free by 11 white men who said they were satisfied
Justice had been done and one black woman who said "They con-
vinced me" meaning they had dragged her 4'10" black woman's
frame over the hot coals of four centuries of white male approval
until she let go the first real power she ever had and lined her own
womb with cement to make a graveyard for our children. 60 6
Prosecutors' 60 7 and defense lawyers' 608 continued use of the ra-
cially inspired peremptory challenge perpetuates a primary badge of
605 See supra notes 548-63 and accompanying text.
606 AUDREY LORDE, Power, in THE BLACK UNICORN 108-09 (1978).
607 Prior to Batson, prosecutional use of the racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenge was accepted practice in states. See supra notes 459, 462. In Batson, Justice Mar-
shall referred to Dallas prosecutors who systematically eliminated prospective black
jurors in every case where the accused was also black. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
104 (1986) (quotingJ. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 152). In 1983, this practice resulted in
an armed robbery conviction of Lenell Greer, a black engineer who had never previously
been arrested. Despite testimony by nine white coworkers that Greer was at his job
when the robbery occurred, the all-white jury convicted Greer and sentenced him to life
imprisonment. National and local media criticism ultimately led the Dallas prosecutor
to reopen the case, and dismiss the charges against Greer. PAULA DIPIERNA, JURIES ON
TRIAL 154-55 (1984).
In Guilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983), Justice Marshall described the pros-
ecution's common jury selection strategy in capital cases when a black defendant is
charged with a crime against a white person:
The facts.., follow a now familiar pattern: For-cause challenges by both
defense counsel and the prosecution leave an integrated jury panel. The
prosecution then resorts to peremptory challenges to remove Negro
members of the panel .... The all-white jury proceeds to hear the case
and sentence the Negro defendant to death.
Id. at 868.
608 In a number of highly publicized criminal cases this decade, defense lawyers have
excused blackjurors and selected only white jurors to judge cases involving white defen-
dants and black crime victims. In the South, charges of whites' racially motivated vio-
lence against blacks surfaced in Miami, Florida; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Greensboro,
North Carolina; and Hemphill, Texas. P. DIPIERNA, supra note 607, at 163-64, 171-73.
Following all-white juries' acquittals of Miami police officers in 1980 and in 1984, the
black community's response resulted in extensive personal injury and property damage.
A Governor's Report identified the exclusion of black jurors, and the resulting all-white
jury as a cause of the 1980 riot, and a reason why the African-American community had
little trust in Miami's criminal justice system. Andrews v. State, 438 So. 2d 489, 492 n.4
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (FergusonJ., dissenting); James R.Jorgenson, Back to the Labo-
ratory with Peremptory Challenges: A Florida Response, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 558 (1984);
Miami Times, June 23, 1983, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989; at 1, col. 1; id. at
B6, col. 5. In 1989, Miami officials braced for a comparable reaction in the event that a
trial jury acquitted a Hispanic officer accused of killing a black motorcyclist. However,
the six-person jury, which included two African-Americans, convicted the officer and the
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slavery-the denial of impartial justice for African-American de-
fendants and crime victims. Even before the thirteenth amendment
was passed, African-Americans knew that "justice" in the courtroom
African-American community celebrated the verdict. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at 1,
col. 1.
In November 1980, an all-white Greensboro jury acquitted eight Ku Klux Klan de-
fendants of charges that they murdered five Communist Workers Party members who
had been active in organizing black textile workers. Four years later, the defendants
faced federal civil rights charges. They again peremptorily challenged every blackjuror,
and were acquitted by the all-white federaljury. P. DIPIERNA, supra note 607, at 171-73.
In 1988, in Hemphill, Texas, 11 white jurors and one black juror (a housekeeper
who worked for one of the white jurors) acquitted a police chief and two deputy sheriffs
of civil rights violations in the killing of Loyal Garner, who had died after being taken
into police custody. The jury rejected testimony of black witnesses who said that the
defendants had repeatedly beaten Mr. Garner and refused to give him medical care.
N.Y. Times, July 10, 1988, at 16, col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 17, 1988, at 14, col. 5.
The defense strategy of selecting an all-white jury has not always succeeded. When
the Hemphill defendants were tried on murder charges in Tyler, Texas, an all-white jury
found each guilty and sentenced them to 28, 14, and 10 years in prison. Officials indi-
cated the defendants would serve only one year in ten if the conviction was affirmed.
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1990, at Al, col. 4. And in 1988 an all-white jury convicted a white
defendant of murdering (by hanging) African-American Michael Donald. During jury
selection, the defense lawyers had struck each of the 21 potential black jurors. See Ala-
bama v. Cox, 488 U.S. 1018 (1988).
Defense lawyers in the North have also relied on the peremptory challenge to elimi-
nate prospective black jurors when defending a white person or police officer on charges
of racially motivated violence. Unlike the pre-Batson southern trial jury, the northern
jury in these cases typically included one, and sometimes two, black jurors. Although
the northern jury has sometimes convicted white defendants who have committed vio-
lence against blacks, these defendants are always convicted on reduced charges. People
v. Bova, 68 N.Y.2d 810, 499 N.E.2d 875, 507 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1986) (defense perempto-
rily dismissed all thirteen prospective black jurors; all-white jury acquitted white defen-
dant of murdering black transit worker Willie Turks, but convicted him of lesser charge
of reckless manslaughter); Holtzman v. Supreme Court, 139 Misc.2d 109, 526 N.Y.S. 2d
892 (S. Ct. Westchester Co. 1988); People v. Wiggins, 70 N.Y.2d 878, 518 N.E.2d 16,
523 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1987) (defense peremptorily dismissed all nineteen prospective black
jurors; all-white jury acquitted three white defendants in assault of three black Veterans
Administration workers); People v. Goetz, 73 N.Y.2d 751, 532 N.E.2d 1273, 536
N.Y.S.2d 45 (1988) (defense struck all but two black prospective jurors; jury acquitted
defendant of most serious attempted murder and assault charges in shooting of four
black teenagers, and return conviction on unlawful weapon possession); People v. Kern,
75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990) (defense struck each pro-
spective black juror until trial court applied Batson ruling to defense; the eleven person
white, one person black jury acquitted three white defendants of murdering a black man
in Howard Beach, N.Y. and convicted of less erious manslaughter and assault charge).
For a fourteenth amendment argument that Batson should not apply to a defendant's use
of peremptory challenges, see Goldwasser, supra note 496; cf. Comment, Prosecution Right
to Object to a Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory Challenges, 93 DICK. L. Rav. 143 (1989) (au-
thored by Michael Sullivan).
The dramatic increase in racial violence suggests that, in race-sensitive cases in the
1990s, defense lawyers will continue to rely on the peremptory challenge to achieve an
all-white, or predominantly white jury when defending a white person. See Reports of
Racial Violence on the Rise, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Nov. 28, 1989);Jones, supra
note 13; Matsuda, supra note 380; Note, Bias Crimes: On Conscious Racism in the Prosecution
of "Racially Motivated Violence", 99 YALE LJ. 845, 845-46 (1990) (authored by Tanya
Hernandez).
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and legal "protection" for themselves depended on black citizens
serving as trial jurors.609 During Reconstruction, an Alabama black
convention recognized that significant black representation on ju-
ries was necessary to ensure impartial jury verdicts. In 1874, it
passed a resolution that guaranteed a black party to a lawsuit the
right to demand a jury "composed of not less than one-half of his
own race."
'610
Peremptory challenges should be abolished in race-sensitive
cases to permit meaningful representation by black trial jurors.
Only then will the thirteenth amendment's promise be realized-
impartial courtroom justice for all citizens.
609 See supra notes 171-74, 257-61 and accompanying text.
610 E. FONER, supra note 14, at 539. Foner refers to black leaders who argued in
1873-74 that race, historically "the cause of exclusion", must now become a "ground of
recognition until the scales are once more balanced."
Throughout this country's history, the presence of black jurors has almost always
been required to gain justice for African-American victims of whites violence against
them. See supra notes 254-63 and accompanying text (describing a three year period
during Reconstruction-1870 to 1873-in which significant representation of African-
American trial jurors resulted in successful prosecutions of Klan violence); see also supra
notes 548-63 and accompanying text (describing studies in which the multi-racial jury is
the best guarantor of impartial justice when African-American rights are at stake).
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